TAYLOR SCHMELZ, ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
THE SHERIFF OF MONROE COUNTY, APPELLEE
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Schmelz appeals a summary judgment dismissing his lawsuit against the Monroe County Sheriff for injuries sustained during an attempted suicide while in custody. The court reversed, holding that whether the suicide attempt was foreseeable—and thus whether the Sheriff's negligence in failing to maintain proper suicide watch procedures was the proximate cause—is a factual question for a jury, not a matter for summary judgment.
The court held that the foreseeability of Schmelz's suicide attempt is a question of fact for the jury to determine, not a matter for summary judgment. Because there was evidence that the booking officer had concerns about suicide risk and placed Schmelz on watch, and the watch officer had heightened concerns based on observing his emotional state, a jury could find the attempt foreseeable despite Schmelz's lack of prior suicide threats or attempts.
[1] A defendant's negligence may be considered the proximate cause of an injury even if an independent intervening cause occurs, if that intervening cause was foreseeable or…
[2] The foreseeability of an intervening cause is a question of fact for the trier of fact.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“if an intervening cause was foreseen or reasonably might have been foreseen by the wrongdoer, his negligence may be considered the proximate cause of an injury. Thus, he may be held liable, notwithstanding the intervening cause.”
Establishes the controlling legal standard: foreseeability of an intervening cause determines whether the defendant's negligence remains actionable.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSchmelz was arrested and placed on suicide watch by a booking officer who observed him as subdued and depressed and stated she felt 'he might try to d…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from final summary judgment which determined that appellant’s attempted suicide while incarcerated constituted an independent, intervening and unforeseeable cause of his injuries for which defendant is not liable. Guice v. Enfinger, 389 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). We find the instant facts distinguishable from those in Guice and reverse the order under review.
Causal connection between a person’s negligence and an injury is broken by the intervention of a new, independent, and efficient intervening cause such that the negligence is not actionable, subject to the qualification that if an intervening cause was foreseen or reasonably might have been foreseen by the wrongdoer, his negligence may be considered the proximate cause of an injury. Thus, he may be held liable, notwithstanding the intervening cause. In such case, the intervention of the' independent intervening cause does not break causal connection if the intervention was itself foreseeable. Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Co. v. Pope, 127 So. 2d 441 (Fla.1961); Savarese v. Hill, 128 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961).
In Guice, a prisoner who was to bond out of jail the following morning took ill and was put in the prison’s sick bay where he hung himself with his own belt which sheriff employees had failed to remove. The first district concluded that there were no facts indicating that any officer was or should have been suspicious of suicidal tendencies in the inmate and that therefore, the suicide was not sufficiently foreseeable to impose upon the sheriffs employees a duty to remove the belt. The prisoner’s own actions were the intervening superceding cause of his death.
In the instant case, the trial court observed, and it is uncontroverted in the record, that prior to his attempted suicide Schmelz had never either threatened, attempted, or even talked about suicide. However, there was also evidence that the booking officer knew Schmelz from previous incarcerations and immediately observed him as subdued and depressed. She stated she felt “he might try to do something.” She placed Schmelz on a suicide watch, which consisted of checking the prisoner every fifteen minutes and not leaving the cell area. The watch officer observed that after a deputy spoke to Schmelz about the felony charge against him, Schmelz appeared “real flustered,” nervous, and worried. At that point, that officer became concerned and shortened his watch to less than fifteen-minute intervals. Nonetheless, in violation of watch procedure, the watch officer left the cell area when requested to relieve a dispatcher, whereupon, minutes later, Schmelz attempted to hang himself, failed, but suffered severe brain damage.
The question of whether an intervening cause is foreseeable is for the trier of fact. Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car Syst., Inc., 386 So. 2d 520 (Fla.1980). Confronted with conflicting evidence as to the foreseeability of Schmelz’ actions, it was for a trier of fact to determine whether Schmelz’ own actions constituted the unforeseeable intervening cause of his injuries.
Accordingly, the summary judgment under review is reversed and the ease is remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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White v. Whiddon, 670 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…6 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), citing Department of Transportation v. Anglin, 502 So. 2d 896 (Fla.1987). Generally, “[t]he question of whether an intervening cause is foreseeable is for the trier of fact.” See Schmelz v. Sheriff of Monroe County, 624 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (summary judgment reversed where jail inmate attempted suicide and brain damage resulted); see also Guice v. Enfinger, 389 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).2 Appellee also contends summary judgment should be affirmed based on the p…
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Clark v. L. & A. Contracting Co., 730 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…negligence may be considered the proximate cause of an injury-In such ease, the intervention of the independent intervening cause does not break the causal connection if the intervention itself was foreseeable.” Schmelz v. Sheriff of Monroe County, 624 So. 2d 298, 298 [*289] (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), review denied, 634 So. 2d 627 (Fla.1994). The majority’s reliance on Metropolitan Dade County v. Colina, 466 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), review denied, 464 So. 2d 554 (Fla.1985), is misplaced. Unlike Colina, the…
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Cook v. Sheriff OF Monroe Cnty., 402 F.3d 1092 (11th Cir. 2005)…, 271 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980). However, causation is not defeated, and the officer is not relieved of liability, if the intervening cause “was foreseeable or reasonably might have been foreseen by the wrongdoer.” Schmelz v. Sheriff of Monroe County, 624 So. 2d 298, 298 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1993). Thus, in suicide cases, Florida courts have treated as the key inquiry whether “it was reasonably foreseeable that harm would befall [the inmate] either directly or indirectly as a result of the actions and omissions of…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gibson v. AVIS Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 386 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1980)
- Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Co., Inc. v. Doyle Pope, 127 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1961)
- Guice v. Harvell Enfinger, 389 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- Savarese v. Hill, 128 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)