RAFAEL FONSECA, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Rafael Fonseca appealed his sentencing for second-degree murder, arguing the trial court erred by departing from sentencing guidelines without written reasons. The court remanded for resentencing, finding the trial court mistakenly believed the habitual offender statute removed the case from guideline requirements, rather than making a valid departure for proper reasons.
The sentencing was improper because it was based on the trial court's mistaken belief regarding the applicability of guidelines, not on valid written reasons for departure. The court remanded for resentencing, permitting the trial court to enter a proper departure sentence with valid written reasons.
[1] A sentence imposed under the habitual offender statute is not a departure from the sentencing guidelines if the trial court mistakenly believes the statute removes the se…
[2] A trial court may enter a proper departure sentence based upon valid written reasons, even if a prior sentence was based on a mistaken belief regarding the applicability…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the defendant's sentence was based on the trial court's mistaken belief that the application of the habitual offender statute took the sentence out of the guidelines”
Distinguishes between invalid departure reasons and erroneous application of guideline requirements
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFonseca was convicted of second-degree murder with a firearm and sentenced as a habitual offender. At sentencing, the prosecution incorrectly stated t…
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GODERICH, Judge.
This ease is before us on remand for reconsideration in light of Jones v. State, 559 So. 2d 204 (Fla.1990).1
The defendant contends that the trial court erred in departing from the sentencing guidelines without providing written reasons, and therefore, this cause must be remanded for resentencing within the sentencing guidelines. Under the circumstances of this case and in light of Jones, we disagree.
In the instant case, the defendant was sentenced as a habitual offender. At the sentencing hearing, it is clear that the State misinformed the trial court that because of the application of the habitual offender statute, the sentencing guidelines did not apply.2'3 As in Jones, this was not a departure sentence based on the invalid reason that the defendant was a habitual offender. Rather, the defendant’s sentence was based on the trial court’s mistaken belief that the application of the habitual offender statute took the sentence out of the guidelines. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court for resentencing. Upon resentencing, the trial court is permitted to enter a proper departure sentence based upon valid written reasons.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
. This court had previously affirmed the defendant’s conviction for second-degree murder with a firearm, reversed his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm while engaged in a criminal offense and remanded for resentencing within the guidelines. Fonseca v. State, 570 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 3d DCA1990). The Florida Supreme Court quashed this court’s opinion and remanded for further reconsideration. State v. Fonseca, 598 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1992). On remand, based on the State’s proper confession of error, we once again affirm the defendant's conviction for second-degree murder and reverse his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm while engaged in a criminal offense.
. At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor stated the following:
MR. RANCK: So it’s clear, 775.084, the habitual offender statute takes the sentence out of the guidelines.
This is not considered a deviation or departure, simply a life sentence which is not controlled by the guidelines.
.The defendant’s conviction was for an offense which occurred on June 29, 1988, prior to the effective date of the 1988 amendment to the habitual offender statute. Pursuant to the 1988 amendment, the application of the habitual offender statute removes a sentence from the guidelines. See Ch. 88-131 § 6, Laws of Florida (1988); see abo, Marion v. State, 582 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 3d DCA1991).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Braggs v. State, 642 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…ase where the judge relied upon a reason for departure that was later declared invalid but, rather, one in which the judge consid [*132] ered his sentence to be one to which the guidelines did not apply.” Id. at 206. As occurred in Fonseca v. State, 614 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), "the defendant's sentence was based on the trial court's mistaken belief that the application of the habitual offender statute took the sentence out of the guidelines.” Id. at 33. Consequently, the trial court was permitted to en…
Authorities Cited
- Jones v. State, 559 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1990)
- Marion v. State, 582 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
- Fonseca v. State, 570 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- State v. Fonseca, 598 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1992)