JEREMIAH MARION, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Marion appeals his sentence imposed upon revocation of probation for a May 1988 conviction. The court reverses, finding that the trial court applied the wrong version of the habitual offender statute when resentencing Marion on the original offense, as the applicable 1987 statute rather than the amended 1988 statute governed the sentencing.
The court holds that because Marion committed the original offense prior to October 1, 1988, section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1987), governs his habitual offender status rather than the amended 1988 statute. The trial court erred by applying the wrong statute and by sentencing without making the required findings under the 1987 statute. The sentence is therefore vacated.
[1] A defendant's original offense date determines the applicable statute for sentencing upon revocation of probation.
[2] A court must make specific findings under the governing statute before sentencing a defendant as an habitual offender.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Violation of probation results in revocation of probation and resentencing on the original offense.”
Establishes the legal principle that probation revocation requires resentencing on the original offense, which determines the applicable statute.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMarion was convicted and sentenced in May 1988. In October 1990, while on probation, he was charged with two counts of selling cocaine and entered a p…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Plea Agreement Interpretation cases and more on FLexlaw
BASKIN, Judge.
Jeremiah Marion appeals a sentence imposed upon revocation of probation. We reverse.
Marion was convicted and sentenced in May 1988. In October 1990, while Marion was serving his probation for the May 1988 conviction, he was charged with two counts of selling cocaine. Marion entered into a plea agreement with the state, agreeing to plead guilty to the second count and to be sentenced as an habitual offender. In exchange for the guilty plea, the state consented to nolle prosequi the first count and agreed to a “60-month cap” on Marion’s prison sentence.
Upon Marion’s conviction for the October 1990 offense, the trial court implemented the plea agreement, found Marion to be an habitual offender, and sentenced him to serve five years in prison. Additionally, based on the October 1990 conviction, the court found Marion in violation of his probation imposed for the May 1988 offense and revoked the probation, sentencing Marion to five years in prison as an habitual offender. Marion’s guidelines scoresheet range for the May 1988 conviction, including the enhancement for violation of probation, was three and a half to four and a half years. Marion argues on appeal that the court erred in imposing a sentence in excess of the guidelines and in declaring him an habitual offender without making the findings required under section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1987). Marion asserts that the trial court mistakenly applied section 775.084 as amended by Chapter 88-131, section 6, Laws of Florida, which became effective October 1, 1988, after his May 1988 conviction. We agree.
“[Violation of probation results in revocation of probation and resentencing on the original offense.” Irizarry v. State, 16 F.L.W. D967 (Fla. 3d DCA April 9, 1991) (on rehearing). The date of the original offense determines the applicable statute for sentencing. Marion committed the original offense for which probation was revoked prior to October 1, 1988. Thus, section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1987), governs Marion’s habitual offender status for the May 1988 offense. Troup v. State, 574 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Because the court sentenced Marion without making the required findings under the 1987 statute, the sentence must be vacated. Parker v. State, 546 So. 2d 727 (Fla.1989); Eutsey v. State, 383 So. 2d 219 (Fla.1980).
The state asserts that Marion’s plea agreement contemplated that he would receive a sentence as an habitual offender for a term not to exceed 60 months. The record shows that Marion entered the agreement voluntarily, and it should not be disturbed. Pollack v. Bryson, 450 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). However, we are compelled to reject the state’s assertion. The record fails to demonstrate that the plea agreement encompassed the sentence imposed upon revocation of probation for the May 1988 offense.
Sentence vacated; remanded for resentencing.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Shields v. State, 296 So. 3d 967 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)…revoking probation). When a court resentences a defendant after revoking his probation, then, it is sentencing the defendant for the original offense, not for the conduct constituting the violation. See Lambert, 545 So. 2d at 841; Marion v. State, 582 So. 2d 115, 116 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) ("[V]iolation of probation results in revocation of probation and resentencing on the original offense." (alteration in original) (quoting Irizarry v. State, 578 So. 2d 711, 714 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990))). As such, a trial court s…
-
Atkinson v. State, 626 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…ling. Appellant has not demonstrated any basis for relief. First, we note that when sentencing a habitual offender, the trial court is required to use the version of § 775.-084, Fla.Stat., in effect when the offense was committed. Marion v. State, 582 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). Appellant committed the instant offense on August 24, 1989. The 1989 statute did not become effective until October 1, 1989. See Laws of Florida 1989, c. 89-280, § 1. Our review of the record indicates that Appellant would have q…
-
Fonseca v. State, 614 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…te of the 1988 amendment to the habitual offender statute. Pursuant to the 1988 amendment, the application of the habitual offender statute removes a sentence from the guidelines. See Ch. 88-131 § 6, Laws of Florida (1988); see abo, Marion v. State, 582 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 3d DCA1991).…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fredford James Eutsey v. State, 383 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1980)
- Timmie Lewis Parker v. State, 546 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1989)
- Fisher v. Fisher, 450 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Pollock v. Honorable Fred L. Bryson, 450 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Troup v. State, 574 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)