DARRYL D. BLACKISTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Darryl Blackiston appealed a sentencing condition requiring him to report to the Clerk of Courts Collections Division pursuant to an administrative order establishing a collections court program. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that an administrative order cannot mandate trial judges to enroll defendants in the collections program, as this improperly removes the discretionary authority vested in trial judges by statute.
The court held that Administrative Order No. 07-99-26 exceeded the authority of the chief judge by mandating enrollment in the collections program rather than allowing trial judges to exercise discretionary authority to determine whether individual defendants should be enrolled, as contemplated by Section 938.30, Florida Statutes.
[1] An administrative order mandating participation in a collections court program improperly limits the discretionary authority vested in trial judges.
[2] A chief judge's administrative order cannot override a statute that grants trial judges discretion in implementing a program.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Administrative Order No. 07-99-26 seeks to carry out the purpose of section 938.30, but in doing so, the administrative order improperly limits the discretionary authority vested in the trial judges to utilize the program when they deem it appropriate.”
Establishes that while the administrative order's purpose was valid, it exceeded authority by removing discretion
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBlackiston pled no contest to purchasing cannabis in violation of Florida Statutes Section 893.13(3)(a)(2). At sentencing, the trial judge ordered him…
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THOMPSON, C.J.
Darryl D. Blackiston pled no contest to the offense of purchasing cannabis, in violation of Section 893.13(3)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (1999). Blackiston appeals the portion of his sentence ordering him to report to the “Clerk of Courts Collections Division” thirty days after his release from jail, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 07-99-26. The administrative order created a “collections court program” in the Ninth Circuit pursuant to Section 938.30, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998). We reverse.
The purpose of the statute is set out at chapter 98-247, Section 2 Laws of Florida:
Florida’s judiciary routinely enters judgments and court orders in criminal cases setting forth court costs, fines, and fees against litigants, pursuant to statutory law. The enforcement of such orders is crucial to insure respect for the rule of law and credibility of the court. Uncollected fines, fees, and court costs are more than lost revenue; they represent a court order ignored, an unobeyed sentence, and the punished going unpunished. To insure that non-compliers fulfill their financial obligations under all sentences and court orders imposed, this act is designed to satisfy the need for enforcement of such sentences and court orders through aggressive followup in a manner most appropriate for courts and their respective communities, set reasonable parameters for compliance, collect offenders’ financial obligations to the state, and increase respect for the law.
To effectuate that purpose, the legislature gave the trial courts of this state the authority to utilize, at their discretion, a program by which fines, costs, and other criminal penalties are collected by civil supplementary proceedings. § 938.30, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). Lastly, the law states: “The court may enter any orders necessary to carry out the purposes of this section.” § 938.30(14), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998).
Administrative Order No. 07-99-26 seeks to carry out the purpose of section 938.30, but in doing so, the administrative order improperly limits the discretionary authority vested in the trial judges to utilize the program when they deem it appropriate. See Valdez v. Chief Judge of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 640 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). Instead of recognizing the discretionary authority of the trial judges, the administrative order mandates that each trial judge of the ninth circuit order into the program the defendants to whom the law' and administrative order applies. Section 938.30 contemplates that the trial judge may order the defendant into the program, and then subject the defendant to the various dictates of the statute, as the trial judge sees fit.1 For this reason, the administrative order is beyond the authority of the chief judge. See id.
REVERSED and REMANDED for re-sentencing in accordance with this opinion.
COBB and W. SHARP, JJ„ concur. . For example, § 938.30(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998) states that:
The court may require a person ordered to pay an obligation to appear and be examined under oath concerning the person’s financial ability to pay the obligation.
Any person failing to attend a hearing may be arrested on warrant or capias which may be issued by the clerk upon order of the court. *
[e.s.] The administrative order removes that discretionary authority:
When fines are imposed at sentencing or reimposed pursuant to a modification or termination of probation, the judge shall also order each defendant who does not pay the fines and court costs in full at sentencing to comply with the terms of the Program.
If a defendant is not current with the required payments and does not appear at the scheduled hearing, the judge shall order a Writ of Bodily Attachment for the defendant’s arrest and delivery to the Orange County Jail.
[e.s.] Throughout the administrative order, the trial court's discretionary authority to determine whether to subject a defendant to the dictates of the program is removed and instead the chief judge, by virtue of the language of the administrative order, makes the decision for the trial judge.
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Antwain Mitchell v. State, 783 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…THOMPSON, C.J. REVERSED. See Blackiston v. State, 772 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). COBB and SAWAYA, JJ., concur.…
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Flowers v. State, 781 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…ce of worship. We find no merit in his arguments except with respect to the trial court’s order that he pay his costs and fees to the Orange County Collections Court following his release from the Department of Corrections. In Blackiston v. State, 772 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 5th DCA), reh’g denied, (Dec. 8, 2000), this court declared invalid the administrative order creating the Orange County Collections Court. Accordingly, we vacate only that portion of Flowers’ sentence that orders him to report to the Orange Co…
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Echevarria v. State, 783 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…ntends that the portion of his sentence which requires him to comply with Orange County’s Collections Court Program created by Ninth Judicial Circuit Administrative Order No. 07-99-26 should be stricken as improper. We agree. In Blackiston v. State, 772 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), this court struck down Administrative Order No. 07-99-26 as invalid, holding that the order improperly limited the discretionary authority vested in trial courts to utilize the program only when they deemed it appropriate. We a…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Valdez v. The Chief Judge OF the Eleventh Jud. Cir. OF Fla., 640 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)