PATSY L. KAHLER, APPELLANT,
v.
C. HARRY KENT, M.D., AND LAWNWOOD MEDICAL CENTER, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION D/B/A LAWNWOOD REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this medical malpractice appeal, the Fourth District reversed a summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's claim as barred by the statute of limitations. The court held that a genuine factual dispute existed regarding when the plaintiff discovered her injury, precluding summary judgment and requiring the case to proceed to trial.
Summary judgment was improper because a factual dispute existed as to when the plaintiff learned of her injury. Although the defendants argued she discovered the injury by June 1986, the plaintiff's testimony that she believed her condition was a normal consequence of treatment despite her awareness of problems created a jury question as to discovery of the injury within the statute of limitations meaning.
[1] A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence raises conflicting inferences or permits different reasonable inferences regarding the plaintiff's discovery of…
[2] The statute of limitations in a medical malpractice action is triggered by the discovery of an injury, not necessarily the discovery of negligence.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Unlike the facts in Bogorff and Barron, there is a factual dispute in this case as to when the plaintiff learned of her injury.”
Establishes the court's primary distinction from controlling precedent and basis for reversing summary judgment.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiff Kahler underwent medical treatment and subsequently experienced problems. By June 1986, she applied for social security benefits, indicating…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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FARMER, Judge.
We withdraw our previous opinion and substitute the following. In light of this opinion, we deny the motion for rehearing.
This is an appeal of a summary judgment finding that appellant’s medical malpractice cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations. § 95.11(4)(b), Fla.Stat. (1989). We distinguish this case from the recent supreme court decisions in University of Miami v. Bogorff, 583 So. 2d 1000 (Fla.1991), and Barron v. Shapiro, 565 So. 2d 1319 (Fla.1990). Unlike the facts in Bogorff and Barron, there is a factual dispute in this case as to when the plaintiff learned of her injury.
Defendant argues that she discovered the fact of her injury by June 1986 when she applied for social security benefits. She testified, however, that while she knew she had problems at that early date, given her prior medical history and representations made by the defendant’s staff, she believed her condition to be a normal and expected consequence of her treatment.
Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla.1966), requires that the party moving for summary judgment show conclusively the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. In Barron and Bogorff the defendants were able to show a clear lack of dispute as to when plaintiffs discovered the fact of the injuries from the treatment; plaintiffs had attempted to show that the discovery of negligence occurred long after the discovery of the fact of injury. In Barron the court held that it was the discovery of an injury alone that triggered the statute of limitations. That is surely the law, but in our case the facts are not nearly so crystallized as to when plaintiff discovered the fact of injury. See Moore v. Morris, 475 So. 2d 666 (Fla.1985).
The controversy surrounding what plaintiff knew, and when, creates an issue of fact. The rule is so often stated that it hardly merits reprinting; if the evidence raises any issue of material fact, if it is conflicting, if it will permit different reasonable inferences, or if it tends to prove the issues, it should be submitted to the jury as a question of fact to be determined by it. Moore v. Morris, 475 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla.1985). It may well be that a jury will find, after reviewing all of the evidence, that plaintiff had notice of her injury within the meaning of Section 95.11(4)(b) Florida Statutes. Nonetheless, as an appellate court reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we content ourselves with determining only that factual issues exist.
We reverse so that plaintiff can offer evidence of her claim to a jury.
REVERSED.
STONE, J„ and WALDEN, JAMES, H„ Senior Judge, concur.
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Nettie Stein and Arthur Stein v. Feingold, 629 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…. Ionata, 503 So. 2d 1237 (Fla.1987), second, even if such a defense was available there is a disputed question of material fact as to when the patient actually learned of the malpractice, Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So. 2d 177 (Fla.1993); Kahler v. Kent, 616 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), and third, the affidavit of the independent expert was timely filed when the initial complaint was timely. Stebilla v. Mussallem, 595 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), rev. denied, 604 So. 2d 487 (Fla.1992); Hospital Corp. of Amer…
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Gonzalez v. Tracy, 994 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)…material fact as to when the patient had reasonable knowledge or should have had reasonable knowledge of unwarranted surgery where plaintiff physician advised that the ongoing medical problem was the result of an unrelated disease); Kahler v. Kent, 616 So. 2d 601, 601 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (reversing the entry of final summary judgment, finding that issue of when statute of limitations began to run must be submitted to jury because, based on the medical doctor’s staffs representations, plaintiff “believed her…
Authorities Cited
- Gory Roofing Tile Mfg., Inc. v. Davison, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1966)
- Moore v. Morris, 475 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1985)
- Univ. OF Miami v. Bogorff, 583 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1991)
- Janies Barron, M.D. v. Shapiro, 565 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 1990)