WILLIAM PARRIMON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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William Parrimon appeals sentences imposed pursuant to a plea agreement in three related cases involving first degree murder, attempted robbery, and firearm possession charges. The appellate court found multiple sentencing errors, including improper habitual offender enhancement on a capital felony, consecutive mandatory minimum sentences that should run concurrently, and unauthorized costs, requiring remand for correction.
The court held that: (1) a capital felony is not subject to habitual offender enhancement provisions, requiring the habitual offender designation to be struck; (2) the three-year mandatory minimum for firearm possession during the murder must be deleted as it was not orally pronounced at sentencing; (3) the firearm possession mandatory minimum in case 91-1007F must run concurrently with the habitual offender sentence, not consecutively; and (4) costs imposed under sections 943.25(4) and 943.25(8) and the two hundred dollars in additional court costs must be stricken for lack of statutory authority.
[1] A capital felony is not subject to the enhancement provisions of section 775.084, Florida Statutes.
[2] A mandatory minimum sentence for possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony must be orally pronounced at sentencing.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a capital felony is not subject to the enhancement provisions of section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1989)”
Establishes that habitual violent felony offender designation cannot apply to first degree murder
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceParrimon was sentenced in three separate cases (91-775F, 91-997F, and 91-1007F) pursuant to a plea agreement. In case 91-775F, he received a sentence …
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PER CURIAM.
Mr. Parrimon appeals judgments and sentences that were imposed in three separate but interrelated cases pursuant to a plea agreement.1 He raises ten issues on appeal, only four of which merit discussion.
In case number 91-775F, the trial court sentenced Parrimon as a habitual violent felony offender for first degree murder. This was error because a capital felony is not subject to the enhancement provisions of section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1989). McLain v. State, 612 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Thus, we remand with directions to strike the notation in the sentence for first degree murder designating Parrimon as a habitual offender. We also must remand with directions to delete the three year mandatory minimum sentence that the trial court imposed under section 775.087(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), for possession of a firearm during the commission of the first degree murder. See Downs v. State, 616 So. 2d 444 (Fla.1993). Moreover, this sentence must also be stricken under Yates v. State, 429 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), as it was not orally pronounced at sentencing.
In ease number 91-1007F, the trial court also sentenced Parrimon as a habitual violent felony offender on the charge of attempted robbery with a firearm, imposing a ten year mandatory prison term pursuant to section 775.084(4)(b)2. The trial court erred, however, when it ordered that the three year mandatory prison term it imposed for possessing a firearm during the commission of the attempted robbery be served consecutively to the ten year mandatory habitual offender sentence. Davis v. State, 630 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). On remand, the trial court shall designate that the two mandatory minimum terms be served concurrently. Longley v. State, 614 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).
Finally, Parrimon challenges the trial court’s impositions of certain costs in all three cases. We conclude that the costs imposed pursuant to sections 943.25(4) and 943.25(8), Florida Statutes (1989) are without statutory authority and must be stricken. Siplin v. State, 584 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). We also determine that the two hundred dollars in “additional court costs” that were imposed must also be stricken because the record does not “contain a citation to the proper statutory authority supporting the assessment of such costs.” Sutton v. State, 635 So. 2d 1032, 1033 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). On remand, the state may seek to reimpose these costs.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
HALL, A.C.J., and PATTERSON and LAZZARA, JJ., concur. . Case numbers 91-775F, 91-997F, and 91-1007F.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Cited By
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Shepherd v. State, 932 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…ame criminal episode. [*337] In his motion for rehearing, Shepherd correctly pointed out that if he was actually sentenced as an HFO for count one, then he was incorrectly habitualized for an offense that was a capital felony. See Parrimon v. State, 644 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Shepherd additionally claimed that section 775.021(4)(a) cannot be used to impose consecutive HFO sentences for offenses that occurred as part of the same criminal episode. See Murray v. State, 890 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).…
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Jones v. State, 225 So. 3d 290 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)…capital crimes cannot be enhanced under this statute. We have de novo review. Willard v. State, 22 So. 3d 864, 864 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). [*292] Capital crimes cannot be enhanced under the plain language of section 775.084(4)(a)1. Parrimon v. State, 644 So. 2d 95, 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). The highest degree of felony which may- be enhanced for a habitual felony offender- is a life felony or a felony of the first degree. § 775,084(4)(a)1, Florida Statutes (2016). Here, the defendant was convicted of two counts…
Authorities Cited
- Sutton v. State, 635 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Downs v. State, 616 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1993)
- In the Interest of R.B. v. State, 429 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Yates v. State, 429 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Columbus Ferry Siplin v. State, 584 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Davis v. State, 630 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Jones v. State, 614 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Longley v. State, 614 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)
- McLAIN v. State, 612 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)