YOSI GIL, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
MIRIT MENDELSON, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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In this family law appeal, the Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's unequal property division in a dissolution of marriage, holding that the husband's superior earning capacity alone cannot justify awarding the wife substantially more than 50% of marital assets. The court ordered equal division of the disputed $420,000 apartment in Israel and addressed ancillary issues regarding asset division and alimony.
The husband's superior earning capacity, as a matter of law, does not justify an unequal division of marital property. The trial court erred in awarding substantially all assets to the wife. Substantially equal distribution is required absent cognizable legal reasons to deviate. The Israeli apartment must be equally divided between the parties, and the husband is entitled to credit for the value of the watch collection wrongly retained by the wife.
[1] A spouse's superior earning capacity, as a matter of law, does not justify an unequal division of marital property.
[2] Marital property must be divided substantially equally in the absence of a cognizable reason for unequal distribution.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial judge's reason for awarding the wife substantially more than 50% of the assets, the husband's superior earning capacity, as a matter of law does not justify any such result.”
Establishes the core holding that superior earning capacity alone cannot justify unequal property division in equitable distribution
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGil and Mendelson were parties to a dissolution of marriage proceeding. The trial court awarded the wife substantially more than 50% of the marital as…
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
The primary point on these multiple appeals from the final judgment of dissolution and several post-judgment orders involves what we find to be the husband’s meritorious attack upon the unequal division of their property in equitable distribution. The trial judge’s reason for awarding the wife substantially more than 50% of the assets, the husband’s superior earning capacity,1 as a matter of law does not justify any such result.2 Dease v. Dease, 688 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); see Barner v. Barner, 716 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 615 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Weimer v. Weimer, 677 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). We also agree with the husband’s position that to correct this legal error by effecting the substantially equal distribution which is required in the now-determined absence of any cognizable reason not to do so, Adams v. Adams, 677 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Paul v. Paul, 648 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Lagstrom v. Lagstrom, 662 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Sinclair v. Sinclair, 594 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), it is necessary only to require, instead of the present award of the parties’ entire interest in their $420,000 apartment in Israel to the wife, the equal division of this asset between the two, with credit to the husband of the value of a men’s watch collection which was awarded to him but which the wife has wrongly retained.
This disposition moots most of the other points presented. To the extent that it does not, we find no error with the exception that, as the husband now agrees, and as the initial trial judge provided (albeit somewhat ambiguously), he shall be liable for the payments on the wife’s vehicle. No further proceedings below other than the entry of orders to conform with these holdings will be required, and the judgment and orders under review are otherwise affirmed.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with directions.
. In this respect, the final judgment provided:
9. The Court is aware that this is an unequal distribution of the debts and assets which favors the Petitioner. The reason for doing so is due to the Respondent’s superi-or economic circumstances. He has consistently made a six figure income. The Respondent [sic] simply does not have the capacity to make that kind of income. Even with an advanced degree, she would be starting a career at an entry level income at the approximate age of forty.
. We note that there is no basis for upholding the unequal portion of the distribution as lump sum alimony by another name. See Roffe v. Roffe, 404 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)(error in nomenclature as to domestic awards immaterial). To the contrary, the final judgment contains an ample rehabilitative alimony provision. Indeed, although the husband initially challenged that award as beyond his means, he agreed to withdraw that contention at oral argument, if, as we now require, the equitable distribution is equalized. The wife’s claim that permanent alimony was required is without merit.
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Citator
Cited By
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Badgley v. Sanchez, 165 So. 3d 742 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)…factual findings required by statute. This is error. See David v. David, 58 So. 3d 336, 338 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (“[Disparate earning abilities cannot, without more, justify unequal distribution of marital assets and liabilities.”); Gil v. Mendelson, 793 So. 2d 1061, 1061 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (“The trial judge’s reason for awarding the wife substantially more than 50% of the assets, the husband’s superior earning capacity, as a matter of law does not justify any such result.” (footnote omitted)). We are cognizant…
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Yosi GIL v. Mirit Mendelson, 870 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)…reverse. In 1997, appellee Mirit Mendelson (“former wife”) filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in the trial court. After more than two years of litigation and one appeal, this Court reversed the trial court’s judgment in Gil v. Mendelson, 793 So. 2d 1061, 1062 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001), stating: We also agree with the husband’s position that to correct this legal error by effecting the substantially equal distribution which is required in the now-determined absence of any cognizable reason not to do so, i…1 / 2
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Estopinan v. Consuelo A. Estopinan, 870 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)…icated that the wife incurred over $13,000 of debt during the course of the proceedings. [*185] Regarding the first reason, unequal earning power, it appears that the award of lump sum alimony cannot be justified on this basis. See Gil v. Mendelson, 793 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). The court already made an adjustment for lower earning power by awarding permanent periodic alimony and child support. The second stated reason, compensation for unpaid support, cannot be sustained on the facts of this case. Tha…
Authorities Cited
- Roffe v. Moises Roffe, 404 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Sinclair v. Sinclair, 594 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
- Weimer v. Weimer, 677 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- Lagstrom v. Lagstrom, 662 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Freeman W. Barner, Jr. v. Barner, 716 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Adams v. Adams, 677 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)
- Dease v. Dease, 688 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)
- Reynolds v. Reynolds, 615 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
- Paul v. Paul, 648 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)