FRANCES THOMPSON KNOIZEN, APPELLANT,
v.
JENINA M. BRUEGGER, APPELLEE
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Frances Thompson Knoizen appeals the denial of her motion for new trial following a jury verdict awarding damages to Jenina Bruegger in a personal injury case arising from a motorcycle-car collision. Knoizen challenged the trial court's allowance of references to harm suffered by Bruegger's family during closing argument as an improper appeal to jury sympathy, but the appellate court affirmed, finding the argument supported by evidence and not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal.
The court affirmed, holding that the closing argument was not so 'highly and patently prejudicial' as to warrant reversal because it was supported by the facts and evidence presented at trial, including testimony from family members about substantial changes in Bruegger's life, and was not so 'pervasive, inflammatory, and prejudicial' as to preclude rational jury consideration of the case.
[1] Closing arguments must be confined to the facts and evidence presented to the jury and logical deductions therefrom, and must not be used to inflame the passions of the j…
[2] A trial court has the ultimate responsibility to ensure proper behavior of trial counsel and fair trial proceedings by curbing improper closing arguments.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“To warrant reversal on the ground that a closing argument was an improper appeal to the jury's emotions, the argument must be "highly and patently prejudicial."”
Establishes the legal standard for appellate review of allegedly improper closing arguments
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBruegger was severely injured in a head-on motorcycle collision with Knoizen's car, suffering catastrophic injuries including an open book pelvis, fiv…
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THOMPSON, Judge.
Frances Thompson Knoizen appeals a final order denying her motion for new trial following a verdict for Jenina M. Bruegger in a personal injury case. Knoizen raises several issues on appeal, only one of which is discussed as the others have no merit. We affirm.
Bruegger was severely injured when her motorcycle collided head-on with the Knoizen’s car. The medical evidence presented during the trial established that Bruegger was severely injured. After the accident, Bruegger’s bladder was lying in the sand. She suffered an open book pelvis injury and five major pelvic fractures. As a result of the accident, she also sustained a very extensive vaginal laceration. Bones protruded into her skin and into the vaginal wound. Other injuries included a broken femur and an open wrist fracture. She lost physical support for her bladder, and her bladder and uterus are prolapsed.
Knoizen contends on appeal that the trial court erred during Bruegger’s closing argument by allowing her attorney to make reference to damages sustained by her children and family. During closing argument, Bruegger’s attorney stated: And now she’s sitting here damaged for life with the most devastating injury a woman can suffer. Devastating to her, devastating to her family, to her kids, devastating to everybody that knows her and cares for her. Devastating.
Please don’t leave her alone to deal with that. Don’t leave her bare and naked, like this accident has already left her, and her children and her family. Don’t leave her like that.
Knoizen timely objected and was overruled. Knoizen argues that the closing argument was an improper attempt to invoke jury sympathy to inflate the recovery of damages, and that it went well beyond the scope of the evidence and issues presented. Moreover, she urges, the argument was an attempt to inflame the passions of the jury. See School Bd. of Palm Beach County v. Taylor, 365 So. 2d 1044, 1047 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (holding the plaintiffs argument was, in effect, argument for punitive damages). Accord Russell, Inc. v. Trento, 445 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). We disagree. To warrant reversal on the ground that a closing argument was an improper appeal to the jury’s emotions, the argument must be “highly and patently prejudicial.” Erie Ins. Co. v. Bushy, 394 So. 2d 228, 229 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Here, the closing argument is supported by the facts. Bruegger is 34 years old and the mother of six minor children. Before the accident, she was involved in weight lifting, karate, and aerobics, and actively played with her children. Two of her children testified that since the accident she experiences pain and tires quickly when she tries to play with them. Further, she is unable to do household chores.
When reviewed in light of the serious and debilitating injuries, and the testimony from family members about the substantial changes in her life, we find the closing argument only marginally objectionable. Attorneys are given broad latitude during closing, but they must confine their argument to the facts and evidence presented to the jury and all logical deductions from the facts and evidence. Venning v. Roe, 616 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) In this ease, the testimony supports the argument that the accident had a devastating effect upon Bruegger and her family.
Further, Knoizen has not established that any improper closing argument was so “pervasive, inflammatory, and prejudicial to preclude the jury’s rational consideration of the case.” Hagan v. Sun Bank of Mid-Florida, N.A., 666 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Cf. Superior Industries Int’l, Inc. v. Faulk, 695 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, sub nom., Hopper v. Superior Industries Int’l, Inc., 700 So. 2d 685 (Fla.1997); D’Auria v. Allstate Ins. Co., 673 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); State v. Fritz, 652 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Walt Disney World Co. v. Blalock, 640 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. dismissed, 649 So. 2d 232 (Fla.1994); Silva v. Nightingale, 619 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Schubert v. Allstate Ins. Co., 603 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. dismissed, 606 So. 2d 1164 (Fla.1992).
AFFIRMED.
GRIFFIN, C.J., and ANTOON, J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (23 total)
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Murphy v. Int'l Robotic Sys., Inc., 766 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2000)…la.1987). Attorneys should be afforded great latitude in presenting closing argument, but they must “confine their argument to the facts and evidence presented to the jury and all logical deductions from the facts and evidence.” Knoizen v. Bruegger, 713 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); see also Venning v. Roe, 616 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Moreover, closing argument must not be used to “inflame the minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an emotional response ... rather than…
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Lenon Lee McARTHUR, Jr. v. State, 801 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…o the case.”); Seckington v. State, 424 So. 2d 194, 195 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (“One of the purposes of closing arguments is to give the attorneys the opportunity to tie together for the jury the law and the facts .... ”); see also Knoizen v. Bruegger, 713 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 5th DCA [*1040] 1998). The courts generally allow wide latitude in closing arguments by permitting counsel to advance all legitimate arguments and draw logical inferences from the evidence. See Lukehart v. State 776 So. 2d 906 (Fla.2000), cert…
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Jackson v. State, 89 So. 3d 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)…1982). However, “attorneys must ‘confine their argument to the facts and evidence presented to the jury and all logical deductions from the facts and evidence.’ ” Hosang v. State, 984 So. 2d 671, 672 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (quoting Knoizen v. Bruegger, 713 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)). When evaluating a prosecutor’s comment, the comment “should be examined in the context in which it is made.” Lubin v. State, 963 So. 2d 822, 824 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). Here, Jackson contends that the prosecutor impermissib…
Previewing 3 of 23 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (12 total)
- Hagan v. SUN Bank OF Mid-Florida, N.A., 666 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Walt Disney World Co. v. Blalock, 640 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- Marga R. Silva v. Nightingale, 619 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)
- Erie Ins. Co. & Margaret Borman v. Bushy, 394 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Venning v. Oradell ROE, 616 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Russell, Inc. v. Trento, 445 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- State v. Fritz, 652 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)
- Michael Schubert and his wife v. Allstate Ins. Co., 603 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)
- Superior Indus. Int'l, Inc. v. Faulk, 695 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)
- D'Auria v. Allstate Ins. Co., 673 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)