JAMES F. REYNOLDS, APPELLANT,
v.
EVELYN FAITH REYNOLDS, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this dissolution of marriage appeal, the husband challenges the trial court's valuation of his pension plan and the allocation of attorney's fees. The appellate court reversed because the trial court improperly included post-dissolution income in calculating the pension's present value, which is erroneous as a matter of law.
The court reversed the trial court's orders because the pension valuation methodology improperly included post-dissolution income. Marital property rights cannot extend to property acquired after the dissolution judgment. The court remanded for the trial court to reconsider the asset distribution and attorney's fees allocation using the correct pension valuation of $92,862, which represents only the benefit earned during the marriage.
[1] Retirement benefits earned during a marriage are considered marital property.
[2] Marital property rights cannot extend to property acquired after a judgment of dissolution of marriage.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“marital property rights cannot inure in property acquired after a judgment of dissolution of marriage”
Establishes the fundamental principle that post-dissolution income cannot be considered marital property.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJames and Evelyn Reynolds were divorcing. The trial court valued the husband's pension plan at $173,785 based on the wife's expert testimony, which as…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Marital Assets cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
In this dissolution of marriage, the husband appeals the distribution of marital assets and the order that he pay 55% of the wife’s attorney’s fees. The wife cross-appeals claiming her attorney’s fees should be paid in full by the husband.
In evaluating the marital assets of James and Evelyn Reynolds for equitable distribution purposes, the trial court, relying on the testimony of the wife’s expert, adopted the figure of $173,785 for the present value of the husband’s pension plan. That figure assumed that the husband would continue to work through age 62 and also included expected increases in salary in arriving at that payout amount. Because the inclusion of post-dissolution income in arriving at a value for the plan was erroneous as a matter of law, we reverse the order under review. As has been repeatedly stated, retirement benefits are to be considered “contract rights of value received in lieu of higher compensation which would otherwise have enhanced either marital assets or the marital standard of living and, therefore, are marital property.” DeLoach v. DeLoach, 590 So. 2d 956, 960 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) quoting Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 491 So. 2d 265, 267 (Fla.1986), quoting Majauskas v. Majauskas, 61 N.Y.2d 481, 474 N.Y.S.2d 699, 704-05, 463 N.E. 2d 15, 20-21 (1984); see § 61.075(5)(a)4 (Fla.Stat.1991). However, marital property rights cannot inure in property acquired after a judgment of dissolution of marriage. Hower-ton v. Howerton, 491 So. 2d 614, 615 (Fla. 5th DCA1986), citing In re Marriage of Frazier, 125 Ill.App.3d 473, 80 Ill.Dec. 838, 841, 466 N.E. 2d 290, 293 (1984).
There are a number of ways to evaluate a pension/retirement plan and this court in no way intends to limit the discretion which has been granted trial judges in this regard. See Diffenderfer, 491 So. 2d at 265; see also Trant v. Trant, 545 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 551 So. 2d 464 (Fla.1989). However, here a method was chosen which clearly considered post-dissolution income. Of the three pension evaluations given by the wife’s expert, only the figure of $92,862 represents the present value of the benefit earned during the marriage.
A trial court’s decisions in a dissolution proceeding should be considered interrelated and part of an overall scheme. Hamlet v. Hamlet, 583 So. 2d 654, 657 (Fla.1991); see also Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1202 (Fla.1980). Thus, we reverse the instant orders thereby permitting the trial court to reconsider its rulings in light of the proper valuation of the pension plan. We are not directing the trial judge to make a change in the division of property or obligations of the parties; rather, we are remanding to provide the trial court the opportunity to reconsider its rulings both as to the distribution of assets and liabilities, and the responsibility for fees, in light of the statements made herein.
Accordingly, the orders under review are reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Freeman W. Barner, Jr. v. Barner, 716 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…ction 61.075(5)(a)(l), Florida Statutes (1991), “marital” assets are only those that are acquired “during the marriage.” “[Mjarital property rights cannot inure in property acquired after a judgment of dissolution of marriage.” Reynolds v. Reynolds, 615 So. 2d 243, 244 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)(inclusion of post-dissolution income erroneous as a matter of law). Since the husband’s future salary could not be characterized as accruing “during” the marriage, as a matter of law, the wife has no right to a portion of it…
-
Yosi GIL v. Mirit Mendelson, 793 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…f the assets, the husband’s superior earning capacity,1 as a matter of law does not justify any such result.2 Dease v. Dease, [*1062] 688 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); see Barner v. Barner, 716 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 615 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Weimer v. Weimer, 677 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). We also agree with the husband’s position that to correct this legal error by effecting the substantially equal distribution which is required in the now-determined absence of…
-
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 664 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge. Following Reynolds v. Reynolds, 615 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), the trial court ordered the husband to pay fifty-five percent of the wife’s attorney’s fees in accordance with the percentage of the parties’ assets, as recomputed in accordance with our decision, which were equitably distributed…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 491 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1986)
- Hamlet v. Hamlet, 583 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1991)
- DeLOACH v. Ruthie Mae DeLOACH, 590 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Howerton v. Howerton, 491 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
- Trant v. Trant, 545 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)