BYTE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
MAURICE GUSMAN RESIDUARY TRUST NUMBER 1, ETC., APPELLEE
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Byte International appeals an award of attorney's fees and costs to a landlord in a possession action, arguing that Florida Statute 83.231 authorizes attorney's fees only when both possession and money damages are awarded. The Florida Third District Court of Appeal affirms, holding that the statute's use of "and" should be construed as "or" based on legislative intent, permitting attorney's fees in possession-only actions.
The statute authorizes attorney's fees and costs in a possession action even when only possession is awarded and no money damages are recovered. The word "and" in the statute should be construed as "or" to permit attorney's fees in cases involving possession only or possession combined with money damages.
[1] A court may construe "and" as "or" in a statute to avoid an unintended or unreasonable result that would defeat legislative intent.
[2] The legislative history of a statute may be judicially noticed to clarify ambiguity and illuminate legislative intent.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the plaintiff in the judgment for possession and money damages may also he awarded attorney's fees and costs”
The statutory language of section 83.231 at issue in the case, which the court interpreted to allow attorney's fees either with possession alone or with possession and money damages
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Maurice Gusman Residuary Trust, as landlord, brought an action against Byte International Corporation, as tenant, to recover possession of premise…
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PER CURIAM.
Byte International Corporation (Byte) appeals an award of attorney’s fees and costs to the Maurice Gusman Residuary Trust in an action by the Gusman Trust, acting as landlord, to recover possession against the tenant Byte pursuant to section 83.231, Florida Statutes (1991). Money damages were neither sought nor awarded. Byte challenges the award of attorney’s fees and costs on the ground that the statute, in derogation of the common law, does not authorize attorney’s fees unless both possession and money damages are awarded. We agree with the trial judge’s ruling, and affirm the award of attorney’s fees and costs.
Section 83.231 provides in part:
If the issues are found for plaintiff, judgment shall be entered that he recover possession of the premises. In addition to awarding possession of the premises to the plaintiff, the court shall also direct, in an amount which is within its jurisdictional limitations, the entry of a money judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the amount of money found due, owing, and unpaid by the defendant, with costs [T]he plaintiff in the judgment for possession and money damages may also he awarded attorney’s fees and costs, (emphasis added).
Courts may construe “and” as “or” in statutes where a construction based on the strict reading of the statute would lead to an unintended or unreasonable result and would defeat the legislative intent of the statute. Winemiller v. Feddish, 568 So. 2d 483, 485 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Following the reasoning of Winemiller, we see no reason why the word “and” used in the statute should not be given the meaning “or” in the circumstances of only recovering possession of real property and not also recovering money damages. Such a construction is entirely in accord with the legislative history of the enactment of this particular statute. The debate before the Florida House of Representatives on the final passage of section 83.231, Florida Statutes (1991) reflects this construction:
Representative Renke: Under Section 1 on page 2 of the bill, the Florida Statute 83.231 provides that “the plaintiff in the judgment for possession and money damages may also be awarded attorney’s fees and costs.” Is the intent of that to allow the plaintiff to recover attorney fees in the case where he only goes for a judgment of possession, even if he is not seeking money costs?
Representative Drage: I believe that the intent of this bill — and I’ll stand corrected if Mr. Cosgrove disagrees — is to make sure that attorney’s fees will be awarded either in the case eviction without money damages is involved or in the case where there is an eviction with money damages involved.
The legislative history of the adoption of a statute may be judicially noticed by the court to clarify ambiguity and illuminate the judiciary as to legislative intent. Amos v. Moseley, 74 Fla. 555, 77 So. 619 (1917). Here, legislative intent clearly includes permitting a landlord to recover attorney’s fees from a tenant pursuant to a judgment for possession only or pursuant to a judgment for possession and money damages.
Accordingly, the order of the trial court awarding attorney’s fees and costs is affirmed.
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Corfan Banco Asuncion Paraguay v. Ocean Bank, 715 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…. Eventually, Silva acknowledged that he owed Corfan Bank $72,972.00 and gave Corfan a series of post-dated checks to repay that amount, plus interest. However all the checks bounced. . See Byte Int’l Corp. v. Maurice Gusman Residuary Trust No. 1, 629 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Harper v. Cooper, 226 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969); Infante v. State, 197 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967); Dotty v. State, 197 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967). . One respected treatise on the Uniform Commercial Code analyzes the…
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Burger King Corporation/Cigna Ins. Co. v. Moreno, 689 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)…and” in the statute as “or.” Unlike the cases relied upon by appellants, the present case does not involve a clear expression of legislative intent which is contrary to the plain language of the statute. See Byte Int’l Corp. v. Maurice Gusman Trust, 629 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Winemiller v. Feddish, 568 So. 2d 483, 486 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). The construction of the statute employed by the JCC meets the legislative aim, as expressed in section 440.15, Florida Statutes (1991), by eliminating supplemental b…
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Triplett v. State, 709 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)…ourt did not expressly consider whether the legislature intended that the conjunction “and” used between subsections 1 and 2 of the amended section 775.089(l)(a) should mean “or.” See Byte International Corp. v. Maurice Gusman Residuary Trust No. 1, 629 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Winemiller v. [*111] Feddish, 568 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 4th DCA1990)3. Since it appears that the “defendant’s offense” would always be a part of, and normally the culmination of, any “criminal episode,” the amendment appears meaningle…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ernest Amos as Comptroller of the State of Fla. v. Burke and John Neel, 74 Fla. 555 (Fla. 1917)
- Winemiller v. Feddish, 568 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)