RICKY MAHARAJ AND CHANDRA MAHARAJ, PETITIONERS,
v.
ALEXANDER GROSSMAN, RESPONDENT
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal granted certiorari and quashed a trial court's order denying consolidation of three separate lawsuits arising from the same automobile accident. The court held that denying consolidation of related claims from the same accident constitutes an abuse of discretion because it creates the risk of inconsistent verdicts and offends principles of judicial economy.
The court held that denying consolidation of related claims arising from the same accident constitutes an abuse of discretion and a departure from the essential requirements of law. Although consolidation ordinarily rests in the trial court's sound discretion, the risk of inconsistent verdicts and the interests of judicial economy weigh heavily in favor of consolidation absent unusual circumstances.
[1] Consolidation of lawsuits arising from the same accident is favored to promote judicial economy and avoid inconsistent verdicts.
[2] Denial of consolidation of lawsuits arising from the same accident may constitute a departure from the essential requirements of law, remediable by certiorari.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Where denial of consolidation is a departure from the essential requirements of law, however, it is inherently an abuse of discretion.”
Establishes the standard for appellate review: when consolidation denial violates essential requirements of law, it is automatically an abuse of discretion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRicky Maharaj made a left turn and collided with Sannasardo's vehicle, which then struck the Grossmans' stopped car. Both Alexander and Muriel Grossma…
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KLEIN, Judge.
We grant certiorari and order consolidation of three lawsuits arising out of the same automobile accident.
Respondent plaintiff, Alexander Gross-man, who opposes consolidation, alleged that he and his wife were injured in an accident when Ricky Maharaj made a left turn and collided with Sannasardo, who was coming from the opposite direction, which resulted in the Maharaj car then striking the Grossmans’ car, which was stopped at a red light. Alexander and Muriel Grossman, husband and wife, were both injured, and Muriel later died of causes apparently unrelated to the accident. Three separate lawsuits were filed as a result of the accident.
In March of 1992 Alexander Grossman sued the Maharajes and his UM carrier for his injuries. In July of 1992 the Maharajes moved for leave to file a third party complaint for contribution against Sannasardo, which the court denied.
In September of 1992 Alexander Gross-man, as personal representative of the estate of his deceased wife, Muriel, sued the Maharajes for the injuries sustained by Muriel. In that case the Maharajes filed a third party complaint against Sannasardo seeking contribution.
In December of 1992 the Maharajes sued Sannasardo for contribution on the claim of Alexander Grossman for his injuries.
In February of 1993 the Maharajes moved, in the first case, which days earlier had been set for trial in June, 1993, to consolidate the three lawsuits. The court denied consolidation, stating that “this case needs to be brought to a final conclusion.” The Maharajes seek review by certiorari, and Sannasardo supports their position, arguing that without consolidation there could be inconsistent verdicts, citing Tommie v. LaChance, 412 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 4th DCA1982). There this court granted certiorari, and concluded that the denial of consolidation of two plaintiff’s cases arising out of the same accident was a departure from the essential requirements of law not remediable by final appeal, because of the possibility of inconsistent verdicts.
In U-Haul Co. of Northern Florida, Inc. v. White, 503 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1st DCA1986), the first district granted certiorari, and required consolidation of three separately filed wrongful death actions which arose out of the same accident, citing, in addition to the possibility of inconsistent verdicts, the interests of judicial economy.
Respondent argues that consolidation “ordinarily rests in the sound discretion of the trial court”, citing Brody Con struction, Inc. v. Fabri-Built Structures, Inc., 322 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 4th DCA1975). Where denial of consolidation is a departure from the essential requirements of law, however, it is inherently an abuse of discretion.
There is normally no reason why claims of family members arising out of one accident should not be combined in one lawsuit, or if filed separately, consolidated and tried together. Where there are unusual circumstances the court “in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice” may order separate trials. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.270(b).
In the present case the trial judge apparently denied consolidation because the case assigned to him was already set for trial, and he did not want to delay its disposition. While disposing of cases is important, it is not as important as the efficient and proper administration of justice.
We grant certiorari and quash the order denying consolidation.
ANSTEAD and POLEN, JJ., concur.
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Hickey v. Pompano K OF C, Inc., 647 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…ously granted certiorari where a trial court has refused to consolidate cases brought by different plaintiffs against one defendant, as a result of a single accident, on the grounds that there could be inconsistent verdicts. See Maharaj v. Grossman, 619 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Tommie v. LaChance, 412 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). See also U-Haul Co. of Northern Florida, Inc. v. White, 503 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Meyers v. Shore Indus., Inc., 575 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Although there…
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Umberto Pages v. Dominguez, 652 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…ation. We do not agree that Tommie is authority for the proposition that because both eases arose from the same accident consolidation is required, rendering the failure to consolidate an abuse of discretion. To the extent that Maharaj v. Grossman, 619 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), contains dicta to this effect and to the extent that the first district in U-Haul Co. of Northern Florida, Inc. v. White, 503 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), so held in reliance on Tommie, we disagree. See also Holiday Inns, Inc…
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State Farm Fla. Ins. Co. v. Bonham, 886 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…ri relief has been granted where a lower court refused to consolidate personal injury and wrongful death actions, which arose out of the same motor [*1075] vehicle accident, to avoid the possibility of inconsistent verdicts. See Maharaj v. Grossman, 619 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Tommie v. LaChance, 412 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). But see Pages v. Dominguez By & Through Dominguez, 652 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (consolidation not required simply because separate actions arose out of same accident…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Tommie v. LaCHANCE, 412 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- U-Haul Co. OF N. Fla., Inc. v. White, 503 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Brody Constr., Inc. v. Fabri-Built Structures, Inc., 322 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)