DAVID DEVON MOULTRIE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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David Devon Moultrie appealed the revocation of his probation and resulting 9-year sentence, challenging whether the trial court properly refused to credit him for the entire 4.5-year term of his original sentence. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the sentence but reversed and remanded on the sentencing credit issue, holding that Moultrie was entitled to credit for the complete original sentence under the law in effect when he committed the offense.
The court affirmed on the first issue without discussion. On the second issue, the court reversed, holding that Moultrie was entitled to credit for his entire original 4.5-year sentence, not merely the period he had actually served.
[1] A trial court errs by denying credit for the full incarcerative portion of a split sentence when the defendant has completed that sentence, even if the defendant later vi…
[2] A defendant is entitled to credit for the entire period of incarceration originally imposed as part of a split sentence, not merely the time actually served, if the offen…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Having completed the sentence originally imposed, appellant was entitled to credit for that entire sentence, not merely the period actually served.”
Establishes the core holding that credit must be given for the complete original sentence upon probation revocation
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1990, Moultrie was convicted of robbery with a firearm and sentenced to 4.5 years in prison followed by 3 years probation. After his release from p…
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PER CURIAM.
In this direct appeal from an order revoking the probationary portion of a split sentence and again sentencing him to prison, appellant raises two issues: (1) whether the trial court committed reversible error when it imposed a sentence which was within the next higher cell’s permitted range, rather than the recommended range; and (2) whether the trial court committed reversible error when it declined to give credit for the entire incarcerative portion of the split sentence originally imposed. We affirm as to the first issue without discussion, based upon Brown v. State, 581 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). However, we are constrained to reverse as to the second issue.
In 1990, appellant was adjudged guilty of robbery with a firearm and sentenced to 4V2 years in prison, to be followed by 3 years on probation. After he had been released from prison, appellant violated the terms of his probation.
The trial court revoked appellant’s probation, and sentenced him to 9 years in prison.
However, when appellant requested credit for the full 4¾⅛ years to which he had originally been sentenced, the trial court held that he was entitled to credit only for the period he had actually spent in prison. This was error. Having completed the sentence originally imposed, appellant was entitled to credit for that entire sentence, not merely the period actually served. State v. Green, 547 So. 2d 925 (Fla.1989). Accord Latham v. State, 596 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Bolden v. State, 557 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). In 1990, the legislature effectively overruled Green, when it enacted what is now section 948.06(6), Florida Statutes. Ch. 89-526, § 8, at 2664, Laws of Fla.
However, that provision did not become effective until after appellant had committed the original offense.
Therefore, Green controls the outcome in this case. Bell v. State, 610 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Thomas v. State, 605 So. 2d 1286 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
We affirm appellant’s sentence. However, we remand with directions that the trial court give appellant credit for the entire 4½ year term of his original sentence. AFFIRMED and REMANDED, with directions.
ERVIN, ZEHMER and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.
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Jones v. State, 633 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…peal we have accepted the sentences orally announced by the trial court at the sentencing hearing. However, it seems clear that at the violation of probation hearing the trial court treated the original sentences as we have. . In Moultrie v. State, 618 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), this court stated that "[i]n 1990, the legislature effectively overruled Green, when it enacted what is now section 948.06(6), Florida Statutes. Ch. 89-526, § 8, at 2664, Laws of Fla.” That statement is inaccurate because Moultr…
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Loring Spencer Jones v. State, 635 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…e incarcerative portion of his sentence and was placed on probation were committed before September 1,1990, the effective date of legislation countering the Green decision. See Jackson v. State, 619 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Moultrie v. State, 618 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). After determining whether Green applies, it would be unnecessary to hold an extensive evidentiary hearing to determine the equivalent of 3½ years in days. Finally, pursuant to Thomas, the matter of 185 days of presentence jail t…
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Thaddeus Brown v. State, 632 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…g. Brown appeals this sentence. The State correctly concedes that the trial court erred in limiting Brown’s credit to time actually served and forfeiting the gain time he earned on the incarcerative portion of his split sentence. Moultrie v. State, 618 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (citing State v. Green, 547 So. 2d 925 (Fla.1989)). Prior to the enactment of section 948.06(6), Florida Statutes (1989), when a split sentence was imposed and the probationary portion of that split sentence was revoked, credit w…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Green, 547 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 1989)
- L.V. Thomas v. State, 605 So. 2d 1286 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)
- Chuck Brown v. State, 581 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Bolden v. State, 557 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Hayes v. State, 610 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Bell v. State, 610 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Latham v. State, 596 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)