MICHAEL CRAIG, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Michael Craig appeals his drug possession sentence, challenging the trial court's imposition of jail time as a special condition of community control, an unstatutorily authorized $60 cost, and a public defender's lien assessed without proper notice of hearing rights. The appellate court agrees with all three contentions and vacates the sentence for resentencing with proper statutory compliance.
The court held that the jail sentence was improper under State v. Davis and must be vacated, though the trial court may impose a departure sentence on remand if it provides proper contemporaneous written reasons. The $60 cost was improper because the trial court failed to reference statutory authority. The $100 public defender's lien was improper because the trial court failed to comply with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.720(d)(1) by not advising Craig of his hearing rights.
[1] A trial court may impose a departure sentence on remand if proper contemporaneous written reasons are provided, even if the initial imposition was not recognized as a dep…
[2] A trial court must reference statutory authority when imposing costs on a defendant.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We vacate this sentence on the authority of State v. Davis, 630 So.2d 1059 (Fla.1994); however, because the trial court did not realize that it was imposing a departure sentence, on remand the court may impose a departure sentence as long as proper contemporaneous written reasons are provided.”
Establishes the standard for vacating and remanding sentencing errors—departure sentences require written reasons.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCraig was convicted of unlawful purchase/possession of cocaine. The trial court sentenced him to two years of community control followed by three year…
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DIAMANTIS, Judge.
Michael Craig appeals his sentence for unlawful purchase (possession) of cocaine.1 We agree with all three contentions raised by Craig on appeal and, thus, we vacate Craig’s sentence and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The trial court sentenced Craig to two years of community control followed by three years of drug-offender probation. As a special condition of community control, the trial court ordered Craig to serve 200 days in the Volusia County Jail, with 67 days credit for time served. We vacate this sentence on the authority of State v. Davis, 630 So. 2d 1059 (Fla.1994); however, because the trial court did not realize that it was imposing a departure sentence, on remand the court may impose a departure sentence as long as proper contemporaneous written reasons are provided. See State v. Betancourt, 552 So. 2d 1107 (Fla.1989).
We also agree that the trial court erred in requiring Craig to pay $60 to First Step of Volusia County without referencing the statutory authority for the imposition of such costs,2 and in assessing a $100 public defender’s lien without advising Craig of his right to a hearing to contest the amount of the lien as required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.720(d)(1).3 In resentencing Craig on remand, the trial court shall comply with rule 3.720(d)(1) before assessing a public defender’s hen and, if the trial court reimposes the $60 costs to be paid to First Step of Volusia County, the trial court shah reference the statutory authority for the imposition of such costs.
Sentences VACATED; cause REMANDED.
COBB and W. SHARP, JJ., concur. . See § 893.13(l)(a)l, Fla.Stat. (1993). See also § 893.03(2)(a)4, Fla.Stat. (1993).
. See Gedeon v. State, 636 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Thomas v. State, 633 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), rev. denied, 640 So. 2d 1109 (1994).
. Smith v. State, 622 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). We note that, in an apparent attempt to comply with rule 3.720(d)(1) and Bull v. State, 548 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1989), Ae trial court orally notified Craig of Ae imposition of Ae $100 public defender's lien and Aen entered a written judgment in that amount, which stated: “YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT YOU HAVE 30 DAYS FROM THE ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT TO FILE A WRITTEN REQUEST FOR A HEARING TO CONTEST THE AMOUNT OF THE LIEN.” The record, however, fails to reflect Aat a copy of this judgment was served on Craig or his attorney, or that Craig was apprised of his right to a hearing at sentencing.
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Brooks v. State, 649 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)…ires Brooks to pay $1 per month to First Step, Inc., of the Fifth Circuit, because the trial court failed to reference the statutory authority for the imposition of such costs. See Tibero v. State, 646 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Craig v. State, 643 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). If the trial court reimposes such costs on remand, the trial court must reference the statutory authority for the imposition of these costs. We also vacate the special condition contained in each sentence requiring Brooks to pa…
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McLEOD v. State, 645 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)…the court improperly assessed attorney fees against appellant without first giving him notice of the intention to assess fees and a hearing regarding the entitlement and amount. See Burke v. State, 642 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Craig v. State, 643 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Dewitt v. State, 639 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Edwards v. State, 639 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Griffin v. State, 636 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Fulmore v. State, 634 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Lynch v. Stat…
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Vaughn v. State, 671 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…stance conviction. In March, after determining that the defendant had violated his probation, the trial court sentenced him to 366 days in prison followed by one year probation. Relying on State v. Davis, 630 So. 2d 1059 (1994), and Craig v. State, 643 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), the defendant argues that his sentence was an improper departure from the sentencing guidelines. He argues that the trial court could have sentenced him to prison, community control, or probation, but not a combination of any tw…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Betancourt, 552 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1989)
- Bull v. State, 548 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1989)
- State v. Davis, 630 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1994)
- Menchaca v. State, 636 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Bruce v. State, 622 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Domena v. State, 622 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)
- Arjomand v. Alec J. Ross, 633 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
- Lenthius Daryl Thomas v. State, 633 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)