ANTHONY A. BROOKS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Anthony Brooks appealed his sentences, challenging a departure from sentencing guidelines without written reasons and the imposition of certain costs. The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the departure sentence because it was imposed pursuant to a plea agreement, but vacated cost conditions for lacking statutory authority and proper pronouncement.
A trial court may impose a departure sentence exceeding sentencing guidelines without written reasons if the sentence is based on a legitimate, uncoerced plea agreement and does not exceed the statutory maximum. However, cost conditions must be supported by statutory authority and, if appearing in the sentencing order, must be orally pronounced at sentencing.
[1] A trial court may impose a sentence exceeding recommended guidelines without written reasons when the defendant agrees to the departure sentence as part of a plea agreeme…
[2] A trial court must reference statutory authority when imposing costs on a defendant.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A trial court is authorized to impose a sentence which exceeds the recommended guidelines without providing written reasons justifying departure based upon a legitimate and un-coerced plea agreement, provided that the sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum.”
Establishes the legal principle allowing departure sentences without written reasons when based on a valid plea agreement
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrooks received concurrent terms of two years community control with six months county jail followed by two years probation. This sentence departed fr…
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DIAMANTIS, Judge.
Anthony A. Brooks appeals his sentences, contending that the trial court’s departure from the sentencing guidelines violates State v. Davis, 630 So. 2d 1059 (Fla.1994) (sentencing disposition which imposes sanctions of county jail and community control constitutes departure sentence requiring contemporaneous written reasons). Brooks also challenges the imposition of certain costs. We affirm Brooks’ sentences, vacate the cost items, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Under the applicable guidelines, Brooks’ sentencing guidelines range was any non-state prison sanction or community control, or 1 to 3½ years incarceration. The trial court departed from these guidelines and sentenced Brooks to concurrent terms of two years community control, with a special condition that Brooks serve six months in the county jail, followed by two years of probation. The trial court did not provide any contemporaneous written reasons justifying the departure.
Although we recognize that, standing alone, this departure sentence would require the furnishing of contemporaneous written reasons, we affirm because this sentence was imposed pursuant to a plea agreement in which Brooks specifically agreed to the imposition of a departure sentence.1 A trial court is authorized to impose a sentence which exceeds the recommended guidelines without providing written reasons justifying departure based upon a legitimate and un-coerced plea agreement, provided that the sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum. Smith v. State, 529 So. 2d 1106, 1107 (Fla.1988); Quarterman v. State, 527 So. 2d 1380, 1382 (Fla.1988). Cf. Cheney v. State, 640 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Vickers v. State, 630 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Marshall v. State, 623 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA), appeal dismissed, 626 So. 2d 207 (Fla.1993). Accordingly, we affirm Brooks’ departure sentence.
We vacate, however, the special condition in each sentence which requires Brooks to pay $1 per month to First Step, Inc., of the Fifth Circuit, because the trial court failed to reference the statutory authority for the imposition of such costs. See Tibero v. State, 646 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Craig v. State, 643 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). If the trial court reimposes such costs on remand, the trial court must reference the statutory authority for the imposition of these costs.
We also vacate the special condition contained in each sentence requiring Brooks to pay to the State of Florida $1 per day for the cost of his electronic monitoring during the period of his community control because, although this condition appears on the sentencing documents, it was not orally pronounced at sentencing. Any discrepancy between oral pronouncements and written sentencing orders must be resolved on remand. See Cleveland v. State, 617 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). See also Anderson v. State, 616 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). Also, the trial court failed to reference the statutory authority for the imposition of such costs. See Morris v. State, 642 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Shaddix v. State, 599 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). On remand, if the trial court resolves this discrepancy by reimposing the payment of this cost item as a condition of community control, the trial court must reference the statutory authority for its imposition.2
AFFIRMED in part; VACATED in part; REMANDED.
COBB and GOSHORN, JJ., concur. . Compare Hause v. State, 643 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), wherein the defendant merely acquiesced in the imposition of an illegal sentence and, thus, on appeal the court reversed the sentence. In this regard, we agree with Brooks that departure errors apparent on the face of the record do not require a contemporaneous objection to be preserved for review. See Taylor v. State, 601 So. 2d 540 (Fla.1992). See also Forehand v. State, 537 So. 2d 103 (Fla.1989); State v. Whitfield, 487 So. 2d 1045 (Fla.1986).
. While section 948.03(2)(a)(4), Florida Statutes (Supp.1992), authorizes a trial court to impose surveillance by electronic monitoring of a person placed on community control, and sections 948.03(2)(b)l and 948.03(3)(a)l contain provisions pertaining to electronic monitoring of persons in community control programs, this statute does not authorize or mandate imposition of costs for such electronic monitoring.
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State v. Williams, 667 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1996)…2d DCA 1995), to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. . These offenses were committed on March 12, 1993. . See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 649 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Reynolds v. State, 598 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Wolf v. State, 595 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Casmay v. State, 569 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Hicks v. State, 559 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). . First DCA: Se…1 / 2
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Madison v. State, 664 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)…FDLE. That alone is not sufficient. Initially we note that this court has followed the practice of requiring that the trial judge identify the statutory authority for costs imposed in the written sentence or order of probation. See Brooks v. State, 649 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Samuels v. State, 649 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), cause dismissed, 657 So. 2d 1163 (Fla.1995); [*1141] Valdez v. State, 639 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). In a case where the statutory basis is not clear or easily ascertai…
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Travessa Eugene Merricks v. State, 90 So. 3d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)…trial court never orally pronounced that Merricks would be responsible for paying the costs of electronic monitoring. The trial court may not impose the obligation to pay costs of electronic monitoring without orally pronouncing it. Brooks v. State, 649 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (vacating special condition requiring appellant to pay $1 per day for costs of electronic monitoring during period of his community control because condition was not orally pronounced at sentencing and because trial court failed…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (17 total)
- THE Florida BAR v. Mullins, 527 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1988)
- State v. Whitfield, 487 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 1986)
- State v. Davis, 630 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1994)
- Forehand v. State, 537 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1989)
- Taylor v. State, 601 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1992)
- Tibero v. State, 646 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- Goshay v. State, 646 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Benny Ray Smith v. State, 529 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 1988)
- Cheney v. State, 640 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- Marlette Evette Cleveland v. State, 617 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)