CALVIN SCOTT MCDONALD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1993-07-21
No. 92-2269
DELL, C.J., and ANSTEAD and HERSEY, JJ., concur.
622 So. 2d 70 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1993) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Holding

The court held that the trial court's insufficient inquiry into the defendant's request to represent himself constituted reversible error, and also noted a sentencing error regarding habitual offender status.


Headnotes

[1] A criminal defendant has a right to represent himself, which requires the trial court to conduct a specific inquiry to ensure the waiver of counsel is knowing and volunta…

[2] Denial of a criminal defendant's request to represent himself is reversible error when the trial court fails to conduct the requisite inquiry.

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Facts & Procedural History

The defendant, Calvin McDonald, requested to represent himself, but the trial court's inquiry did not meet the requirements outlined in Faretta v. Cal…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The primary issue in this criminal appeal is whether appellant, Calvin McDonald, was improperly denied the right to represent himself and to make his own defense. The essential inquiries to be made by the trial court when a criminal defendant seeks to handle his own defense are outlined in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). See also Jones v. State, 584 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.111.

The inquiry made below did not satisfy these minimal requirements; thus denial of appellant’s request was reversible error. This error was made more egregious by the trial court’s refusal to grant a continuance to permit appellant to prepare his defense. See Valle v. State, 394 So. 2d 1004 (Fla.1981); Stanojevich v. State, 567 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).

In the interest of judicial economy we address a sentencing error, although rendered moot by the foregoing determination. While there was discussion, at sentencing, of prior criminal convictions, there were no certified copies placed in evidence. The trial court declared appellant an habitual felony offender but did not make the requisite findings. As stated in State v. Rucker, 613 So. 2d 460 (Fla.1993), expanded upon in Herrington v. State, 622 So. 2d 1339, 1340-41 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (en banc), a harmless error analysis may be appropriate in these cases where the trial court fails to make the statutory findings. However, section 775.084(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), requires the trial court to make factual findings, and this requirement has not been eliminated by the case law. The present case illustrates the danger of failing to make such findings. We are unable to tell, on this record, whether the timing of the convictions qualifies under the statute. Thus, but for the previous error, we would have reversed and remanded for resentencing in any event. Judicial economy is better served by adherence to the statutory requirements.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

DELL, C.J., and ANSTEAD and HERSEY, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Livernois v. State, 625 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
    …te, 605 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). We are also unable to discern from the record presented to us whether the factors required to support habitualization existed at the time of sentencing. § 775.084(l)(b); Moore; Rowland. See McDonald v. State, 622 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). Upon remand, if the court makes the requisite findings it may sentence the appellant as a habitual felony offender or a habitual violent felony offender. See Moore. We remind the court, however, that since all of the offenses o…

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