LYNN M. KILVINGTON, APPELLANT,
v.
RONNIE C. KILVINGTON, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A Florida appellate court reversed a final divorce judgment awarding the husband custody of their child and the wife's interest in the marital home, finding the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the wife because the husband's petition failed to allege the required jurisdictional facts under Florida's long-arm statute.
The court reversed the judgment, holding that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the wife. The husband was required to allege either that the parties maintained a marital domicile in Florida or that the wife resided in Florida to invoke the long-arm statute; his allegation of only his own residency was insufficient. Additionally, the petition failed to establish jurisdiction over the child.
[1] A Florida court lacks jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a dissolution of marriage action unless the petition alleges that the parties maintained a marital domi…
[2] Failure to allege sufficient jurisdictional facts in a petition for dissolution of marriage renders service of process void, even when a default judgment is entered again…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Before the husband could effect service of process under section 48.193(l)(e), Florida Statutes (1991) he was required to allege in his complaint that the parties maintained a marital domicile in Florida at the time of the commencement of the action or that the wife resided in Florida preceding commencement of the action.”
Establishes the mandatory jurisdictional allegations required to invoke Florida's long-arm statute in family law cases
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe husband filed an amended petition for dissolution of marriage in Florida, alleging only that he had been a Florida resident for more than six mont…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Matrimonial Domicile cases and more on FLexlaw
SMITH, Judge.
The wife appeals a final judgment of dissolution which awards the husband custody of the parties’ child, child support, and the wife’s interest in the parties’ marital home, contending the judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction. We agree and reverse.
The sole jurisdictional allegation in the husband’s amended petition for dissolution of marriage is that he was a Florida resident for a period of more than six months immediately prior to the filing of his petition. The wife was personally served in Wisconsin, and when she failed to respond to the amended petition, a default was entered. A few days later, without further notice, the final judgment appealed was entered by the trial court.1
Before the husband could effect service of process under section 48.193(l)(e), Florida Statutes (1991) he was required to allege in his complaint that the parties maintained a marital domicile in Florida at the time of the commencement of the action or that the wife resided in Florida preceding commencement of the action. Hargrave v. Hargrave, 495 So. 2d 904, 905 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); accord, Laney v. Laney, 487 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Failure to allege one of these jurisdictional facts rendered the service of process void, and the trial court’s final judgment of dissolution must be vacated. Id. Under Florida law, even the entry of a default judgment against a nonresident defendant cannot prevent assertion of lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant, when the complaint lacks sufficient jurisdictional allegations to bring the claim within the ambit of the long arm statute. Mouzon v. Mouzon, 458 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).
Moreover, we note an additional defect. Neither the amended petition, nor any attachments or affidavits, set forth any allegations establishing the trial court’s jurisdiction over the parties’ child. See Perez v. Perez, 519 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); and Mouzon v. Mouzon, 458 So. 2d at 383. See also Walt v. Walt, 574 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
REVERSED.
ALLEN and DAVIS, JJ., concur. . The wife also maintains in this case that she was entitled to notice before the issues of child support and equitable distribution could be tried. Since the jurisdictional issue controls resolution of this case, we decline to rule on this point.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Caputo v. Eggleston, 637 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…nal jurisdiction over the husband for the purposes of alimony and equitable distribution. We also note that the petition did not set forth allegations establishing the trial court’s jurisdiction over the parties’ child. See Kilvington v. Kilvington, 632 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). We, accordingly, reverse and remand with directions to dismiss the complaint with leave to amend by adding proper jurisdictional facts if such facts exist. Reversed and remanded. SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and THREADGILL and QUINCE,…
Authorities Cited
- Mouzon v. Mouzon, 458 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- Walt v. Walt, 574 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Laney v. Laney, 487 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Perez v. Perez, 519 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Hargrave v. Hargrave, 495 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)