JUDITH LUNDELL, APPELLANT,
v.
RICHARD LUNDELL, APPELLEE
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Judith Lundell appeals a trial court order classifying a health insurance provision in her divorce settlement as an unmodifiable property settlement rather than a modifiable support obligation. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the provision could constitute a support obligation depending on the facts and circumstances, and remanded for further proceedings to determine need and ability to pay.
The court reversed the trial court's order, holding that depending on the particular facts and circumstances, a health insurance provision may be either an unmodifiable property settlement or a modifiable support obligation. The general master's determination that the provision was in the nature of a support obligation was supported by substantial competent evidence and should not have been disturbed. The case was remanded to determine need and ability to pay.
[1] A provision requiring one former spouse to provide health insurance to the other may be characterized as either an unmodifiable property settlement or a modifiable suppor…
[2] A trial court errs in disturbing a general master's finding when there is substantial competent evidence in the record to support it.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Depending upon the particular facts and circumstances, a provision requiring one former spouse to provide health insurance to the other may be in the nature of an unmodifiable property settlement, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 485 So.2d 20 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); In re Markizer, 66 B.R. 1014 (Bkrtcy. S.D.Fla.1986), or it may be in the nature of a modifiable support obligation.”
Establishes the key legal principle that characterization of health insurance provisions depends on facts and circumstances and can be either property or support.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJudith and Richard Lundell's property settlement agreement, incorporated into their final judgment of dissolution, included a provision requiring Rich…
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PER CURIAM.
The former wife, Judith Lundell, appeals the trial court order upholding the former husband’s exceptions to the general master’s report in her modification proceeding. The master had determined a health insurance provision in the parties’ property settlement agreement, incorporated into the final judgment of dissolution, to be in the nature of a support obligation, and recommended the court order Appellee to provide Appellant with medical and dental insurance, or reimburse her for the cost of obtaining it herself. The court instead found the insurance provision to be in the nature of a property settlement, not subject to modification.
We reverse. Depending upon the particular facts and circumstances, a provision requiring one former spouse to provide health insurance to the other may be in the nature of an unmodifiable property settlement, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 485 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); In re Markizer, 66 B.R. 1014 (Bkrtcy. S.D.Fla.1986), or it may be in the nature of a modifiable support obligation. E.g., Putnam v. Putnam, 226 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 234 So. 2d 118 (Fla.1969); Fisher v. Fisher, 202 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967).
While the facts of the instant case are not clearly one-sided, there was substantial competent evidence in the record to support the general master’s finding.1 Consequently, it was error for the trial court to disturb it. Matos v. Matos, 421 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
Although Appellant neither filed exceptions to an earlier report of the general master, recommending denial of her motion for contempt for Appellee’s failure to comply with the insurance provision, nor appealed the trial court’s order approving that report, the law of the case doctrine does not control the result here, as the precise issue — categorizing the provision as being in the nature of either support or property settlement — was not “necessarily” determined in the earlier proceeding. State v. Stabile, 443 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
It does not appear from our record that there has been a determination of need and ability to pay. Therefore, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ANSTEAD, STONE and POLEN, JJ., concur. . The instant property settlement agreement not only divided the parties' property, but also addressed the former husband’s support obligations to their minor child, the child's custody, and the husband's visitation and included the former wife’s waiver of alimony; furthermore, the agreement provided that Appellee's obligation to maintain health insurance for Appellant would to continue until her death or remarriage.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Whitcomb v. Whitcomb, 669 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…he wife argues that the insurance provision in the marital settlement agreement was a nonmodifiable property settlement. We disagree, and hold that section of the agreement was part of Mr. Whitcomb’s child support obligation. See Lundell v. Lundell, 629 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (provision in marital settlement agreement requiring husband to provide health insurance to wife was modifiable). A court may modify child support, retroactive to the date of the petition. State, Dept. of Health and Rehabilitativ…
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MacKay v. Mechetti, 695 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…ad cancer at the time of divorce. It was terminable on the former wife’s death or remarriage, a hallmark of a support obligation rather than a property settlement. See Fisher v. Fisher, 202 So. 2d 868, 870 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967). In Lundell v. Lundell, 629 So. 2d 1013, 1014 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), we determined that a nearly identical medical insurance provision was a support obligation. That the former wife agreed in another provision to waive any claim for permanent alimony is not controlling, because she did not…
Authorities Cited
- Putnam v. Putnam, 226 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)
- Matos v. Otsenre E. Matos, 421 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)
- Kingsway Condo. Apts. NO. 1, Inc. v. Kingsway Builders, Inc., 443 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- State v. Stabile, 443 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- Fisher v. Fisher, 202 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967)
- McDONALD v. State, 485 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- Hall v. Fla. State Dep't of Pub. Welf., 234 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 1969)
- Moses v. Besco Elec. Supply Co., 234 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 1969)