RAFAEL PEREZ, APPELLANT,
v.
ELIZABETH PEREZ, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1988-02-09
No. 87-1203
Schwartz, Chief Judge
519 So. 2d 1104 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1988) Caution
Cited by 16 cases

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Synopsis

Florida appellate court reversed a dissolution of marriage judgment entered by default because the complaint failed to allege Florida residency (depriving subject matter jurisdiction), the husband lacked notice of the hearing (violating due process), and the judgment awarded custody and property division not sought in the complaint.


Holding

A dissolution judgment entered by default must be reversed when the complaint fails to allege the statutory residency requirement, the defendant lacks notice of the hearing, and the judgment awards relief not requested in the complaint.


Headnotes

[1] A dissolution of marriage judgment entered by default must be reversed when the complaint fails to allege that a party was a Florida resident for the statutory period req…

[2] A dissolution judgment awarding custody or property division must be reversed when such relief was not sought in the complaint and therefore could not be awarded in a def…

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Facts & Procedural History

Rafael Perez appealed a dissolution of marriage judgment entered after a default hearing. The complaint did not allege that either party was a Florida…

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Opinion of the Court
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

The judgment of dissolution entered after hearing following the entry of a default is reversed in its entirety for numerous reasons, of which the most prominent are (a) the failure of the complaint to allege that either party was a resident of Florida for the statutory period deprived the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cause, Beekman v. Beekman, 53 Fla. 858, 43 So. 923 (1907); Gredler v. Gredler, 36 Fla. 372, 18 So. 762 (1895); (b) the appellant husband’s failure to receive notice of the hearing deprived him of the basic requirements of due process, Buffington v. Torcise, 504 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Heritage Casket & Vault Ind., Inc. v. Sunshine Bank, 428 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); see also Cortina v. Cortina, 98 So. 2d 334 (Fla.1957); Barreiro v. Barreiro, 377 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Matthews v. Matthews, 376 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); (c) that portion of the judgment granting “custody” of the parties’ child was plainly erroneous both because the complaint did not comply with section 61.1308 or 61.132, Florida Statutes (1985), and because the relief granted was not sought in the complaint and therefore could not be awarded in a proceeding by default, Hernandez v. Hernandez, 444 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), pet. for review denied, 451 So. 2d 848 (Fla.1984); see also Williams v. Williams, 227 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); and (d) the award of the husband’s interest in the marital home to the wife was similarly not supported by any such demand in the complaint.

Reversed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Strommen v. Strommen, 927 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)
    …attack of this judgment and, therefore, reverse. We discuss and distinguish Ruble v. Ruble, 884 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Kochinsky v. Moore, 698 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Walt v. Walt, 574 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Perez v. Perez, 519 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); and Mouzon v. Mouzon, 458 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). In 1995, the Hillsborough County Circuit Court entered a final judgment of dissolution of marriage dissolving the parties’ marriage and setting forth a rotating custody a…
    1 / 2
  • Walt v. Walt, 574 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
    …case completely failed to file the information required by section 93-23-17 (Fla.Stat. 61.132), Florida cases construing the UCCJA indicate that the court could not have validly exercised jurisdiction in conformance with the act. See Perez v. Perez, 519 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Mouzon v. Mouzon, 458 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). In Perez, the third district gave as one of its reasons for reversing a judgment of dissolution that the “portion of the judgment granting ‘custody’ of the parties’ child was…
  • Orbe v. Orbe, 651 So. 2d 1295 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)
    …it can still dissolve the marital relationship of the parties, provided the subject matter requirement for jurisdiction is met (six months residency of that spouse in Florida prior to filing the petition). § 61.021, Fla.Stat. (1993); Perez v. Perez, 519 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Arnstein v. Arnstein, 422 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Bowers v. Bowers, 287 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). This is known as the divisible divorce concept.2 See Davis v. Dieujuste, 496 So. 2d 806 (Fla.1986); Pawley v. Pawley…

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