WILLIE J. BELL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A defendant may knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to express findings under the habitual felony offender statute as part of a plea agreement.
Appellant pleaded no contest to burglary and grand theft and stipulated to a four-year habitual felony offender sentence. He signed a waiver acknowled…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant, Willie J. Bell, challenges the trial court’s judgment and sentence imposed pursuant to the habitual felony offender statute, § 775.084, Fla.Stat. (1991), contending that the trial court erred in failing to follow the procedural requirements of section 775.-084(1). We affirm.
The appellant entered a plea of no contest to one count of burglary to a business and one count of grand theft. At the plea hearing, the appellant stipulated to the negotiated plea of a four year habitual felony offender sentence. The appellant signed an acknowledgement and waiver of rights document which stated that if the trial court accepted his plea, his sentence would be four years as a habitual offender. The appellant’s attorney stated that he had discussed habitualization and the sentence with the appellant. The appellant stated that he understood that he was waiving his right to a habitualization hearing. The trial court found that the plea and waiver were freely and voluntarily made and sentenced him to four years in prison as a habitual offender. The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him as a habitual offender without making the findings that he had the predicate felony convictions as required under section 775.084(1). We disagree.
In Spriggs v. State, 615 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), the Fourth District held that a defendant may knowingly and voluntarily waive, in a plea agreement or otherwise, the right to express findings under section 775.-084(3). See also Greenlee v. State, 591 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). In the present case, the appellant expressly agreed to be sentenced as a habitual felony offender as part of his plea agreement and knowingly and voluntarily waived the procedural requirements of section 775.084. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment and sentence.
Affirmed.
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and PARKER and ALTENBERND, JJ., concur.
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Citator
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State v. Will, 645 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…ly consents to a habitual offender sentence as part of a plea bargain, it is unnecessary for the trial court to make the statutory habitual offender findings. Spriggs v. State, 615 So .2d 828, 829 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (en banc); accord Bell v. State, 637 So. 2d 941, 942 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). That being so, no useful purpose would be served by holding the habitual offender hearing, or obtaining an on-the-record waiver of the habitual offender hearing.3 See Greenlee v. State, 591 So. 2d 310, 310-11 (Fla. 2d DCA 19…
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LEE v. State, 731 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…result of a plea bargain does not preclude him from contesting the legality of his sentence”). [*74] In concluding that Lee may attack his sentence as being illegal, despite having entered into a plea agreement, we have not overlooked Bell v. State, 637 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). In Bell, this court held that the defendant was precluded from contending the trial court erred in sentencing him as a habitual offender without making specific factual findings that he had the predicate felony convictions requir…
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Bertram P. OCE v. State, 891 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…on without an evidentiary hearing where the record conclusively refutes the appellant’s claims that his plea was involuntary. See Heggan v. State, 745 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Jones v. State, 643 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Bell v. State, 637 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).…
Authorities Cited
- Greenlee v. State, 591 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Spriggs v. State, 615 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)