KAREN J. RILEY, APPELLANT,
v.
DANIEL T. PARKER, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1993-09-30
No. 92-2793
SMITH, KAHN and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur.
624 So. 2d 828 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1993) Positive Treatment
Cited by 9 cases


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Karen Riley appeals an order establishing Daniel Parker’s child support obligation at $55.00 a month. The trial court’s statement that “although child support guidelines yield a child support amount of $207.13 per month, that after taking the defendant’s other financial obligations into consideration, he can only afford to pay $55.00 per month for the child in this case” is insufficient as a matter of law. § 61.30(1)(a), Fla.Stat. (1991). We vacate the order and remand this case for the trial court to either order the guidelines amount or make legally sufficient findings as to why the child in this ease should only receive a small fraction of the support contemplated by Florida’s child support guidelines. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Bush, 614 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

SMITH, KAHN and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

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  • Reynolds v. Reynolds, 668 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
    …uncontroverted testimony demonstrating that at least $9,000.00 of the former husband’s credit card debts were incurred after the date of the parties’ separation, a more detailed explanation was required as a matter of law. We agree. Riley v. Parker, 624 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). In Riley, the trial court ordered the former husband to pay only ¾ of the presumptive guideline support amount upon finding that after his “other financial obligations” were considered, the former husband could afford to pay no…
  • Patterson v. State, 693 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
    …d that the offense of aggravated assault with a firearm under section 784.021(l)(a) cannot be reclassified to a second-degree felony pursuant to section 775.087(1) because use of a firearm is an essential element of that offense. Harrelson v. State, 624 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Ellison v. State, 538 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Stinson v. State, 520 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Because the trial court did not attach portions of the record to the order denying relief, however, we cannot make this d…
  • Tullis v. State, 692 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
    …aring on restitution. We also remand on appellant’s third issue. The offense of aggravated assault with a firearm cannot be reclassified to a second degree felony because use of a firearm is an essential element of the offense. Harrelson v. State, 624 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1st [*230] DCA 1993); Ellison v. State, 538 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Stinson v. State, 520 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Although appellant’s guidelines seoresheet shows that aggravated assault was calculated correctly as a third degre…

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