TONY PATTERSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1997-04-28
No. 96-3311
MINER, ALLEN and PADOVANO, JJ., concur.
693 So. 2d 74 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1997) Caution
Cited by 12 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Patterson appealed the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his imposed sentences exceeded statutory maximums for the offenses. The court affirmed the denial regarding armed robbery sentences but reversed regarding aggravated assault sentences, finding the trial court failed to adequately address whether the offenses qualified for firearm-based reclassification.


Holding

The court affirmed the denial of relief for the armed robbery sentences, which are lawful under Florida law. However, the court reversed the denial of relief for the aggravated assault sentences because the trial court failed to attach record portions establishing whether the aggravated assault qualified as aggravated assault with a firearm (which cannot be reclassified under § 775.087), and remanded for proper determination with record support.


Headnotes

[1] A conviction for aggravated assault with a firearm cannot be reclassified to a second-degree felony under section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes, because the use of a firea…

[2] A trial court's order denying a motion to correct an illegal sentence must be supported by record attachments that conclusively refute the defendant's claim.

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Key Quotes

“This court has repeatedly held that the offense of aggravated assault with a firearm under section 784.021(l)(a) cannot be reclassified to a second-degree felony pursuant to section 775.087(1) because use of a firearm is an essential element of that offense.”

Establishes the legal principle that firearm-based aggravated assault offenses cannot be reclassified, which is central to determining whether Patterson's sentences are illegal.

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Facts & Procedural History

Patterson was sentenced in two cases: case 87-2850 to two twelve-year terms for aggravated assault (counts III and IV), and case 87-2852 to fifty-year…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Patterson appeals from denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3:800. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Appellant was sentenced in case number 87-2850 to two twelve-year terms on counts III and IV for aggravated assault. In case 87-2852 the court imposed fifty-year sentences on two counts of armed robbery. In his 3.800 motion appellant argues that although these sentences were negotiated, the court lacked authority to impose them because the sentences exceed the statutory máximums for those offenses. The trial court denied relief on both claims.

The basis for the lower court’s denial of appellant’s first claim for relief was that these third-degree felonies of aggravated assault had been reclassified to second-degree felonies pursuant to section 775.087, Florida Statutes, because appellant possessed a firearm during the commission of these crimes. If the twelve-year sentences were imposed for the offense of aggravated assault with a firearm under section 784.021(l)(a), Florida Statutes, however, appellant would be entitled to relief. This court has repeatedly held that the offense of aggravated assault with a firearm under section 784.021(l)(a) cannot be reclassified to a second-degree felony pursuant to section 775.087(1) because use of a firearm is an essential element of that offense. Harrelson v. State, 624 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Ellison v. State, 538 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Stinson v. State, 520 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Because the trial court did not attach portions of the record to the order denying relief, however, we cannot make this determination. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of relief on this issue.

The trial court was correct in denying relief on appellant’s second claim. Armed robbery is a felony of the first degree punishable by a term of years not exceeding life. § 812.13, Fla. Stat. Appellant’s fifty-year sentences, therefore, are not illegal. See Green v. State, 630 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

The trial court’s order is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Upon remand, if the trial court again determines that appellant’s motion should be denied as to the first issue, the order should be supported by record attachments that conclusively refute appellant’s claim.

MINER, ALLEN and PADOVANO, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Betancourt v. State, 804 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2001)
    …ming a habitualized sentence for a first-degree felony punishable by life); Knickerbocker v. State, 619 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (affirming a habitualized life sentence for a first-degree felony punishable by life); see also Patterson v. State, 693 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (affirming a fifty-year sentence for a first-degree felony punishable by life); Roberts v. State, 685 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (affirming a thirty-five year sentence for a first-degree felony punishable by life). . The Thir…
  • Bass v. State, 739 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
    …an essential element of the crime charged. While it would be error to reclassify a third degree felony to a second degree felony7 for use of a firearm where the use of the firearm is an essential element of the crime charged (see Patterson v. State, 693 So. 2d 74, 75 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)), the imposition of the three year minimum mandatory sentence for use of the firearm8 is required where defendant is convicted of aggravated assault with a firearm. See Carter v. State, 693 So. 2d 111, 112 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)…
  • Betancourt v. State, 767 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)
    …uld follow the quoted portion of the Eady decision today. See Brown v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2753, D2754, - So. 2d -, 1999 WL 1112715 (Fla. 1st DCA Dec. 8, [*559] 1999); Dues v. State, 716 So. 2d 282, 283 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Patterson v. State, 693 So. 2d 74, 75 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Roberts v. State, 685 So. 2d 88, 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Knickerbocker v. State, 619 So. 2d 18, 19 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). We have, however, been unable to find that the First District has receded from it, so we are obliged to…

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