JAMES ESTILL EVANS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
James Estill Evans appealed his conviction for three counts of engaging a child in sexual activity, challenging sentencing conditions and costs. The court affirmed the convictions but partially struck certain probation conditions that were not orally pronounced and a cost assessment lacking statutory authority.
The convictions are affirmed. The court struck probation conditions prohibiting weapons and destructive devices and the excessive use of intoxicants because they were not orally pronounced at sentencing, but affirmed the firearm prohibition as a statutory requirement and the restriction on visiting places where intoxicants are unlawfully sold. The court struck the $33.00 cost assessment for lack of statutory authority, allowing the state to reimpose it on remand if supported by law.
[1] A condition of probation that is a general prohibition need not be orally pronounced at sentencing.
[2] A condition of probation that is a more precise definition of a general prohibition need not be orally pronounced at sentencing.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Since section 790.23, Florida Statutes (1991), makes it unlawful for any person convicted of a felony to own or have in his care, custody, possession, or control any firearm, that part of condition (3) prohibiting possessing, carrying, or owning firearms is a general condition for which no oral pronouncement is needed.”
Explains why the firearm prohibition portion of probation condition (3) was affirmed despite not being orally pronounced—it is mandated by statute.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEvans pleaded nolo contendere to three counts of engaging a child in sexual activity under Florida Statutes sections 794.041(2)(b). He was adjudicated…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Oral Pronouncement Of Sentence Conditions cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The appellant, James Estill Evans, challenges the trial court’s judgments and sentences for three counts of engaging a child in sexual activity. We affirm the appellant’s conviction, however, two of the appellant’s points on appeal regarding costs and conditions of probation merit discussion.
The appellant pled nolo contendere to three counts of engaging a child in sexual activity in violation of section 794.041(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1989) and (1991). The appellant was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to two concurrent terms of ten years in prison to be followed by ten years probation. This timely appeal followed.
We agree with the appellant’s contentions that two conditions of probation should be stricken in part because they were not orally pronounced at sentencing and that a certain cost assessment should be stricken because no statutory authority was cited for it.
Probation condition (3) states: “You will not possess, carry or own any weapons, firearms, or destructive devices.” Since section 790.23, Florida Statutes (1991), makes it unlawful for any person convicted of a felony to own or have in his care, custody, possession, or control any firearm, that part of condition (3) prohibiting possessing, carrying, or owning firearms is a general condition for which no oral pronouncement is needed. We, therefore, affirm that portion of condition (3). However, we strike the general prohibition of weapons and destructive devices in condition (3) because they were not orally pronounced at sentencing. See Fitts v. State, 649 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
Probation condition (5) states: “You will not use intoxicants to excess. You will not visit places where intoxicants, drugs or other dangerous substances are unlawfully sold, dispensed, or used.” That portion of condition (5) prohibiting the excessive use of those substances must be stricken since the trial court failed to announce it in open court, thus preventing the appellant from having the opportunity to object to its imposition. Tomlinson v. State, 645 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). However, we affirm the remaining portion of that condition prohibiting a probationer from visiting places where intoxicants are unlawfully sold, dispensed, or used since it is valid as a more precise definition of a general prohibition and, as such, need not be orally pronounced. Chitty v. State, 20 Fla.L.Weekly D76, — So. 2d-[1994 WL 714418] (Fla. 2d DCA Dec. 28, 1994).
We also strike the imposition of the “eost/fine” of $33.00 because no statutory authority was cited for it. See Stallworth v. State, 640 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). On remand, the state may seek to reimpose that cost in accordance with the law. See Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
We, accordingly, affirm the convictions and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and PATTERSON and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Jones v. State, 666 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…n that the trial court failed to announce at sentencing. Stark v. State, 650 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). The remainder of condition 5 is valid as a more precise definition of a general prohibition that needs no oral pronouncement. Evans v. State, 653 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Jones has also challenged probation condition 33, which states, “No early termination of probation [typed]. Sex Offender Program must participate [hand written].” Although the intention of this condition may have been to proscr…
-
Spence v. State, 667 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…v. State, 635 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). On remand, however, [*431] the state may seek to reimpose these costs in accord with appellant’s plea agreement by providing the proper statutory citation supporting their assessment. See Evans v. State, 653 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Finally, we affirm the imposition of the discretionary cost imposed under section 943.25(13), Florida Statutes (1993). As the record reflects, the appellant specifically agreed to pay $288 in court costs as part of his written…
-
Snyder v. State, 664 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…s, or aggrieved parties, as appropriate. We agree with the appellant’s second argument that the trial court erred in imposing a $33 “cost/fine” as part of the appellant’s sentence because no statutory authority was cited for it. See Evans v. State, 653 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Stallworth v. State, 640 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Accordingly, we strike the imposition of that cost. We also strike the $2 discretionary cost imposed pursuant to section 943.25(13), Florida Statutes (1993), because the tri…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Abel Oliveros Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Tomlinson v. State, 645 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Fitts v. State, 649 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Stallworth v. State, 640 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)