JOHN DYER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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John Dyer appealed the summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence for sexual battery on a child. The court reversed, finding that Dyer's sentence of 15 years imprisonment followed by life probation exceeded the statutory maximum of 40 years combined, and remanded for resentencing within legal limits.
The sentence is illegal because it violates the statutory maximum. Once the judge elected a term of years (15 years), the maximum permissible probation is 25 years, as the combined sentence cannot exceed 40 years. The illegality of the sentence cannot be cured by the existence of a valid plea agreement.
[1] A sentence of 15 years incarceration followed by life probation is illegal when the underlying felony is punishable by a term of imprisonment for life or by a term not ex…
[2] Once a judge enumerates a term of incarceration for a felony punishable by life or up to 40 years, the maximum probation that can follow is 25 years, as the combined sent…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Once the judge enumerated a term of 15 years in the DOC, the judge elected to sentence Dyer to a term of years. Therefore, the maximum probation that can follow is 25 years.”
Establishes the core legal principle that a definite prison term limits subsequent probation to maintain statutory maximum compliance
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDyer, age 23, was originally charged with capital sexual battery against a child under 12. As part of a plea agreement, the state reduced the charge t…
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THOMPSON, Judge.
The defendant, John Dyer (“Dyer”), appeals a Summary Denial of a 3.800(a) Motion to correct an illegal sentence. We reverse.
Dyer was originally charged with a capital sexual battery.1 The victim at the time was a child under 12 years of age and Dyer was 23 years of age. Dyer entered a plea of nolo contendere to the lesser life felony of sexual battery on a child under 12 years of age by a person under 18 years of age.2 As part of the plea negotiation, the state reduced the charge from capital battery with a 25 year minimum mandatory sentence to a life felony. Dyer agreed to a sentence of 15 years in the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) with life probation. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Dyer was originally sentenced to life probation with a condition of 15 years in the DOC. After being sentenced, Dyer filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence.3 This sentence was corrected by an amended order which sentenced Dyer to 15 years incarceration followed by life probation. Dyer argues that this sentence is also illegal and excessive because it violates the statutory maximum.
Dyer entered a plea to a life felony. This felony was committed after 1 October 1983 and is therefore punishable by a term of imprisonment for life or by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 40 years.4 The trial judge sentenced Dyer to 15 years incarceration followed by life probation. This sentence is illegal. Taylor v. State, 573 So. 2d 173, 174 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). Once the judge enumerated a term of 15 years in the DOC, the judge elected to sentence Dyer to a term of years. Therefore, the maximum probation that can follow is 25 years. See Mitchell v. State, 573 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). The reason probation can not exceed 25 years is that the combined sentence must fall within the statutory maximum of 40 years. See Wilson v. State, 622 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Ward v. State, 558 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). The fact that his sentence was the result of a valid plea agreement does not make the sentence imposed a legal sentence. The trial court cannot impose an illegal sentence even if the sentence is pursuant to a valid plea agreement. See Watkins v. State, 613 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Williams v. State, 500 So. 2d 501 (Fla.1986), receded from on other grounds, Quarterman v. State, 527 So. 2d 1380 (Fla.1988).
We reverse the denial of the 3.800(a) motion and remand with directions that Dyer be resentenced. Although Dyer was sentenced on 10 November 1987 to serve 15 years in the DOC, he has been lawfully released from prison and is currently on probation. At the resentencing, the trial judge has two options. The first option, a “true split sentence,” is to sentence Dyer to imprisonment for life, suspended after 15 years, with credit for time served, with the balance to be served on probation. The second option, a “probationary split sentence,” is to sentence Dyer to 15 years in the DOC, with credit for time served, followed by 25 years probation. The trial judge can sentence Dyer to a combined sentence not to exceed 40 years. See Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161, 164 (Fla.1981).
Dyer may argue at resentencing that he is being punished for his success on appeal. That is incorrect. His sentence is not being increased, only corrected to fulfill his negotiated plea. Therefore, the sentence is lawful and not vindictive. Wood v. State, 582 So. 2d 751, 754 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).
REVERSED and REMANDED for resentencing.
HARRIS, C.J., and GRIFFIN, J., concur. . Sections 794.011(2) and 775.082(1), Fla.Stat. (1991).
. Sections 794.011(2) and 775.082(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991).
. See § 775.082(3), Fla.Stat. (1991).
. Dyer's original sentence is not before this court. The assistant state attorney at the motion hearing agreed that sentence was illegal and the trial judge entered the amended order which is before this court.
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Cited By (17 total)
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Jones v. State, 872 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…. denied, 535 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 1794, 152 L.Ed.2d 652 (2002); Bowles v. Singletary, 698 So. 2d 1201 (Fla.1997). . See Shelton v. State, 739 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Cheney v. State, 640 So. 2d 103, 105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Dyer v. State, 629 So. 2d 285, 286 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Stephens v. State, 627 So. 2d 543, 544 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). . Kendrick v. State, 817 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Williams v. State, 782 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 805 So. 2d 811 (Fla.2001); Smith v. State,…
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Gonzales v. State, 816 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…om on other grounds Quarterman v. State, 527 So. 2d 1380 (Fla.1988); Hollybrook v. State, 795 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Sohl v. State, 710 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Cheney v. State, 640 So. 2d 103, 105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Dyer v. State, 629 So. 2d 285, 286 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Stephens v. State, 627 So. 2d 543, 544 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Even with a defendant’s consent, the court is without jurisdiction to impose a sentence beyond the statutory maximum. Collins v. State, 697 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 4th DC…
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Holloway v. State, 668 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…f cases which hold that, when sentencing a defendant for a “life felony” the total split sentence consisting of a term of years plus probation may not exceed forty years. See State v. Holmes, 360 So. 2d 380 (Fla.1978). For example, in Dyer v. State, 629 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), this court held that a term of fifteen years incarceration followed by a term of life probation exceeded the statutory maximum of forty years for a life felony. See also White v. State, 652 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Turner…
Previewing 3 of 17 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1988)
- THE Florida BAR v. Mullins, 527 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1988)
- Williams v. State, 500 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1986)
- Wood v. State, 582 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)
- Wilson v. State, 622 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Taylor v. State, 573 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)
- NME Hosps., Inc. v. Azzariti, 573 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Ward v. State, 558 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Spradling v. State, 573 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Kerrie Marlene Mitchell v. State, 573 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)