CLARENCE STEVEN WHEATLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that a probation condition imposing a cost not statutorily authorized is illegal, and a written condition that differs from the oral pronouncement is also illegal.
[1] A condition of probation requiring submission to drug/alcohol evaluation and counseling as directed by an officer is statutorily authorized.
[2] A cost associated with participation in a work program is an illegal condition of probation if it is not statutorily authorized.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceClarence Wheatley pleaded nolo contendere to sale of a controlled substance and was adjudicated guilty, with probation and community control imposed. …
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PER CURIAM.
Clarence Wheatley appeals a final judgment and probation order which, pursuant to his plea of nolo contendere to sale of a controlled substance, adjudicate him guilty of the offense and place him on community control for a period of two years, followed by a three-year period of probation. Wheatley contends that the circuit court erred in imposing three illegal conditions of probation.
We affirm condition # 15 of the probation order, which orders Wheatley to “submit to drug/aleohol evaluation and counseling as directed by your Officer.”1 See § 948.-03(1)(j)1, Fla.Stat. (1989); Boudreaux v. State, 578-So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Rowland v. State, 548 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
We reverse condition # 14 of the probation order, which orders Wheatley to pay $200 as an additional cost associated with his participation in the Bay County Work Program, because this cost is not statutorily authorized.2 Martin v. State, 618 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
We also reverse condition # 18 of the probation order, which directs Wheatley to stay away from five specified areas apparently located in Bay County. This written condition fails to conform with the oral pronouncement that Wheatley “stay away from areas in Bay County that are known to be ... high drug use areas, to be defined by your probation officer....”3 Sumter v. State, 570 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. dismissed, 583 So. 2d 1037 (Fla.1991).
Accordingly, the probation and community control orders are reversed and this cause is remanded with directions to strike condition # 14 of the probation order and condition # 19 of the community control order, and to reconsider condition # 18 of probation and condition #24 of community control.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED and REMANDED in part.
ZEHMER, C.J., and JOANOS and MICKLE, JJ., concur. . Condition # 20 of the community control order also imposes this requirement.
. Condition # 19 of the community control order also imposes this requirement.
. Condition # 24 of the community control order also imposes this requirement.
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Starr Tyme, Inc. v. Cohen, 659 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 1995)…rd Doney v. State, 648 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (final judgment of conviction entered pursuant to plea of nolo contendere), review denied, 659 So. 2d 272 (Fla.1995); Doyle v. State, 644 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (same); Wheatley v. State, 629 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (same). A “final judgment” is not exempt from the plain language of the estoppel statute simply because it was entered pursuant to a plea of nolo contendere. Moreover, the district court’s concern that the judgment of conviction…
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Edwards v. State, 656 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…ount of $20.00, as authorized by section 960.20, Florida Statutes (1989).1 In addition, the assessment of $200.00 as an additional cost associated with appellant’s participation in the Bay County Work Program must be stricken. See Wheatley v. State, 629 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Blanchette v. State, 620 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Martin v. State, 618 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). See also Thomas v. State, 633 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 640 So. 2d 1109 (Fla.1994). Finally, appellan…
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Carter v. State, 975 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)…iring [the defendant] to complete a drug or alcohol rehabilitation program as recommended by [his] probation [officer].” This Court rejected the claim that the condition vested unbridled discretion in the probation officer. Accord Wheatley v. State, 629 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (upholding condition which ordered defendant to “submit to drug/alcohol evaluation and counseling as directed by your Officer”); Rowland v. State, 548 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (approving condition that “You will receive alc…
Authorities Cited
- Rowland v. State, 548 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Sumter v. State, 570 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Smith v. State, 618 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Martin v. State, 618 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)