JAYNEE ADINOLFE, APPELLANT,
v.
JOHN ADINOLFE, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this family law appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage, including its refusal to recuse itself and its award of permanent periodic alimony to the wife despite a nine-year marriage duration. The court held that a nine-year marriage is not so short as to categorically preclude permanent alimony, particularly where the wife suffered serious health impairments during the marriage.
The court affirmed the trial court on all issues. Regarding recusal, without a transcript or sworn factual allegations concerning the context of the judge's comments, a motion to disqualify does not state a legally sufficient ground for recusal. Regarding alimony, a nine-year marriage is not so short as to categorically deny permanent periodic alimony, especially where the wife suffered serious health impairments during the marriage and the trial court considered all relevant factors including the wife's changed circumstances and credibility of witnesses.
[1] A motion for recusal is legally insufficient without sworn factual allegations concerning the context of the trial judge's alleged comments or a transcript of those comme…
[2] A nine-year marriage is not necessarily a short-term marriage that would preclude permanent periodic alimony as a matter of law.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Without a transcript or sworn factual allegations concerning the context in which the trial judge's alleged comments arose, ... the allegations in [the] motions to disqualify [did not] set forth a legally sufficient ground for recusal.”
Establishes the standard for recusal motions—context is essential, and without a record of the comments' context, recusal is not warranted.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJaynee Adinolfe was married to John Adinolfe for nine years. During the marriage, she developed rheumatoid arthritis, diabetes, and kidney disease, re…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Duration Of Marriage cases and more on FLexlaw
FRUSCIANTE, JOHN A., Associate Judge.
The Appellant seeks to have this court find error in a number of decisions made by the trial court and to reverse accordingly. The trial judge made the relevant decisions in a family law case in which he also entered a detailed twenty-page Final Judgement of Dissolution of Marriage. We affirm the lower court on all points presented, but single out two matters for special comment.
First of all, in reference to the trial judge’s refusal to recuse himself and the wife’s supporting affidavit requesting such recusal, Appellant argues that the Appellee failed to mention any case which holds that such an affidavit of recusal must include a transcript or other record of the trial judge’s actions. While it is true that we have not made a transcript or other record mandatory under such circumstances, we have clearly expressed our desire for a record when circumstances fail to deliver the context in which a trial judge’s comments were made. See Pressey v. State, 710 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
There still exist those situations that may require recusal simply based upon the factual scenario presented and the judge’s comments stated. See Torres v. State, 697 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 703 So. 2d 477 (Fla.1997); Gonzalez v. Goldstein, 633 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
We are unwilling, however, to condemn a judge’s comments and require recusal when the context of those comments may very well lead to a different conclusion. “Without a transcript or sworn factual allegations concerning the context in which the trial judge’s alleged comments arose, ... the allegations in [the] motions to disqualify [did not] set forth a legally sufficient ground for recusal.” Ellis v. Henning, 678 So. 2d 825, 827 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), rev. denied, 699 So. 2d 1373 (Fla.1997).
Having no such transcript here, we accordingly affirm the trial judge’s ruling.
The second matter refers to the trial judge’s mistaken belief that a nine-year marriage was of such short duration that it would not entitle the wife to permanent periodic alimony. Although not cited by either party, Echols v. Elswick, 638 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), correctly stated that, although duration of marriage is a proper consideration in determining whether to award alimony, six year’s was not such a short period as to necessarily deny permanent alimony. Likewise, this court finds that nine years is not such a short period as to deny this wife permanent periodic alimony as a matter of law. In fact, it is just such a scenario as is presented in this ease that would overcome the ordinarily accepted presumption that there is no permanent alimony in a short-term marriage.
While this court will not go so far as to state nine years is a short-term marriage (it may very well be in the “gray area,” Young v. Young, 677 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)), it will state that the facts presented could allow permanent alimony even if this was a short-term marriage. In the case before this court, the wife apparently married while in a relatively healthy state and then suffered from rheumatoid arthritis, diabetes and kidney disease. She also requires costly eye surgery every six months and has 82% permanent partial impairment and may never be able to work again. Were the trial court to stop its analysis regarding permanent alimony with the duration of the marriage issue, this court would be compelled to reverse.
However, the trial court proceeded further as if the duration of the marriage was not a limiting factor finding, among other things, that a worker’s compensation claim award placed her in a better financial position than the husband. Credibility apparently played a major role, and “[t]he credibility of the witnesses is within the trial court’s exclusive purview.” Maliski v. Maliski, 664 So. 2d 341, 343 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
The trial court also distributed the marital assets and the marital debt decidedly in the wife’s favor despite the worker’s compensation award and the husband’s inability to pay alimony.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court on these issues, as well as on all the remaining issues.
POLEN and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Layeni v. Kehinde A. Layeni, 843 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…001). Permanent alimony can be awarded in cases involving a short-term marriage where events have occurred during the marriage, which preclude a spouse from earning as much as he or she did prior to the marriage. See generally, Adinolfe v. Adinolfe, 718 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Similarly, where the parties agree that the wife would discontinue her career to provide care for a handicapped child, permanent alimony should be awarded. Reeves. [*303] The facts of this care more strongly support an award of…
-
Lakin v. Lakin, 901 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…, 1248 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (reversing trial court’s decision to deny permanent alimony to wife following a five-year marriage, where wife could only earn minimum wage and would be left “in a pathetic financial state”); see also Adinolfe v. Adinolfe, 718 So. 2d 369, 370 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (noting that “six years was not such a short period as to necessarily deny permanent alimony”). The award of permanent alimony here was within the trial court’s discretion. Earning over $150,000 annually, the husband has th…
-
Reeves v. Carey Reeves, 821 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…5th DCA 2001). Permanent alimony can be awarded in cases involving a short term marriage where events which occurred during the marriage preclude a spouse from earning as much as [*335] he or she did prior to the marriage. See Adinolfe v. Adinolfe, 718 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)(holding that permanent periodic alimony is available in a short-term marriage where wife married while she was in a healthy state but became permanently disabled during the course of the marriage). Such is the case here in that t…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Young v. Martine Denn Young, 677 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)
- Ferguson v. State, 633 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- Ellis v. The Honorable Patti Englander Henning, 678 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- Echols v. Elswick, 638 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Singletary v. Tatol, 697 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
- Roldolfo Torres v. State, 697 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
- Springer v. State, 664 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Maliski v. Maliski, 664 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)
- Turner v. State, 710 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)