SANDRA EATON, APPELLANT,
v.
PETER A. GURRY, APPELLEE
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Sandra Eaton appealed the denial of her claim for reasonable compensation for work performed at a restaurant owned by Peter Gurry, with whom she lived but was not married. The court held that denial of compensation based solely on the parties' nonmarital cohabitation relationship was error, and reversed and remanded for reconsideration.
The trial court erred in denying compensation based solely on the meretricious nature of the relationship. A party in a nonmarital cohabitation relationship may recover for services rendered as long as the consideration is not related to an agreement regarding sexual relations.
[1] A claim for the reasonable value of services rendered during a nonmarital cohabitation is not automatically barred solely because of the parties' relationship.
[2] Dicta in prior case law stating compensation for services during a meretricious relationship is unrecoverable does not preclude such claims when the holding of that case…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court erred by denying compensation solely because the parties were living together at the time the services were rendered”
Establishes the core holding that nonmarital cohabitation alone cannot bar recovery for services
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSandra Eaton and Peter Gurry lived together but were not married. During their relationship, Eaton worked for Gurry at the Porthole, a restaurant and …
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BLUE, Judge.
Sandra Eaton appeals the denial of her claim for the reasonable value of her work as cook, bartender, waitress, janitor, and sometimes manager of the Porthole, a restaurant and bar owned by Peter Gurry. Eaton and Gurry lived together but were not married during the time she worked at the Porthole. After a non-jury trial, the court determined that the relationship between Eaton and Gurry was “meretricious” and denied recovery. We hold that the court erred by denying compensation solely because the parties were living together at the time the services were rendered.
In reaching its decision, the trial court relied on Botsikas v. Yarmark, 172 So. 2d 277 (Fla.3d DCA), cert. dismissed, 179 So. 2d 211 (Fla.1965), which states, “Compensation for services rendered by the appellant during the existence of the meretricious relationship of course would not be recoverable.” 172 So. 2d at 279. A careful reading of Botsikas leads us to conclude the quoted statement is dicta, in light of its holding that a constructive trust is available as a remedy for a party seeking to recover contributions made during a nonmarital relationship. See also Evans v. Wall, 542 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (citing Botsikas to support a constructive trust between cohabitating parties as long as the consideration was not related to any agreement regarding sexual relations).
Although this court has not previously decided this issue, we are persuaded that the Fourth District has correctly stated the law. Poe v. Estate of Levy, 411 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (allowing a cause of action based on services rendered between unmarried cohabitants); Stevens v. Muse, 562 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (holding agreements between unmarried cohabitants were not violative of public policy).
Eaton does not appeal, and we do not address, the court’s ruling that she waived her claim for services prior to October 3, 1988. We hold only that the trial court erred in denying claims arising after that date when the denial was based on her relationship with Gurry. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further consideration in conformance with this opinion.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and THREADGILL, J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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LEE Cnty. v. Eaton, 642 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…eth Judicial Circuit. The action alleged that Ms. Eaton was entitled to recover the value of her services to Mr. Gurry under quantum meruit. The trial court denied the claim after a nonjury trial. This court reversed that judgment in Eaton v. Gurry, 627 So. 2d 1317 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). On remand, Ms. Eaton filed a motion in the circuit court seeking taxation of her appellate costs under rule 9.400(a). Without notice to Lee County, the trial court entered an order requiring it to pay for the cost of the transcr…
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State v. Sullivan, 727 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…rt, a trial court does not have jurisdiction to set aside a judgment of paternity more than one year after its rendition, even where a private blood test suggests that the party is not the biological fáther. 691 So. 2d at 12. See Lathrop v. Lathrop, 627 So. 2d 1317 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Miller v. Cowart, 546 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). In the present case,, there was no showing of fraud on the court. Therefore, it was error for the trial court to find that Sullivan was not the biological father of the child.…
Authorities Cited
- POE v. Est. OF Gertrude Levy, 411 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Botsikas v. Yarmark, 172 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
- Evans v. Kathie Wall, 542 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
- Stevens v. Robbyn Muse, 562 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
- O'Brien v. Fla. Bd. of Pharmacy, 179 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1965)
- Evans v. State, 179 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1965)