MICHAEL EDWARD GOGGINS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Michael Goggins appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence imposed as a habitual violent felony offender. The court vacates his sentence and remands for resentencing because the underlying offense was committed during a period when the habitual offender statute was unconstitutional, making his sentence illegal regardless of when sentencing occurred.
A defendant's sentence is illegal and resentencing is required when the underlying offense was committed during a period when the habitual offender statute was unconstitutional. The relevant time period is the date the offense was committed, not the date of sentencing. Resentencing is required when a defendant is affected by the unconstitutional amendments to the statute.
[1] A defendant's eligibility for habitual offender sentencing is determined by the date the offense was committed, not the date of sentencing.
[2] A sentence imposed under an unconstitutional statutory amendment is illegal and subject to correction.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The relevant time period in this matter is the date the offense was committed.”
Establishes the critical principle that constitutional validity of a statute is determined by when the offense occurred, not when sentencing happened.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGoggins was arrested on December 17, 1989, for first degree murder and convicted of second degree murder. He was sentenced as a habitual violent felon…
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PER CURIAM.
Michael Edward Goggins appeals the summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. We find merit in Goggins’ argument, vacate the habitual violent offender sentence and remand for resentencing.
Goggins was arrested on December 17, 1989, for first degree murder; allegedly the date the offense was committed. He was tried and convicted of second degree murder. On August 30, 1991, Goggins was sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender. The court reconsidered the term imposed and resentenced Goggins on September 6, 1991.
In his motion, Goggins alleges that his sentence is illegal because the offense was committed during the October 1, 1989 to May 2,1991 “window period” when the habitual offender statute was unconstitutional. See Johnson v. State, 616 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1993). The trial court denied the motion based upon the fact that the imposition of sentence and resentencing occurred outside the applicable “window period” and, therefore, Goggins’ sentence was unaffected by the unconstitutional statutory amendment.
The trial court’s ruling is incorrect. The relevant time period in this matter is the date the offense was committed. See Johnson, 616 So. 2d at 3-4. The offense for which sentence was imposed occurred during the time period when the unconstitutional statute was in effect and Goggins has properly questioned the legality of the sentence. See Freeman v. State, 616 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Miffin v. State, 615 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).
The inquiry does not stop at this juncture. Resentencing is required only when a defendant is affected by the amendments to section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1991) contained in chapter 89-280, Laws of Florida. Johnson, 616 So. 2d at 4.
Goggins’ habitual violent felony offender status is based upon a prior aggravated battery conviction. He claims that without this predicate offense he would not be eligible for such classification. The trial court does not refute these allegations in its order denying the motion.
Clearly, Goggins’ sentence is affected by the unconstitutional statutory amendment. His classification as a violent felony offender is based on the unconstitutional amendment’s addition of the offense of aggravated battery to those prior offenses which qualify a defendant for violent offender status. Resentencing is required. See Johnson; Gayman v. State, 616 So. 2d 17, 19 (Fla.1993); Donahue v. State, 616 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Lowe v. State, 612 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
Goggins’ habitual violent felony offender sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing in accordance with Johnson. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
RYDER, A.C.J., and DANAHY and ALTENBERND, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1999)…the foregoing, it is clear that Thompson’s case must be remanded for resentencing. Where a defendant commits an offense during the applicable window period but is sentenced after the unconstitutional chapter law has been cured, see Goggins v. State, 623 So. 2d 590, 590 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Lowe v. State, 612 So. 2d 625, 625 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), it would be improper to resentence the defendant under the valid laws in effect at the time of the original sentencing because those valid laws would include the uncons…
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Golz v. State, 722 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…result. Cf § 924.051, Fla. Stat. (1997). In cases involving illegal sentences, appellate courts routinely remand for resentencing without specific instructions regarding the new sentence except that it not be illegal. See, e.g., Goggins v. State, 623 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (resentencing required when defendant received illegal habitual offender sentence due to unconstitutionality of statute). When a trial court unintentionally imposes a departure sentence, we remand for resentencing but permit the t…
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Brock v. State, 645 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1993). Under Johnson, however, “[r]esentencing is required only when a defendant is affected by the amendments to section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1991) contained in chapter 89-280, Laws of Florida.” Goggins v. State, 623 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). In this case, the trial court used Brock’s prior convictions for grand theft and aggravated battery as the predicate offenses to support the imposition of habitual violent felony offender sentences. Thus, “[h]is classification a…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1993)
- Dorcy Gayman v. State, 616 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1993)
- Freeman v. State, 616 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- Miffin v. State, 615 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Donahue v. State, 616 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- Brady Allen Lowe v. State, 612 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)