MARK CAYSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Cayson was sentenced to 88 years imprisonment for second degree murder with a firearm, a life felony with a statutory maximum of 40 years. The court reversed and remanded for resentencing because the trial court erred in imposing a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum, and the court clarified that on remand, the state may choose between proceeding to trial on original charges or accepting a resentencing within the 40-year limit.
A sentence exceeding the statutory maximum allowed by law will not be enforced notwithstanding a plea stipulation. The court reversed the 88-year sentence and remanded for resentencing, during which the state may either proceed to trial on the original charges or agree to a sentence within the 40-year statutory maximum with the trial court's concurrence.
[1] A sentence exceeding the maximum term of years allowed by law for a life felony is invalid, notwithstanding a plea stipulation.
[2] Second degree murder with a firearm is a life felony, subject to a maximum sentence of 40 years imprisonment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“As such, the only valid sentences are life in prison or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 40 years.”
Establishes the statutory sentencing limits for second degree murder with a firearm as a life felony
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCayson faced a first degree murder charge but entered a guilty plea to second degree murder with a firearm under a plea agreement in which a second co…
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STONE, Judge.
We reverse Appellant’s sentence and remand for resentencing. It was error to deny Appellant’s motion to correct a sentence exceeding the maximum 40-year term of years allowed by law.
Appellant, facing a first degree murder charge, pled guilty to second degree murder with a firearm, a life felony. Under the plea agreement with the státe, a second count was dropped. The court accepted the agreed plea, sentencing Appellant to 88 years in prison.
Second degree murder with a firearm is a life felony. See §§ 775.087(1) (1992); 775.-082(3)(a) (1992). As such, the only valid sentences are life in prison or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 40 years. E.g. Wright v. State, 600 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Salas v. State, 589 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).
This court has recognized a sentence in excess of the maximum term allowed by law, will not be enforced notwithstanding a plea stipulation. See Reed v. State, 616 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Purvis v. Lindsey ex rel. State, 587 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).
The state notes, and seeks relief from, a previously recognized anomaly in the statutory sentencing scheme that permits prison sentence to a-longer term of years for a first degree felony than for conviction of the same offense enhanced to a life felony. See Salas; Patterson v. State, 633 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Greenhalgh v. State, 582 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). However, given the clear wording of the statute, we decline the state’s invitation to recede from Salas,, leaving the resolution of this dilemma to the legislature.
On resentencing, the state should be given the option of proceeding to trial on the original charges or agreeing to a sentence, with the trial court’s concurrence, within the 40-year statutory maximum. See Jolly v. State, 392 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
We recognize that in similar instances in the past we have remanded with instructions that the court impose the maximum allowable term of imprisonment, 40 years. See Wright. In other instances, we have been silent with respect to the resentencing options. See Salas. We do not construe the remand instructions in Wright as a holding that no other resentencing options are available.
ANSTEAD and HERSEY, JJ., concur.
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Waldon v. State, 670 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…cting evidence as to whether Appellant was attending AA meetings as required. She claimed that her dog had eaten her records. In my judgment, the authority relied on by the majority is not controlling. Unlike the circumstances in Lippman v. State, 638 So. 2d 1061 (Fla.1994), the modification in this case was not a new condition. Rather, it constituted a clarification of Appellant’s treatment obligations implicit in the earlier order. In Lippman, the trial court unilaterally modified the terms of probation. I…
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Peters v. State, 658 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…ximum, the sentences are illegal. On remand, the state should be given the option of proceeding to trial on the original charges or agreeing to a sentence, with the trial court’s concurrence, within the forty year statutory maximum. Cayson v. State, 638 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). See also Clemons v. State, 629 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 639 So. 2d 976 (Fla.1994). Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and PATTERSON and LAZZARA, JJ., concur…
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Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jolly v. State, 392 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Greenhalgh v. State, 582 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Purvis v. The Honorable Hubert R. Lindsey, 587 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)
- Stecker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 589 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)
- Mel T. Wright v. State, 600 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)
- Norstrom v. State, 616 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
- Reed v. State, 616 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
- Patterson v. State, 633 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)