NORMA VAUGHAN, APPELLANT,
v.
CLARENCE BUFORD VAUGHAN, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the lower court erred in refusing to consider the application for attorney's fees pendente lite and that the guardianship court's order was facially insufficient.
Appellant sought attorney's fees pendente lite in a dissolution of marriage case. The guardianship court's order, on which the petition was based, was…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Divorce cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The final judgment of dissolution is reversed on two grounds. First, the lower court erred in refusing to consider appellant’s application for attorney’s fees pendente lite on the merits. This was a matter for the court having jurisdiction over the dissolution to determine, not for the guardianship court to decide.1 Additionally, the order of the guardianship court on which the petition was based is facially insufficient to support the guardian’s petition for dissolution and will have to be refiled. Section 744.3725, Florida Statutes, on which petitioner relies, requires the court to authorize the guardian to act after specific steps have been taken and only on clear and convincing evidence.2 Such an order must set forth the guardianship court’s findings and conclusions, otherwise, meaningful appellate review of the final judgment of dissolution would be impossible.
COBB and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. W. SHARP, J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion.
. Based on this record, there is no basis for this court to determine whether appellant is entitled to fees pendente lite or, if so, in what amount or for what legal services.
. Because of the defects we have identified in this opinion, we do not now decide the issue of the power of a guardian, on behalf of his ward, to obtain a divorce from a competent spouse.
W. SHARP, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur with the majority opinion, but write to stress why I think it is particularly important that Norma Vaughan be provided funds for temporary attorney’s fees. This case may well be one of first impression in this state on the question of whether a guardian of an incapacitated person can obtain a divorce for his ward from a competent spouse, solely because the ward has been incapacitated for a total of three years. See §§ 744.3215(4), 744.3725 and 61.052(l)(b). Section 61.052(l)(b) indicates mental incapacity of a spouse is a ground for the competent spouse to seek a divorce, provided the rights of the incapacitated spouse are duly protected. But its express terms do not foreclose the ability of a guardian of an incapacitated spouse to sue a competent spouse for a divorce solely because the ward has been incapacitated for three years. This interpretation would be a departure from precedent in this state1 and other jurisdictions.2 It has potentially far-reaching social implications and could raise constitutional issues, as well.
. See Scott v. Scott, 45 So. 2d 878 (Fla.1950); Wood v. Beard, 107 So. 2d 198, 199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958).
. Annotation, Power of Incompetent Spouse's Guardian, Committee, or Next Friend to Sue for Granting or Vacation of Divorce or Annulment of Marriage or Make a Compromise or Settlement in such Suit, 6 A.L.R.3d 681 (1966).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (11 total)
-
Genden v. Fuller, 648 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 1994)…KOGAN, Justice. We have for review Fuller v. Genden, 630 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), in which the Third District Court of Appeal certified the following question as being of great public importance: Whether the holding of State v. Agee applies when the prosecution is terminated by a voluntary dismissal before an…
-
State v. Latundra Williams, 791 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 2001)…mportance: Whether the holding of State v. Agee applies when the prosecution is terminated by a voluntary dismissal before an indictment or information rather than a “nolle prosse” filed after an information or indictment? [*1091] Fuller v. Genden, 630 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). This Court answered the certified question in Genden in the affirmative. We held that the speedy trial time begins to run when an accused is taken into custody and continues to run when the State voluntarily terminates prosecuti…
-
State v. McCULLERS, 932 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…tate voluntarily terminates a prosecution before an information is filed ... rather than after the defendant has been formally charged, as was done in Agee, ‘is a distinction without a legally cognizable difference.’ ” Id. (quoting Fuller v. Genden, 630 So. 2d 1150, 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)). The principle applied in Agee and Gen-den was extended by the decision in State v. Williams, 791 So. 2d 1088 (Fla.2001), to circumstances where the State simply failed to file charges during the speedy trial period. The c…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Scott v. Scott, 45 So.2d 878 (Fla. 1950)
- John R. Wood ad litem for Gerald A. Beard v. Beard, 107 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)