CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL HANNAH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Christopher Hannah appeals his sentencing as an adult in juvenile court, arguing the trial court failed to properly consider statutory criteria and used an outdated predisposition report. The appellate court reverses and remands for resentencing, requiring strict compliance with statutory requirements and either a current predisposition report or express waiver.
The trial court failed to satisfy Troutman's requirement for individualized evaluation of statutory criteria, as mere conclusional language tracking the statute is insufficient. Additionally, silence by defense counsel does not constitute a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of the requirement for a current predisposition report; only express waiver is acceptable.
[1] A trial court must provide an individualized evaluation of how a juvenile fits within the statutory criteria for imposing adult sanctions, and mere conclusional language…
[2] A trial court must strictly comply with statutory criteria when determining whether to impose adult sanctions on a juvenile.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court must consider each of the criteria in section 39.059(7)(c) before determining whether adult sanctions should be imposed. The supreme court further concluded that, in doing so, the trial court must give an individualized evaluation of how a particular juvenile fits within the criteria and that mere eonclusional language that tracks the statutory criteria is insufficient.”
Establishes the legal standard from Troutman requiring individualized evaluation rather than conclusional statements when imposing adult sanctions.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHannah, age 17, entered a no contest plea to nine charges. At sentencing, the trial court imposed adult sanctions and entered a written order addressi…
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PARKER, Judge.
Christopher Michael Hannah appeals his sentence as an adult, specifically arguing that the trial court failed to consider the criteria in section 39.059, Florida Statutes (1991), and failed to require an up-to-date predisposition report in sentencing him as an adult. We reverse.
Hannah entered a no contest plea to nine charges. He was seventeen years of age at the time of his sentencing hearing. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed adult sanctions. Without orally pronouncing its findings with respect to the criteria in section 39.059(7), which permits the imposition of adult sanctions, the trial court contemporaneously entered a written order enumerating the statutory criteria to be considered and the findings with respect to the criteria. As to-criterion 6, the written order provided:
6. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the child if he is assigned to services and facilities for delinquent children. Notwithstanding the recommendation of the juvenile authorities, I conclude that juvenile sanctions are not suitable.
We conclude that this statement is conclu-sional and does not satisfy the supreme court’s standard set out in Troutman v. State, 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla.1993). In Trout-man, the supreme court concluded that the trial court must consider each of the criteria in section 39.059(7)(c) before determining whether adult sanctions should be imposed. The supreme court further concluded that, in doing so, the trial court must give an individualized evaluation of how a particular juvenile fits within the criteria and that mere eonclusional language that tracks the statutory criteria is insufficient. See Troutman, 630 So. 2d at 531.
Because Troutman requires strict compliance with section 39.059(7)(e), we affirm the judgment but reverse the sentence and remand the case for resentencing in strict compliance with section 39.059(7)(c). On remand the trial court may again sentence Hannah as an adult, provided the court strictly complies with section 39.059(7)(c), taking into consideration conditions existing at the time of sentencing. See Kazakoff v. State, 642 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (en banc).
Hannah also challenges the trial court’s use of a predisposition report pre pared for sentencing Hannah in another ease involving a prior violation of community control. At the sentencing hearing defense counsel did not object to the court’s considering a predisposition report prepared in the other case and did not offer additional information to supplement the predisposition report.
The state contends that defense counsel’s silence constitutes a waiver. Waiver of the requirements of section 39.059(7) must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See Berry v. State, 636 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). The record does not reflect such an affirmative, voluntary, and knowing waiver of a proper predisposition report. The state cites P.D.W. v. State, 620 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), for the proposition that a juvenile defendant may waive a predisposition report. The state also asserts that, as in P.D.W., Hannah effectively waived a duplicate report. P.D.W., however, is distinguishable in that it involved an express waiver of a predisposition report. Here, there was no such express waiver. Upon remand of this ease, the trial court shall obtain a current predisposition report or obtain an express waiver from Hannah.
Reversed and remanded for resentencing.
FRANK, C.J., and FULMER, J., concur.
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Cited By
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Satalino v. State, 652 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…orm order is insufficient to satisfy the prescriptions of section 39.059(7)(c), Florida Statutes (1993), as they were interpreted in Troutman v. State, 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla.1993); Menchaca v. State, 636 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Hannah v. State, 644 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), and an ever-expanding list of additional cases. On resentencing, the trial court may impose adult sanctions after making the appropriate specific findings in a written order. See Messam v. State, 640 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994…
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Alonza Dion Wideman v. State, 651 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…y way to attempt to deal with you in the justice system from this point forward is as an adult. This statement falls short of the specific findings required by section 39.059(7)(d). See Troutman v. State, 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla.1993); Hannah v. State, 644 So. 2d 141 (Fla.2d DCA 1994). We remand this case to the trial court for resentencing. The court may again sentence appellant as an adult after complying with the requirements of sections 39.059(7)(c) and (d). We note the court imposed some special conditions…
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Kison Evans v. State, 672 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…right to -written findings. If the proper sentencing procedure was not followed, the court on resentencing could reimpose adult sanctions after making the necessary written findings. See Troutman v. State, 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla.1993); Hannah v. State, 644 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). REVERSED AND REMANDED. W. SHARP and ANTOON, JJ., concur. . Evans was placed on probation in 1991 and was sentenced to incarceration following a revocation of probation in 1992.…
Authorities Cited
- Troutman v. State, 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1993)
- Edler v. State, 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1993)
- Kazakoff v. State, 642 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Fletcher Berry v. State, 636 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- P.D.W. v. State, 620 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)