WILLIE CLYDE ECHOLS, APPELLANT,
v.
HAZEL R. ELSWICK F/K/A HAZEL R. ECHOLS, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this dissolution of marriage appeal, the court reversed the trial court's award of rehabilitative alimony to the appellee and remanded for reconsideration of her claim for permanent periodic alimony, while affirming the award of attorney's fees. The case addresses whether rehabilitative alimony was properly awarded and whether permanent periodic alimony should have been granted instead.
The court reversed the rehabilitative alimony award because no evidence showed the appellee was seeking to redevelop previous job skills or train for new ones. The court remanded for reconsideration of permanent periodic alimony, finding that the trial court's reasons for denial (husband's poor health, wife's future social security benefits, and marriage duration) were insufficient as a matter of law.
[1] Rehabilitative alimony may not be awarded without evidence that the recipient is seeking to redevelop previous job skills or train for new ones.
[2] A recipient's potential future entitlement to retirement or social security benefits is not a valid reason to deny permanent periodic alimony.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“rehabilitative alimony may not be awarded where there is no evidence that the recipient is seeking to redevelop previous job skills or train for new ones”
Establishes the legal requirement for rehabilitative alimony awards and the basis for reversing the trial court's award.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties married in February 1986, both widowed with grown children. They separated in April 1992 after approximately six years of marriage. The hu…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Alimony Need And Ability To Pay cases and more on FLexlaw
ALLEN, Judge.
The parties appeal and cross-appeal that portion of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage which awards the appellee rehabilitative alimony. The appellant also challenges the award of attorney’s fees to the appellee. We reverse the award of rehabilitative alimony, but we remand for the trial court to reconsider the appellee’s claim for permanent periodic alimony. We affirm the award of attorney’s fees.
The parties were married in February, 1986. Both were widowed from previous marriages and had grown children. They separated in April 1992 when the appellee filed a petition for dissolution in which she sought equitable distribution of the marital assets, permanent periodic alimony and her attorney’s fees. The appellant counter-petitioned, also seeking alimony. The parties resolved all issues except the alimony and attorney’s fees issues prior to the final hearing. The trial court ordered that the appel-lee was not entitled to permanent periodic alimony. However, the court awarded appel-lee $400 monthly rehabilitative alimony until she reaches age 62; she was 59 at the time of the final hearing. The court further awarded the appellee attorney’s fees.
The appellant first argues that the trial court erred in awarding rehabilitative alimony, and the appellee argues in her cross-appeal that the trial court should have awarded permanent periodic alimony rather than rehabilitative alimony. The record amply supports the appellee’s need for alimony and the appellant’s ability to pay alimony where the husband’s monthly income was three times the appellee’s monthly income of $660. But rehabilitative alimony may not be awarded where there is no evidence that the recipient is seeking to redevelop previous job skills or train for new ones. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1202 (Fla.1980); Grant v. Grant, 603 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Because no such evidence was presented in this case, the award of rehabilitative alimony must be reversed.
In denying the appellee permanent periodic alimony the court cited the appel lant’s poor health and the appellee’s entitlement to social security benefits when she retires (which the trial court presumed would be at age 62). In light of the fact that the trial court did not find that the appellant’s poor health was a bar to an award of rehabilitative alimony, and in light of the fact that the appellant’s income is from retirement benefits and investments rather than his personal labor, the appellant’s poor health was clearly not the decisive reason for denying permanent periodic alimony. Furthermore, the fact that the appellee might receive retirement or social security benefits in the future is not a valid reason for denying her permanent periodic alimony. See Shiveley v. Shiveley, 635 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
The other reason given by the trial court for not awarding permanent periodic alimony was the relatively short duration of the marriage. Although the duration of a marriage is a proper consideration in determining whether to award alimony, six years is not such a short period as to necessarily require a denial of permanent alimony. See Driscoll v. Driscoll, 547 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); see also Simzer v. Simzer, 514 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Volosin v. Volosin, 382 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
We therefore direct the trial court on remand to reconsider the appellee’s claim for periodic permanent alimony. Should the trial court award permanent periodic alimony and should the appellee later retire and begin to receive additional benefits, or upon any other showing of changed circumstances, the appellant will have the option of petitioning the court at that time to modify his alimony payments. See § 61.14(1), Fla.Stat. (1991).
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the appellee attorney’s fees. We reverse the award of rehabilitative alimony and remand for further proceedings as directed above. The judgment is in all other respects affirmed.
BARFIELD and WOLF, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Mallard v. Mallard, 771 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 2000)…uch future events.” Nelson v. Nelson, 651 So. 2d 1252, 1254 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). Under the cases, retirement is just the sort of future contingency trial courts are enjoined not to anticipate in permanent, periodic alimony awards. Echols v. Elswick, 638 So. 2d 581, 582 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Id. at 486-87 (Benton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted). Based on the foregoing, we hold that alimony may not include a savings component, we answer the certified question in the negative…
-
Anciaux v. Anciaux, 666 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…le distribution. Given the thirteen-year duration of the marriage and the inequitable division of the debt structure, the trial court should reconsider the denial of an award of permanent periodic alimony to the former wife. See Echols v. Elswick, 638 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Bailey v. Bailey, 617 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Gregoire v. Gregoire, 615 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). After deducting the debt attributable to each party’s automobile, the judge assigned almost $2,000.00 more in debt to…1 / 2
-
Jaynee Adinolfe v. Adinolfe, 718 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…e’s ruling. The second matter refers to the trial judge’s mistaken belief that a nine-year marriage was of such short duration that it would not entitle the wife to permanent periodic alimony. Although not cited by either party, Echols v. Elswick, 638 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), correctly stated that, although duration of marriage is a proper consideration in determining whether to award alimony, six year’s was not such a short period as to necessarily deny permanent alimony. Likewise, this court finds…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Candy W. Shiveley v. Shiveley, 635 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Simzer v. Simzer, 514 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- Volosin v. Volosin, 382 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- Driscoll v. Driscoll, 547 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- Veresta L. Grant v. Grant, 603 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)