RONALD E. BARRETT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed Barrett's judgment and sentence because he entered a plea to attempted first degree murder with a deadly weapon, which is a life felony under Florida law, rendering the habitual offender enhancement invalid. The court remanded for resentencing with the option for the state to withdraw from the plea agreement and reinstate original charges if the defendant does not accept resentencing on an amended information.
An invalid habitual offender sentence on a life felony may be attacked by direct appeal and reversed. On remand, if the defendant does not agree to resentencing on an amended information, the state may withdraw from the plea agreement and reinstate original charges, and the trial court may reevaluate whether to accept a plea on any proposed terms.
[1] A habitual offender sentence is invalid when imposed for a life felony.
[2] An invalid sentence may be attacked by direct appeal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An invalid sentence may be attacked by direct appeal.”
Establishes the appellate court's jurisdiction to review and correct invalid sentences on direct appeal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBarrett entered a plea to attempted first degree murder with a deadly weapon. The record was ambiguous as to whether the court and parties understood …
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STONE, Judge.
We reverse Appellant’s judgment and sentence because the record reflects that Appellant entered a plea to a life felony with respect to which a habitual offender sentence is invalid. Lamont v. State, 610 So. 2d 435 (Fla.1992). An invalid sentence may be attacked by direct appeal. Adamo v. State, 496 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Wickett v. State, 467 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).
We cannot determine from the record whether the court and parties understood that Appellant was charged with a life felony, or whether they were under the impression that attempted first degree murder with a deadly weapon was a first degree felony. At best, the record and written judgment are ambiguous in this regard. There is no indication in the record that the state ever reduced this charge to a first degree felony. Also, the record reflects that both the court and the prosecutor referred to Appellant’s plea as being to the crime as charged, that is, committed with a deadly weapon. Additionally, the written sentence makes specific reference to section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes, which reclassifies the degree of this felony from first degree to life, for use of a weapon.
We reject Appellant’s request that we simply strike the habitual offender portion of his sentence by this opinion, leaving the balance of his sentence untouched. It appears that Appellant’s plea was negotiated, involved the nolle prosse of two other counts, and apparently would not have been accepted by the court but for Appellant’s agreement to habitual offender treatment. As the state points out, all parties acted on the assumption that Appellant qualified as a habitual offender, and Appellant should not be permitted to renege on a portion of his agreement with impunity. We also note that the trial court expressed a preference, at the sentencing hearing, for sentencing Appellant to life in prison if afforded that option.
Therefore, on remand, if the Defendant does not agree to imposition of the same sentence on an amended information, the state is to be afforded the opportunity to withdraw from the plea agreement and reinstate the initial charges, and the trial court shall also have an opportunity, if applicable, to reevaluate whether to accept a plea on any proposed terms not contained in the initial sentence. See Morris v. State, 620 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Dolan v. State, 598 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Daniels v. Smith, 478 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).
DELL, C.J., and DOWNEY, JAMES C., Senior Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Detrick Williams v. State, 650 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…a sentence is illegal, and may be challenged on appeal notwithstanding that it was the product of a negotiated plea. E.g., Lee v. State, 642 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Boatwright v. State, 637 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Barrett v. State, 622 So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). Therefore, the habitual offender sentences imposed for armed kidnapping must be reversed. However, the remedy is not, as appellant urges, that the case be remanded with directions that non-habitual offender sentences of like t…
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Boatwright v. State, 637 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…rst degree murder with a firearm was charged, appellant pled to attempted murder (a first degree felony), not attempted murder with a firearm, and therefore section 775.087(l)(a) is inapplicable. We reject the state’s argument. See Barrett v. State, 622 So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (defendant who entered plea to life felony could not receive habitual offender sentence where there is no indication in the record that the state ever reduced the charge to a first degree felony). Here, the only charging [*355] d…
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LEE v. State, 642 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…imposition of a guidelines sentence. Inasmuch as it appears Lee entered a plea on the assumption that he would qualify as a habitual offender, he “should not be permitted to renege on a portion of his agreement with impunity.” See Barrett v. State, 622 So. 2d 1371, 1372 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). Rather than vacating the sentence at this level, we remand with the following directions. The trial court shall extend the state the opportunity either to (1) accept the plea with the sentence imposed without the habitual…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lamont v. State, 610 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1992)
- Daniels v. Honorable Gilbert A. Smith, 478 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Pearce v. REL Enters., 467 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Adamo v. State, 496 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- Dolan v. State, 598 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)
- Alonzo v. Morris, 620 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)