MICHAEL K. EVANS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Michael Evans appeals the revocation of his probation, challenging a sentence of 37 days in jail plus 2 years of probation imposed for violating the terms of his original probation. The court reverses, holding that when probation is imposed in lieu of a suspended sentence, the maximum penalty for a subsequent probation violation cannot exceed the original suspended sentence.
The court holds that the maximum sentence for a probation violation is limited to the original suspended sentence. When probation is imposed in lieu of a suspended sentence (a true split sentence), the defendant cannot be sentenced to incarceration or probation exceeding the term of the suspended sentence upon revocation.
[1] A trial court cannot impose a sentence greater than the suspended jail sentence initially designated as the sanction for a probation violation.
[2] A true split sentence includes a total period of confinement with a portion of the confinement period suspended and the defendant placed on probation for that suspended p…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the maximum sentence the defendant could receive for a violation of his probation is thirty days in the county jail”
Establishes the core holding that probation revocation penalties are capped at the original suspended sentence
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn May 22, 1997, Evans pleaded nolo contendere to cocaine possession and was placed on 12 months' probation in lieu of a suspended 30-day jail sentenc…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
PADOVANO, J.
Michael Evans, the defendant, appeals a final order revoking his probation. He contends that the trial court erred by imposing a sentence greater than the suspended jail sen tence initially designated as the sanction for a probation violation. We agree and reverse.
On May 22, 1997, the trial court accepted the defendant’s plea of nolo contendere to possession of cocaine and placed him on probation for twelve months in lieu of a suspended term of thirty days in the county jail. The defendant was arrested on a probation violation warrant about six months later when a random drug test revealed that he had used cocaine. He appeared in court on January 15, 1998, and admitted the violation. At that time, the court sentenced the defendant to thirty-seven days in the county jail with credit for thirty-seven days time served to be followed by two years felony drug offender probation.
We conclude that the maximum sentence the defendant could receive for a violation of his probation is thirty days in the county jail. Because the original sentence was a true split sentence as defined in Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161 (Fla.1988), the defendant could not be sentenced on a subsequent •violation of probation for a term greater than the term of the suspended sentence. In Poore, the court defined a true split sentence as a sentence consisting of “a total period of confinement with a portion of the confinement period suspended and the defendant placed on probation for that suspended portion.” Id. at 164.
As the state contends, the sentence in this case is not precisely the same kind of true split sentence the court was referring to in Poore. Here, the probationary term was longer than the jail term, and the trial court suspended the entire jail term, not just a portion of it. Despite these differences, however, the sentence in this case is a true split sentence. More recently, in State v. Powell, 703 So. 2d 444, 445 (Fla. 1997), the supreme court explained that the sentencing classifications identified in Poore were not exclusive, but, rather, they were intended as a summary of “the complex statutory sentencing options available at that time.” The class of true split sentences has now been expanded to include sentences in which the entire in-carcerative term is suspended, see Powell, and sentences in which the probationary term is longer than the suspended jail term. See Szuba v. State, 712 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
Although the opinion in Poore refers to the limits on a new term of “incarceration” following a revocation, the imposition of a true split sentence also precludes the trial court from placing a defendant on probation for a period of time that exceeds the un-served portion of a suspended sentence. See Sullivan v. State, 625 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (the total of incarceration, community control, and probation cannot exceed the original suspended sentence). In the present case, the trial court could not lawfully require the defendant to serve a new term of two years of felony drug offender probation, because the probationary period exceeds the maximum term of the suspended jail sentence.
By ordering probation in lieu of a suspended sentence, the trial court effectively limited the range of penalties that could be imposed in the event of a subsequent revocation. We conclude that the suspended thirty-day sentence was a built-in sanction for failure to comply with the terms and conditions of probation. Consequently, we reverse with instructions to sentence the defendant to not more than thirty days in the county jail with credit for time served. The defendant need not be present for resentencing.
Reversed.
MINER and WOLF, JJ., CONCUR.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Williams v. State, 747 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)…obation. Although the period of community control in appellant’s original sentence was longer than the suspended portion of his incarceration, we interpret this original sentence to be, as urged by appellant, a true split sentence. Evans v. State, 730 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). See also Szuba v. State, 712 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); State v. Powell, 703 So. 2d 444, 445 (Fla.1997) (“Given the different purposes of incarceration and probation, it is not obvious why the length of probation in a true s…
-
Liles v. State, 837 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)…obation was three years’ incarceration. Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161 (Fla.1988); State v. Powell, 703 So. 2d 444 (Fla.1997); Crawford v. State, 763 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Kelly v. State, 762 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Evans v. State, 730 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Accordingly, we reverse with instructions for the trial court to sentence appellant to not more than three years’ incarceration with credit for time served. Reversed and remanded with directions. DAVIS, BROWNING and POLSTON,…
-
Snell v. State, 902 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…. 2d DCA 2000). “The class of true split sentences has now been expanded to include sentences in which the entire in-carcerative term is suspended, and sentences in which the probationary term is longer than the suspended jail term.” Evans v. State, 730 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). See also Liles v. State, 837 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (holding that a sentence structured with three years incarceration (suspended) and eight years of sex offender probation was a true split sentence). Essentially, these…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1988)
- State v. Powell, 703 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1997)
- Szuba v. State, 712 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Daniels v. Reeves, 712 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)
- Sullivan v. State, 625 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Siegle v. State, 625 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)