EUGENE MONSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal on the firearm possession charge due to insufficient evidence and in denying the motion to sever the firearm possession charge from the cocaine possession charge.
[1] A conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon requires affirmative evidence that the defendant is the person named in the prior felony judgment.
[2] Severance of a charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon from other charges should be granted.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of cocaine. He appealed these convictions, raising issues regar…
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ERVIN, Judge.
Appellant, Eugene Monson, raises three issues in this appeal. The first challenges his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the second challenges the trial court’s ruling on his motion to sever, and the third is a sentencing issue.
As to the first issue, we" hold that the trial court erred by denying appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, because the state failed to prove a prima facie case in that it did not present any affirmative evidence that the person named in the certified armed robbery judgment was appellant. See Killingsworth v. State, 584 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Sinkfield v. State, 592 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Miller v. State, 573 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Appellant’s conviction is therefore reversed.
As for the second issue, we hold that the trial court erred by denying appellant’s motion to sever the firearm possession charge from the charge of possession of cocaine. “Although the granting of a motion to sever is discretionary, if one of the several charges to be tried is convicted felon in possession of a firearm, severance should be granted.” Fox v. State, 543 So. 2d 340, 341 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Accord Vazquez v. State, 419 So. 2d 1088 (Fla.1982); Thomas v. State, 440 So. 2d 581 (Fla.1983); Craft v. State, 441 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Riley v. State, 434 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Smith v. State, 434 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). We therefore reverse appellant’s conviction for possession of cocaine and remand for new trial.
The judgment and sentences are reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions that appellant be discharged as to the charge of felon in possession of a firearm and a new trial be provided for the drug-possession charge. Because of our disposition of the first two issues, it is unnecessary to consider appellant’s sentencing issue.
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.
JOANOS and WOLF, JJ., concur.
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Little Tommy Tucker v. State, 884 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…ther offenses. We agree. Although a trial court has discretion to grant or deny a motion for severance, that discretion has been sharply curtailed when it concerns a request to sever a charge of felon in possession of a firearm. See Monson v. State, 627 So. 2d 1301, 1302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Craft v. State, 441 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Even if consolidation is the “most practical and efficient method of processing” a case, practicality and efficiency should not outweigh a defendant’s right to a fair tri…
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McGRIFF v. State, 160 So. 3d 167 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)…ion 776.013(3). Accordingly, the trial court should have severed count II from the remaining charges for purposes of trial, See State v. Vazquez, 419 So. 2d 1088, 1090 (Fla.1982); Shuler v. State, 929 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Monson v. State, 627 So. 2d 1301, 1302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). For these reasons, we reverse Appellant’s judgment and sentence on counts I (manslaughter) and III (carrying a concealed firearm) and remand for a new trial on those counts consistent with this opinion. We affirm Appellan…
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Mason v. State, 853 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)…la. 5th DCA 1999) (reversing conviction for possession of firearm by a convicted felon because a certified copy of a prior felony conviction with defendant’s name on it did not establish the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator); Monson v. State, 627 So. 2d 1301, 1302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (“[T]he trial court erred by denying appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, because the state failed to prove ... that the person named in the certified a…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- State v. Vazquez, 419 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 1982)
- Killingsworth v. State, 584 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Craft v. State, 441 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Alton Freddie Miller v. State, 573 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Elbert Roy Smith v. State, 434 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)
- Mangle Mosley v. State, 543 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- THE Florida BAR v. Kenworthy, 440 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1983)
- Thomas v. State, 440 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1983)
- FOX v. State, 543 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Fernandez v. State, 434 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)