JOSEPH STALLWORTH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Joseph Stallworth appeals his conviction for felony petit theft and resisting arrest, challenging the trial court's imposition of $50 in prosecution costs and $95 in court costs. The appellate court struck both cost assessments, finding the trial court failed to consider Stallworth's ability to pay the mandatory costs and imposed discretionary costs without statutory authority.
The $50 prosecution cost assessment must be struck because the trial court failed to determine Stallworth's ability to pay as specifically required by section 939.01(5). The $95 court cost assessment must be struck because no statutory authority was cited for it. The case is remanded for the state to seek reimposition of the assessments in compliance with the law.
[1] Statutorily mandated court costs provide constructive notice to a defendant upon publication in the Florida Statutes.
[2] A trial court must determine a defendant's ability to pay costs imposed under section 939.01, Florida Statutes, when imposing such costs.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[A] trial court is not required to determine a convicted criminal defendant's ability to pay statutorily mandated costs prior to assessing costs unless the applicable statute specifically requires such a determination.”
Establishes the general rule that ability-to-pay determinations are required only when the statute specifically mandates them
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStallworth entered a no contest plea to felony petit theft and resisting arrest without violence as part of a plea agreement. After sentencing, the st…
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PER CURIAM.
Joseph Stallworth appeals his judgment for felony petit theft and resisting arrest without violence, contending that for several reasons the trial court erred in imposing court costs against him. We agree with most of those reasons, strike the cost assessments, and remand for further proceedings.
Stallworth entered a plea of no contest to the charges against him as part of a plea agreement with the state. After the trial court pronounced Stallworth’s sentence, the state requested that the court assess costs of prosecution of $50 and other fines and costs the court deemed appropriate. Over defense counsel’s objection, the court imposed costs of prosecution of $50 pursuant to section 939.01, Florida Statutes (1991), and court costs of $95.
Stallworth contends the cost assessments should be stricken because they were not part of his plea agreement and he was not given notice and an opportunity to be heard with regard to their imposition. He also contends the trial court failed to determine his ability to pay the assessments.
The assessment of $50 for costs of prosecution was made pursuant to section 939.01, which mandates that such costs be included in all judgments of conviction. Publication in the Laws of Florida or the Florida Statutes constitutes constructive notice of statutorily mandated court costs. State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 139 (Fla.1991). Thus, Stallworth’s contention that he was not given notice with regard to the $50 assessment is without merit.
There is merit, however, in his contention that the trial court failed to determine his ability to pay prior to imposing the $50 assessment. “[A] trial court is not required to determine a convicted criminal defendant’s ability to pay statutorily mandated costs prior to assessing costs unless the applicable statute specifically requires such a determination.” Id. at 142 (emphasis supplied). Section 939.01(5) specifically requires such a determination:
The court, in determining whether to order costs and the amount of such costs, shall consider the amount of the costs incurred, the financial resources of the defendant, the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant, and such other factors which it deems appropriate.
See also Thomas v. State, 625 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (“[Ajbility to pay costs imposed under section 939.01, Florida Statutes, must be determined when the costs are imposed.”).
With regard to the assessment of the $95 in court costs, it must be stricken regardless of whether it was mandatory or discretionary because no statutory authority was cited for it. Sutton v. State, 635 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).
Accordingly, we strike the cost assessments and remand. The state may seek to reimpose the assessments upon remand in accordance with the law set forth in this opinion. We note that if the state seeks to reimpose the $95 assessment and it is a discretionary assessment, Stallworth must personally be given notice and an opportunity to be heard with regard to its imposition. Sutton.
RYDER, A.C.J., BLUE and LAZZARA, JJ., concur.
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Evans v. State, 653 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…be orally pronounced. Chitty v. State, 20 Fla.L.Weekly D76, — So. 2d-[1994 WL 714418] (Fla. 2d DCA Dec. 28, 1994). We also strike the imposition of the “eost/fine” of $33.00 because no statutory authority was cited for it. See Stallworth v. State, 640 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). On remand, the state may seek to reimpose that cost in accordance with the law. See Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). We, accordingly, affirm the convictions and remand for further proceedings in accordance with…
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Snyder v. State, 664 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…he appellant’s second argument that the trial court erred in imposing a $33 “cost/fine” as part of the appellant’s sentence because no statutory authority was cited for it. See Evans v. State, 653 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Stallworth v. State, 640 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Accordingly, we strike the imposition of that cost. We also strike the $2 discretionary cost imposed pursuant to section 943.25(13), Florida Statutes (1993), because the trial court failed to specifically announce that cost at se…
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Lawson v. State, 666 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…. 2d DCA 1995); Chitty v. State, 661 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). The $288.00 in court costs and $100.00 assessment to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement must also be stricken because no statutory authority was provided. Stallworth v. State, 640 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Affirmed in part and reversed in part. THREADGILL, C.J., and WHATLEY, J., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1991)
- Sutton v. State, 635 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Chance v. State, 625 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)