JOHN ARNOLD, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Arnold sought review of a trial court's order denying his motion to mitigate a lifetime driving license suspension imposed as part of his 1991 DUI sentence. The appellate court treated the appeal as a petition for certiorari and held that the trial court erroneously believed it lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion when filed within 60 days of the corrected sentence order.
The trial court had jurisdiction to consider the motion because it was filed within 60 days of the corrected sentence imposed on October 13, 1991. Although the trial court has unfettered discretion to deny the motion, it was within the trial court's jurisdiction to consider it on the merits.
[1] An appeal from an order denying a motion to reduce a sentence is generally not appealable as the trial court's ruling is discretionary.
[2] An appellate court may treat an appeal from an order denying a motion to modify a sentence as a petition for writ of certiorari.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Arnold's motion to mitigate was filed within 60 days from the imposition of the corrected sentence of suspension entered on October 13, 1992. Although it is within the unfettered discretion of the trial court to deny the motion, it was within the trial court's jurisdiction to consider it and the trial court should do so.”
Establishes that the motion was timely filed and the trial court had jurisdiction to consider it despite the original sentencing date.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceArnold was sentenced on July 16, 1991, for DUI and license restriction violation. The trial court mistakenly imposed a lifetime license suspension for…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Motion To Mitigate Sentence cases and more on FLexlaw
COBB, Judge.
The issue here is whether we should treat Arnold’s appeal as a timely petition for certiorari and grant it based upon the trial court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction.
Arnold was originally sentenced on July 16, 1991, on two counts: DUI and violation of a license restriction. The court mistakenly suspended Arnold’s driving license for life in conjunction with the latter count when it meant to do so in conjunction with the former. The court corrected this error by an amended order on October 13, 1991. On November 17, 1992, Arnold filed a motion to mitigate his sentence in respect to the lifetime suspension pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b). The trial court found that it was without jurisdiction to consider the motion on the basis that it should have been filed within 60 days of July 16, 1991, rather than 60 days from October 13,1992, the date the suspension sentence was corrected.
Ordinarily, an order denying a motion to reduce sentence is not appealable because the trial court’s ruling is discretionary. See Daniels v. State, 568 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Davenport v. State, 414 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Under some circumstances, however, the court may treat the appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari. See State v. Rhodes, 554 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). In Marsh v. State, 497 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), the court treated the appellant’s appeal from an order denying his motion to modify sentence as a petition for writ of certiorari. Because the trial court had erroneously believed that it was without the authority to withdraw an adjudication of guilt once it had been imposed, as requested by appellant in his motion to modify, the district court found that appellant might suffer an injustice as a result of the court’s good faith but erroneous ruling. The court therefore granted the petition and remanded the case to the trial court for consideration of appellant’s motion on its merits. See also Smith v. State, 471 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).
Arnold’s motion to mitigate was filed within 60 days from the imposition of the corrected sentence of suspension entered on October 13, 1992. Although it is within the unfettered discretion of the trial court to deny the motion, it was within the trial court’s jurisdiction to consider it and the trial court should do so. We grant certiorari, quash the order of the trial court, and remand for consideration of the motion.
QUASHED AND REMANDED.
W. SHARP, J., concurs.
DAUKSCH, J., dissents without opinion.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Moya v. State, 668 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…order denying his motion to mitigate sentence, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b). Such an order is not appealable, but may be reviewed in an extraordinary case under this court’s certiorari jurisdiction. Arnold, v. State, 621 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Smith v. State, 471 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), approved sub nom., Abreu v. State, 660 So. 2d 703 (Fla.1995). Mr. Moya was sentenced to prison on October 10, 1995, following revocation of probation. He mailed his pro se mot…
-
State v. Swett, 772 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…hus, where the circuit court erroneously denies a motion for mitigation on the ground that it is untimely, certiorari may be employed to quash the order of denial. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 707 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Arnold v. [*51] State, 621 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 5th DCA .1993). Conversely, where a trial court is without jurisdiction due to the untimely consideration of a motion for mitigation and erroneously grants mitigation, an appellate court will quash the order by way of certiorari. See, e.g., St…
-
Schlabach v. State, 37 So. 3d 230 (Fla. 2010)…rial court. See Childers, 972 So. 2d at 309-10.9 In making this suggestion, the Second District aptly observed: A rule 3.800(c) motion is directed to a circuit court’s absolute discretion, and the court’s ruling cannot be appealed. Arnold v. State, 621 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 5th [*240] DCA 1993). But it is subject to certio-rari review “in an extraordinary case.” Moya v. State, 668 So. 2d 279, 280 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). When the issue is whether a motion to modify a sentence should have been dismissed as untimely, ho…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- PIA Psychiatric Hosps., Inc. v. State, 568 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Smith v. State, 471 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Clark v. State, 414 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- State v. Rhodes, 554 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- Marsh v. State, 497 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)