DAVID LEE SIEGLE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1993-10-20
No. 92-03223
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and THREADGILL and BLUE, JJ., concur.
625 So. 2d 955 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1993) Positive Treatment
Cited by 3 cases

Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

We affirm appellant’s convictions for sale and possession of a hallucinogenic substance. However, we find that the trial court erred in imposing adult sanctions without first making the findings required by section 39.059(7)(c), Florida Statutes (1991). This is so even though appellant’s sentence, two years’ Youthful Offender community control, was the result of a plea agreement. Sirmons v. State, 620 So. 2d 1249 (Fla.1993); Thomas v. State, 623 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). After remand the trial court may reimpose the adult sanction provided the statutory findings are made.

Reversed and remanded for resentencing.

SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and THREADGILL and BLUE, JJ., concur.


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  • Evans v. State, 730 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
    …carceration” following a revocation, the imposition of a true split sentence also precludes the trial court from placing a defendant on probation for a period of time that exceeds the un-served portion of a suspended sentence. See Sullivan v. State, 625 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (the total of incarceration, community control, and probation cannot exceed the original suspended sentence). In the present case, the trial court could not lawfully require the defendant to serve a new term of two years of felony…
  • State v. Benjamin, 685 So. 2d 1335 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
    …o years of community control followed by three years of probation. In a true split sentence, upon a violation of probation, the trial court may not order new incarceration that exceeds the remaining balance of the suspended term. Sullivan v. State, 625 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Wallace v. State, 618 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Consequently, it was [*1337] error to give Benjamin a suspended sentence of ten years’ prison. On remand, Benjamin’s sentence may not exceed the five-year term previously suspe…
  • Keri Szewczyk v. State, 16 So. 3d 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)
    …. She correctly contends that the sentence was illegal because it exceeded the three-year suspended incarcerative component of the true split sentence that was originally imposed for an offense she committed on August 8, 2003. See Sullivan v. State, 625 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); see also Evans v. State, 730 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). The State properly concedes that Szewczyk’s sentence was illegal. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for re-sentencing. Reversed and remanded for resentenc-ing. WAL…

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