RAYMOND LEE WILSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Raymond Wilson appeals the denial of his motion to correct sentence, arguing his concurrent split sentences exceed statutory maximums. The court affirms in part and reverses in part, finding that while the life felony sentences violate the 40-year cap and must be corrected on remand, the first degree/life felony sentences are lawful under a statutory anomaly.
The life felony sentences are excessive and must be corrected because the total sanction of 65 years exceeds the 40-year statutory maximum for crimes committed after October 1, 1983. The first degree/life felony sentences are lawful because they are punishable by 'a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment' without a 40-year limitation. Any guideline scoresheet error is immaterial because Wilson agreed to specific sentence lengths.
[1] A split sentence for a life felony committed after October 1, 1983, is limited to a total sanction of 40 years, including prison and probation.
[2] Sentences for first-degree felonies punishable by life imprisonment are not subject to the 40-year statutory maximum applicable to life felonies.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The total duration of a split sentence must fall within the statutory maximum.”
Establishes the governing legal principle for evaluating split sentences against statutory caps.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilson entered a negotiated plea covering multiple offenses: three life felonies and two first degree felonies punishable by life. For the life feloni…
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PER CURIAM.
Raymond Wilson appeals the summary denial of his motion to correct sentence. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Wilson entered a negotiated plea which covered a number of offenses. Three were life felonies1 and two were first degree felonies punishable by life.2 Concurrent split sentences were imposed for each offense. Wilson now argues that these sentences exceed the statutory maximum.3
For the life felonies, the sentence was 35 years prison followed by 30 years probation, that is, a total sanction of 65 years. However, when a court opts to impose a term of years for a life felony committed after October 1, 1983, it is limited to 40 years. § 775.082(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1991). The total duration of a split sentence must fall within the statutory maximum. Mitchell v. State, 573 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Accordingly, Wilson’s life felony sentences are excessive by 25 years and must be corrected after remand.
By virtue of a statutory anomaly, the sentences for the first degree/life felonies — 30 years prison plus 30 years probation — are not unlawfully excessive. Such crimes are punishable by “a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment.” § 775.-082(3)(b), Fla.Stat. (1991). Unlike those which may be imposed for life felonies, such “terms” are not limited to 40 years. Sterling v. State, 584 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 592 So. 2d 682 (Fla.1991). We affirm the denial of postconviction relief as to these sentences.
A final argument concerns an alleged error in Wilson’s guideline score-sheet. As to this the circuit court found, and we agree, that any computational error in the scoresheet is immaterial since Wilson agreed to the specific length of the sentences that he received. Cf. Orsi v. State, 515 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 2d DCA1987). There is no indication that Wilson’s plea negotiation contemplated a guideline sentence, as occurred in such cases as Cannon v. State, 548 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 2d DCA1989). We affirm the trial court on this issue also.
It is debatable whether this limited reversal will or should confer any significant practical benefit upon Wilson. Reviewing the plea and sentencing transcripts, we find that the probationary terms were a vital component of the plea offer made by the state. Although the split sentences imposed for the life felonies are technically illegal, after remand the trial court may impose any combination of prison and probation that will satisfy its original intent at the time of sentencing, so long as no individual sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Mitchell.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and THREADGILL and ALTENBERND, JJ., concur. . Sexual battery, as defined in § 794.011(3), Fla. Stat. (1991).
. Kidnapping, § 787.01(2), Fla.Stat. (1991), and burglary with assault, § 810.02(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1991).
.Lesser felonies and a misdemeanor are not contested in the motion.
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Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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Dyer v. State, 629 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)…imum probation that can follow is 25 years. See Mitchell v. State, 573 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). The reason probation can not exceed 25 years is that the combined sentence must fall within the statutory maximum of 40 years. See Wilson v. State, 622 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Ward v. State, 558 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). The fact that his sentence was the result of a valid plea agreement does not make the sentence imposed a legal sentence. The trial court cannot impose an illegal sentence even if…
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Stephens v. State, 627 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)…ty years. Sterling v. State, 584 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), rev. denied, 592 So. 2d 682 (Fla.1991); Greenhalgh v. State, 582 So. 2d at 108. Moreover, the total duration of a split sentence must fall within the statutory maximum. Wilson v. State, 622 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Thus, the concurrent seventy-year terms of imprisonment followed by life probation for the two sexual batteries exceed the maximum provided by law. The burglary sentence, however, is not excessive because it is a first-degree fe…
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Mills v. State, 642 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…e anomaly in the sentencing statutes has been observed in numerous other cases. See Green v. State, 630 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Crabtree v. State, 624 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), rev. denied, 634 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 1994); Wilson v. State, 622 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Sterling v. State, 584 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 592 So. 2d 682 (Fla.1991); Dunn v. State, 522 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). It should be noted, as was done in Crabtree, that the defendant has raised no constitution…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Kip Sterling v. State, 584 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Roberts, 515 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)
- Orsi v. State, 515 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- Cannon v. State, 548 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Spradling v. State, 573 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Kerrie Marlene Mitchell v. State, 573 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)