IRENE GOMEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
PEDRO P. GOMEZ, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The former wife appealed an order approving a general master's report on attorneys' fees and costs in a dissolution of marriage case. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the trial court erred by allocating fees based on income percentages rather than superior financial ability, and by determining fee amounts before the hearing was completed.
The court reversed, holding that in dissolution cases, attorneys' fees and costs must be borne by the party with superior financial ability to pay, not based on income percentages. The court also held that it was fundamentally unfair to determine the amount of reasonable attorneys' fees while the hearing on that issue was still pending.
[1] Attorneys' fees and costs in dissolution cases are to be borne by the party with the superior or greater financial ability to pay.
[2] A trial court errs by requiring a party to pay a portion of attorneys' fees and costs when the other party has the superior financial ability to pay.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it is well established in dissolution cases that attorneys' fees and costs are to be borne by the party who has the superior or greater financial ability to pay”
Establishes the governing legal standard for allocating attorneys' fees in dissolution cases
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn a dissolution of marriage proceeding, the general master found appellee's net income was $2,293.00 monthly and imputed appellant's net income at $1…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Financial Ability To Pay cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The former wife appeals from an order approving and ratifying a general master’s report determining attorneys’ fees and costs. For the reasons whieh follow, we must reverse.
Appehant filed a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage wherein she sought, among other things, attorneys’ fees and costs for the proceedings involved. Both parties submitted financial affidavits and the ease proceeded to Final Hearing before a general master on April 21, 1992.
On May 11,1992, the Report of the general master was entered wherein it was found, inter alia, that appellee’s net income was $2,293.00 monthly and appellant’s net income should be imputed to be $1,047.00 as she was currently unemployed. The report also reserved ruling on the issue of attorneys’ fees and costs to a later date and provided that pursuant to stipulation of counsel, both parties would be allowed to submit affidavits of such fees and costs in lieu of live expert testimony.
On June 19,1992, both parties and counsel appeared before the general master with a proposed Amended Report on issues not germane to the instant appeal. At that time, the general master executed the Amended Report and then proceeded to hear testimony on the issues of attorneys’ fees and costs for appellant. Appellant submitted an affidavit of counsel which indicated that she was seeking $5,250.00 as attorneys’ fees and $495.00 as costs. Appellee, on the other hand, presented the testimony of a live witness who opined that a reasonable fee in this case would be between $2,250 to $3,000. Upon appellant’s objection to this live testimony, the general master agreed to afford appellant an opportunity to present live testimony at a subsequent hearing to be set.
Prior to the rescheduling of the continuation of the hearing, however, appellee submitted a proposed report of the June 19th hearing to the general master which was approved and adopted both by the general master and later by the trial court below.
The report concluded that because appel-lee earned sixty eight percent (68%) of the parties’ total income, he should be made to pay only sixty eight (68%) of the fees and costs of both parties. The appellant, therefore was charged with thirty two percent (32%) of the fees and costs. The report further determined appellant’s reasonable fees to be twenty five hundred dollars ($2,500) notwithstanding the fact that the hearing had not been completed.
We must reverse and remand for a completed hearing on the issue of attorneys’ fees and costs because it is well established in dissolution cases that attorneys’ fees and costs are to be borne by the party who has the superior or greater financial ability to pay. Werner v. Werner, 587 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Martinez-Cid v. Martinez-Cid, 559 So. 2d 1177, 1178 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Kuse v. Kuse, 533 So. 2d 828, 829 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). Even assuming, without deciding, that the income imputed to appellant was correct, it is clear that appellee still has the superior financial ability to pay and it was error for the court not to require him to pay all of appellant’s reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Heller v. Kuvin, 490 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
Further, we find that it was fundamentally unfair for the general master to make a final determination as to the amount of appellant’s reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs while the hearing on the same was still pending.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a completed hearing on the reasonable amount of attorneys’ fees and costs which are to be borne by appellee.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Brock v. Newman Brock, 690 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)…So. 2d 679 (Fla.1991); McCloskey v. McCloskey, 359 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), cert. denied, 368 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 1979). . Reich v. Reich, 652 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Kovar v. Kovar, 648 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Gomez v. Gomez, 642 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Stowell v. Stowell, 604 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Green v. Green, 542 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Benson v. Benson, 519 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Carroll v. Carroll, 471 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 482…
-
SOL v. SOL, 656 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…ment, but requests recalculation of the amount. The former wife has cross-appealed, asserting that despite only a moderate difference in income, the former husband should be required to pay all of her attorney’s fees.3 She relies on Gomez v. Gomez, 642 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), which states that “it is well established in dissolution cases that attorneys’ fees and costs are to be borne by the party who has the superior or greater financial ability to pay.” Id. at 108 (citations omitted). The former wife…
-
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 664 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…, and, more importantly, that the husband has a far greater income and is in far better health give him a far “superior ability to pay” the wife’s fees. In these circumstances, he must be deemed responsible for the entire amount. See Gomez v. Gomez, 642 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Lozano-Ciccia v. Lozano, 599 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Martinez-Cid v. Martinez-Cid, 559 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Heller v. Kuvin, 490 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). Compare Sol v. Sol, 656 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 3d DCA 199…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Martinez-Cid v. Recy Martinez-Cid, 559 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- Kuse v. Kuse, 533 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Werner v. Werner, 587 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
- Heller v. Kuvin, 490 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)