BURGER KING CORPORATION/CIGNA INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANTS,
v.
JUANA MORENO, APPELLEE
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In a workers' compensation case, the court affirmed that a 69-year-old claimant injured while receiving Social Security retirement benefits remains entitled to permanent total disability supplemental benefits because the statutory cessation requirement applies only to employees eligible for both Social Security retirement and disability benefits, and she could never qualify for disability benefits due to her age.
The statute's requirement that supplemental benefits cease at age 62 if the employee is eligible for both Social Security retirement and disability benefits applies only when the employee is eligible for both types of benefits. Since Moreno could never be eligible for disability benefits after reaching retirement age, the cessation provision does not apply, and she remains entitled to supplemental benefits.
[1] Workers' compensation supplemental benefits cease at age 62 if the employee is eligible for both social security retirement and disability benefits.
[2] Social security disability benefits are not payable to an individual who has attained the retirement age for social security purposes.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The unambiguous language of the statute before us would require, prior to cessation of entitlement to supplemental benefits, that the employee has reached age 62 and is eligible for both retirement and disability benefits under the Social Security Act.”
Establishes the court's interpretation that both conditions must be met for cessation to occur.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJuana Moreno was 69 years old when she suffered a work-related injury that rendered her permanently and totally disabled. At the time of her injury, s…
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KAHN, Judge.
In this workers’ compensation case, the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) applied the literal terms of section 440.15(l)(e)l., Florida Statutes (1991), and held that a claimant, 69 years old at the time of her injury, and who is receiving social security retirement benefits is entitled to permanent total disability supplemental benefits. We affirm.
The statute in question provides, in pertinent part, that entitlement to supplemental benefits “shall cease at age 62 if the employee is eligible for social security benefits under 42 U.S.C. ss. 402 and 423, whether or not the employee has applied for such benefits.” The federal statutes mentioned provide for, respectively, social security retirement benefits and social security disability benefits. Without question, the claimant in the present case suffered her injury and became permanently and totally disabled when she was 69 years old. The unambiguous language of the statute before us would require, prior to cessation of entitlement to supplemental benefits, that the employee has reached age 62 and is eligible for both retirement and disability benefits under the Social Security Act. As noted by the JCC, 42 U.S.C. section 423(a)(l)B provides that disability benefits are not payable to any individual who has attained retirement age for social security purposes. Retirement age under 42 U.S.C. section 416(i)(l)(A) is 65 years old.
Accordingly, Moreno was not eligible for social security disability benefits at the time she became permanently and totally disabled and will never be eligible for such benefits. The statute is clear and unambiguous, and the JCC did not err in applying its literal terms. Capers v. State, 678 So. 2d 330 (Fla.1996); City of Miami Beach v. Galbut, 626 So. 2d 192 (Fla.1993).
We decline appellant’s invitation to construe the word “and” in the statute as “or.” Unlike the cases relied upon by appellants, the present case does not involve a clear expression of legislative intent which is contrary to the plain language of the statute. See Byte Int’l Corp. v. Maurice Gusman Trust, 629 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Winemiller v. Feddish, 568 So. 2d 483, 486 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
The construction of the statute employed by the JCC meets the legislative aim, as expressed in section 440.15, Florida Statutes (1991), by eliminating supplemental benefits for certain claimants between the ages of 62 and 65. Legislative intent to eliminate supplemental benefits for all claimants receiving either social security disability or retirement benefits is not clear, and we choose not to rewrite the statute.
Finally, in this case the employer and carrier failed to show Moreno’s entitlement to social security disability benefits by virtue of her work-related injury or any other cause. Accordingly, we have no evidence in the record before us from which we might conclude, but for the age bar, claimant would be eligible for social security disability benefits.
AFFIRMED.
ERVIN and BENTON, JJ., concur.
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City OF Clearwater v. Judi Acker, 755 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1999)…6 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), and the addition of a provision which terminates this benefit when the recipient becomes eligible for social security retirement benefits and social security disability benefits. See Burger King Corp./CIGNA Ins. Co. v. Moreno, 689 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). . The claimant in Shipp was arguing he was entitled to supplemental benefits even though' he had settled his worker’s compensation claim with a lump-sum payment. . Moreover, recipients of periodic payments, especially those wh…
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Scott v. Mohawk Canoes & Riscorp Risk Mgmt., 730 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…benefits, citing section 440.15(l)(e)l, Florida Statutes (1991), as authority. The JCC found that E/C had correctly ceased payment of supplemental benefits. We disagree, and reverse the JCC’s order. As we explained in Burger King Corp. v. Moreno, 689 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), the unambiguous language of section 440.15(l)(e)l, Florida Statutes, requires that prior to cessation of entitlement to supplemental benefits, a claimant must be eligible for both retirement and disability benefits under the Soc…
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Gracette Wilkins v. Broward Cnty. Sch. Bd. & Gallagher Bassett Servs., Inc., 754 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…red in excluding supplemental benefits after age 65. We affirm. During the attorneys’ fee hearing before the JCC, a dispute arose regarding the calculation of benefits and the applicability of this court’s statements in Burger King Corp. v. Moreno, 689 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), concerning section 440.15(l)(e)l., Florida Statutes. Section 440.15(l)(e)l., Florida Statutes (1993), provides that entitlement to permanent total disability (PTD) supplemental benefits “shall cease at age 62 if the employee is…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Capers v. State, 678 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1996)
- City OF Miami Beach v. Galbut, 626 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1993)
- Winemiller v. Feddish, 568 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
- Robbins v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 629 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
- Byte Int'l Corp. v. Maurice Gusman Residuary Tr. No. 1, 629 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)