RAYMOND ALLEN, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Raymond Allen challenges his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing the trial court improperly struck a black juror (Williams) based on race rather than legitimate reasons. The appellate court affirmed the manslaughter conviction but reversed the separate conviction for exhibition of a deadly weapon as a double jeopardy violation.
The trial court did not err in striking Williams because the reasons given—that her brother had been convicted of the exact same crime charged and that she expressed beliefs of prosecutorial unfairness—were specific to her and not equally applicable to other jurors. However, the separate conviction and sentence for exhibition of a deadly weapon violated double jeopardy because firearm use served as the basis for enhancing the manslaughter conviction.
[1] A peremptory challenge to a potential juror may be deemed an impermissible pretext if the reasons given for the strike are equally applicable to jurors who were not chall…
[2] A trial judge has discretion to strike a potential juror based on expressed beliefs that the police and prosecution treated a family member unfairly, especially when that…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a challenge based on reasons equally applicable to jurors who were not challenged establishes an impermissible pretext”
States the legal standard for identifying discriminatory peremptory challenges under Batson/Neil principles.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAllen was charged with second-degree murder and possession of a firearm during a felony. During jury selection, Williams, a black woman, disclosed tha…
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BARKDULL, Judge.
Appellant, Raymond Allen, Jr., seeks review of the trial court’s entry of judgment and sentence.
Appellant was charged with second degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. During jury selection, the state asked members of the venire whether they or their family members had ever been convicted of a crime. Of the several responses-to the question, a black woman named Williams asked for a side bar conference where she told the judge that her brother had been convicted of second degree murder three years earlier. She further told the judge that she thought the police and prosecution had treated her brother unfairly throughout the entire episode. The state attempted to strike the woman from the panel with a peremptory challenge. In response, the defense raised a Neil challenge to the peremptory strike because the state had not attempted to strike other members of the venire who stated that they or their family members had been convicted of a crime. The judge accepted the state’s reasons for the challenge and struck Williams from the jury. Thereafter, a trial was held and the jury convicted appellant of the lesser included offenses of manslaughter with a firearm and exhibition of a deadly weapon. At sentencing, the judge enhanced the manslaughter conviction from a second degree felony to a first degree felony because appellant had used a firearm during commission of the crime. Appellant was separately sentenced for exhibition of a deadly weapon.
Appellant argues that the trial judge erred by striking Williams from the jury. Appellant states that the reasons given for the strike were merely a pretext for removing Williams because she was black. In support of this argument, appellant states that other members of the panel were not challenged even though they or their family members had been convicted of a crime.
Appellant correctly recognizes that a challenge based on reasons equally applicable to jurors who were not challenged establishes an impermissible pretext. State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 22 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219, 108 S.Ct. 2873, 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988). However, the trial transcript of the jury selection reveals that the trial judge struck Williams from the jury for reason not applicable to the other jurors. First, unlike the other jurors or their relatives, William’s brother had been convicted of second degree murder, the exact same crime as the one charged to the defendant. More importantly, at a side bar conference, Williams told the judge that she thought the police and prosecution had treated her brother unfairly. These statements establish a possibility of prosecutorial prejudice in Williams not evident in the other jurors. Thus, it was fully within the trial judge’s discretion to strike Williams from the jury for these reasons.
The state does not contest the appellant’s second argument that the trial court improperly convicted and sentenced him for exhibition of a weapon. Because use of the weapon served as the basis for enhancing the manslaughter conviction from a second degree felony to a first degree felony, separate conviction and sentence for exhibition of a weapon violated appellant’s constitutional right against double jeopardy. Cleveland v. State, 587 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.1991); Joseph v. State, 625 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).
Therefore, we affirm the conviction and sentence for manslaughter with a firearm, but reverse the conviction and sentence for exhibition of a deadly weapon.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
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Davis v. State, 691 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…he trial court complied and asked the state to proffer a valid race-neutral reason. The state responded with such a reason, specifically, that Ms. Pittman had been previously arrested and that a close relative had also been arrested. Allen v. State, 643 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Aikens v. State, 609 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Miller v. State, 605 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Files v. State, 586 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Step 2 was also satisfied. The defendant argues that because the court di…
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Symonette v. State, 778 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…prospective juror has been previously arrested or has had a relative arrested has been repeatedly held to be a valid race-neutral reason for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. See Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So. 2d 784 (Fla.1992); Allen v. State, 643 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Aikens v. State, 609 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Miller v. State, 605 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Knight v. State, 559 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). The fact that such a juror asserts that he or she can, nevertheless, be…
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Smith v. State, 799 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…a prospective juror has been previously arrested or has a relative who has been is generally considered to be a valid race-neutral reason for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. See Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So. 2d 784 (Fla.1992); Allen v. State, 643 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Aikens v. State, 609 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Miller v. State, 605 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Knight v. State, 559 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). “The fact that such a potential juror asserts that he or she can, nevert…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1988)
- Quinten L. Cleveland v. State, 587 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1991)
- Men's Int'l Prof'l Tennis Council v. Volvo N. Am. Corp., 487 U.S. 1219 (U.S. 1988)
- Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc. v. Wis. Dep't of Natural Res., 487 U.S. 1219 (U.S. 1988)
- Surface v. Town OF BAY Harbor Islands, 625 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
- Joseph v. State, 625 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)