CATHERINE VENNING, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PARENT AND NATURAL GUARDIAN OF SHENITA S. HENDERSON, A MINOR CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
ORADELL ROE, APPELLEE
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In a personal injury automobile accident case, the Florida Second District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's motion for a new trial, finding that defense counsel's improper closing argument comments—which accused the plaintiff's medical expert of perjury and the opposing counsel of fraud—were highly prejudicial and warranted a new trial.
The court held that defense counsel's comments were improper, highly prejudicial, and inflammatory, and therefore warranted reversal and remand for a new trial on all issues. The court also reversed the trial court's award of attorney's fees and costs to the appellee.
[1] Derogatory remarks about opposing counsel and witnesses made during closing arguments, which attack credibility and imply fraud or perjury, are improper and prejudicial.
[2] Attorneys are afforded broad latitude in closing arguments, but comments must be confined to the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“While attorneys are given broad latitude in closing arguments, their comments must be confined to the evidence and to issues and inferences that can be drawn from the evidence.”
Establishes the standard for permissible closing argument scope despite broad attorney latitude
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuring an automobile accident personal injury action, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff awarding minimal damages. In closing argument, def…
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PER CURIAM.
In this personal injury action involving an automobile accident, the plaintiff, appellant, challenges the trial court’s order denying her motion for a new trial. We agree that the improper and highly prejudicial comments made in defense counsel’s closing argument warrant a new trial, and therefore, we reverse.
During closing argument, defense counsel made several derogatory remarks about opposing counsel and a certain witness and also attacked the credibility of a witness. Defense counsel indicated that plaintiff’s medical expert was “nothing more than an unqualified doctor who prostitutes himself ... for the benefit of lawyers” who is paid to perform a service by giving the “magic testimony” for plaintiff’s lawyer which allows him to get the case to court. Defense counsel stated there was a “special relationship” between plaintiff’s medical expert and plaintiff’s lawyer and told the jury that plaintiff's counsel presented “a work of fiction” which he “created and orchestrated” with the assistance of plaintiff’s medical expert. Defense counsel also told the jury that he personally had been involved in seven other cases where this particular attorney and medical expert were working together. After the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, awarding minimal damages, the plaintiff filed a motion for new trial. The motion included assertions that the plaintiff was denied a fair trial because of de fense counsel’s personal attack on opposing counsel, implying that the case was a “scheme” worked up by the attorneys and medical expert involved. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion for new trial. This timely appeal followed.
While attorneys are given broad latitude in closing arguments, their comments must be confined to the evidence and to issues and inferences that can be drawn from the evidence. Riggins v. Mariner Boat Works, Inc., 545 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). We believe the improper comments made by defense counsel essentially accuse the medical expert of perjury and accuse opposing counsel of unethically committing a fraud upon the court. Such comments have not been condoned by other district courts and will not be condoned by this court. See Schubert v. Allstate Ins. Co., 603 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. dismissed, 606 So. 2d 1164 (Fla.1992); Sun Supermarkets, Inc. v. Fields, 568 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), rev. denied, 581 So. 2d 164 (Fla.1991); Moore v. Taylor Concrete & Supply Co., Inc., 553 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Maercks v. Birchansky, 549 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Fla.Bar R.Prof. Conduct 4-3.4(e). See also Griffith v. Shamrock Village, 94 So. 2d 854 (Fla.1957) (defense counsel’s statements suggested perjury and collusion).
We, accordingly, find that the highly prejudicial and inflammatory remarks require us to reverse and remand for a new trial on all issues. Based on our disposition of this point, we must also reverse the trial court’s order awarding attorney’s fees and costs to appellee pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442.
Reversed and remanded.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER and PARKER, JJ., concur.
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Cited By (17 total)
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Murphy v. Int'l Robotic Sys., Inc., 766 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2000)…closing argument, but they must “confine their argument to the facts and evidence presented to the jury and all logical deductions from the facts and evidence.” Knoizen v. Bruegger, 713 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); see also Venning v. Roe, 616 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Moreover, closing argument must not be used to “inflame the minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an emotional response ... rather than the logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law…
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Hagan v. SUN Bank OF Mid-Florida, N.A., 666 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…inflammatory, counsel’s statements made to the jury during closing arguments will not serve as a basis for reversing a judgment.” Metropolitan Dade County v. Dillon, 305 So. 2d 36, 40 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) (citations omitted). See also Venning v. Roe, 616 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (reversing denial of new trial where counsel’s remarks were “highly prejudicial”); Davidojf v. Se-gert, 551 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (affirming new trial where counsel’s remarks “affected jury’s ability to judge evidence fa…
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Knoizen v. Jenina M. Bruegger, 713 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)…g argument only marginally objectionable. Attorneys are given broad latitude during closing, but they must confine their argument to the facts and evidence presented to the jury and all logical deductions from the facts and evidence. Venning v. Roe, 616 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) In this ease, the testimony supports the argument that the accident had a devastating effect upon Bruegger and her family. Further, Knoizen has not established that any improper closing argument was so “pervasive, inflammatory, a…
Previewing 3 of 17 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Griffith v. Shamrock Vill., Inc., 94 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1957)
- Moore v. Taylor Concrete & Supply Co., Inc., 553 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Riggins v. Mariner Boat Works, Inc., 545 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Ralph Maercks, M.D. & Ralph Maercks, M.D., P.A. v. Birchansky, 549 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
- SUN Supermarkets, Inc. v. Fields, 568 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- Michael Schubert and his wife v. Allstate Ins. Co., 603 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)