FELIX VALDEZ, RONALD WHITAKER, PEDRO HERHANDEZ, KEITH JACKSON, TYRONE THOMPSON, EMILIO HERNANDEZ, JOSE ANTONIO DELAROSA, DAVID THOMAS, LUIS AMEZAL, AND STEVE ROMAN, PETITIONERS,
v.
THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA, ET AL., RESPONDENTS
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Petitioners sought a writ of certiorari challenging Administrative Order 93-63, which the chief judge of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit issued to limit magistrates' discretion in approving pretrial release to a county nonfinancial services program. The court held the order exceeded the chief judge's administrative authority and quashed it, restoring prior administrative orders.
The chief judge exceeded his administrative authority. While the chief judge may establish procedures for uniform circuit operations, he cannot limit or direct how colleague judges rule on matters except through established writs or appellate processes. Administrative Order 93-63 was beyond the chief judge's power because it restricted magistrates' discretionary authority through mandatory criteria and offense-based exclusions.
[1] A writ of common law certiorari is an appropriate remedy to challenge an administrative order that exceeds the proper scope of administrative authority.
[2] A chief judge's administrative order limiting a magistrate's discretion in pretrial release decisions is beyond the chief judge's power to establish procedures for the un…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A judge of a paramount court cannot direct a colleague of that court or of an inferior court how to rule upon a matter except through an established writ or appellate process.”
Establishes the fundamental principle limiting a chief judge's authority to constrain subordinate judges' discretion through administrative orders.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe chief judge issued Administrative Order 93-63 to protect public safety and reduce failure-to-appear rates by establishing new standards for eligib…
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PER CURIAM.
In this original proceeding, petitioner prays for the issuance of a writ of common law certiorari on the claim that Administrative Order 93-63, entered by the respondent, is a nullity because it exceeds the proper scope of that administrative authority conferred by Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.050(b).
Other similar petitions filed ad seriatim have been consolidated because of the common question presented. During the pendency of the proceedings, it is conceded that the status of all petitioners has changed from the time in which each was entitled to seek pretrial release pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.131 and section 907.041, Florida Statutes (1993).
Notwithstanding the fact that the instant eases are moot, we have decided to determine the question presented because of the potential harm emanating from future enforcement of the order. Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla.1984).
Because the petition alleges that the chief judge exceeded his jurisdiction in promulgating the instant administrative order, certiorari is an appropriate remedy and we have jurisdiction. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Smith, 618 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).
In the challenged administrative order, the chief judge found that, in the interests of protecting the public safety and reducing the failure to appear rate, a new standard should be applied in considering eligibility for court-ordered release into the nonfinancial pretrial services program operated by the county government. The amended order explicitly limited the power of a magistrate to release such a defendant except upon a finding that a number of explicitly delineated criteria were satisfied. Further, the order enumerated some 19 categories of crimes, some of which were crimes of violence or crimes against the person, in which defendants so classified were “automatically excluded from eligibility for release to the Program.”
Despite the legitimate purpose and goal of the chief judge in adopting the administrative order, as amended, and the fact that the order was implemented upon the recommendation of the Pretrial Release Review Committee, the order is clearly beyond the chief judge’s power to establish procedures for the uniform operation of the circuit under rule 2.050(b).1 While the order explicitly recognized and continued the magistrates’ existing prerogative to determine the terms and conditions of pretrial release in accordance with sections 903.046 and 907.041(3) and rule 3.131(b), by the very terms of the order the trial judge’s discretionary authority was limited by the criteria delineated and the list of offenses for which exclusion from the program was ordered as mandatory. A judge of a paramount court cannot direct a colleague of that court or of an inferior court how to rule upon a matter except through an established writ or appellate process.2
By quashing Administrative Order 93-63, as amended, which abolished Administrative Order 82-18 entered in case no. 82-1 and Administrative Order 90-24, entered in case no. 90-3, those unchallenged orders now remain intact.3
Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari and quash the order under review.
. There appears to be no impediment to the executive branch of the county government to establish the minimum criteria and parameters for eligibility before accepting persons into its program for nonfinancial custody release.
. A well-recognized exception, of course, is that a successor judge is not bound by an interlocutory ruling of a predecessor judge. Groover v. Walker, 88 So. 2d 312 (Fla.1956).
.As identified in Administrative Orders 82-18 and 90-24, pre-bond hearing release to the custody of the Dade County Pretrial Release Program of certain qualified defendants will occur. However, as has been the case, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, any officer, or the State Attorney or any of her Assistant State Attorneys may object to nonjudicial release, in which case the defendant shall be brought to the next scheduled bond hearing so that a judge may pass on the issue of defendant’s pretrial status.
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Blackiston v. State, 772 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…e of section 938.30, but in doing so, the administrative order improperly limits the discretionary authority vested in the trial judges to utilize the program when they deem it appropriate. See Valdez v. Chief Judge of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 640 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). Instead of recognizing the discretionary authority of the trial judges, the administrative order mandates that each trial judge of the ninth circuit order into the program the defendants to whom the law' and administrative order…
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1-888-Traffic Schs. v. Chief Circuit Judge, 734 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1999)…e.g., Hewlett v. State, 661 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (granting certiorari petition challenging administrative order as conflicting with statute and being beyond chief judge’s authority); Valdez v. Chief Judge of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 640 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (granting certiorari petition challenging administrative order as exceeding chief judge’s authority), review denied, 652 So. 2d 816 (Fla.1995); Department of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Johnson, 504 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (d…
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Norris v. State, 737 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)…the issue because the question presented is capable of repetition which would continue to evade review. Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla.1984); McCoy v. State, 702 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Valdez v. Chief Judge of Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 640 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), rev. denied, 652 So. 2d 816 (Fla.1995). Article I, Section 14 of the Florida Constitution provides that, with certain exceptions not applicable here, every person charged with a crime shall be entitled to pretrial release on rea…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Eugene Holly, M.D. v. Albert W. Auld, M.D., 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984)
- Groover v. Walker, 88 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1956)
- Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Hon. C. McFerrin Smith, III, 618 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)