LEONARD R. LANGLEY, PETITIONER,
v.
HARRY K. SINGLETARY, ETC., RESPONDENT
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The court held that the legislative cancellation of provisional gain time was valid and did not violate due process.
Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus challenging the cancellation of his provisional gain time. The cancellation was based on a statute that voided al…
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PER CURIAM.
Leonard R. Langley petitions this Court for habeas corpus, which we treat as a petition for writ of mandamus. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(8), Fla. Const. We note Langley’s argument that our opinion in Griffin v. Singletary, 638 So. 2d 500 (Fla.1994), should not be applicable to the cancellation of his provisional gain time. He correctly notes that Griffin dealt in part with revocation of provisional gain time for certain serious offenses, pursuant to an Attorney General’s opinion.
However, Langley overlooks the fact that section 944.278, Florida Statutes (1993), voided all provisional gain time for every inmate serving a sentence or combined sentence in the custody of the Florida Department of Corrections. In Griffin, we noted that this across-the-board cancellation eliminated any question of arbitrariness and therefore of any conceivable need for the Department to hold individual cancellation proceedings. We also noted that there is no due-process violation in such a legislative cancellation. Griffin.
Even if a more stringent review were needed here — which we do not decide — we also believe the legislature has met the “some evidence” standard suggested by the United States Supreme Court in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985); see Griffin. As Respondent notes, administrative gain time and provisional credits were temporary devices for achieving federally mandated reduction in prison overcrowding. The legislature now has determined that the problem has lessened and that other devices are available that render administrative gain time and provisional credits redundant or unnecessary. These devices include increased building of prisons, front-end diversionary programs, and certain other early release programs. Accordingly, all relief is denied.
It is so ordered. GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN, HARDING and WELLS, JJ., concur.
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Meola v. Dep't OF Corr., 732 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1998)…. 372 (1915). As the District Court recognized in Herring, this Court has already determined that across-the-board legislative cancellations eliminate any question of arbitrariness or any need for individual proceedings. See Langley v. Singletary, 645 So. 2d 961 (Fla.1994); Griffin v. Singletary, 638 So. 2d 500 (Fla.1994). While we acknowledge that Lynce has essentially overruled our previous decisions in this area as concerns the Ex Post Facto Clause, we find no indication in Lynce that we must now also re…
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Winkler v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 2002)…ion, they are disapproved. . This Court stated in Meóla: [Tjhis Court has already determined that across-the-board legislative cancellations eliminate any question of arbitrariness or any need for individual proceedings. See Langley v. Singletary, 645 So. 2d 961 (Fla.1994); Griffin v. Singletary, 638 So. 2d 500 (Fla.1994). While we acknowledge that Lynce has essentially overruled our previous decisions in this area as concerns the Ex Post Facto Clause, we find no indication in Lynce that we must now also re…
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Singletary v. Hon. Robert Evans, 676 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…as held that DOC may cancel provisional credits which were awarded for the sole purpose of reducing prison overcrowding and courts may not go behind the decision to do so. Griffin v. Singletary, 638 So. 2d 500, 501 (Fla.1994); Langley v. Singletary, 645 So. 2d 961 (Fla.1994). Judge Evans had no authority to direct the manner in which DOC calculated credits awarded solely to reduce prison overcrowding. Davis v. Singletary, 659 So. 2d 1126, 1127 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Further, DOC could forfeit 1749 days of Galst…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (U.S. 1985)
- Griffin v. Singletary, 638 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1994)