HARRY K. SINGLETARY, SECRETARY, ETC., PETITIONER,
v.
HON. ROBERT EVANS, CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE, ETC., RESPONDENTS
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The Florida Supreme Court granted Secretary of Corrections Singletary's petition for writ of prohibition against Circuit Court Judge Evans, prohibiting the judge from compelling the Department of Corrections to award disputed sentence credits (12 years 171 days) to a probation violator or threatening contempt. The Court held that DOC had statutory authority to cancel provisional credits awarded for prison overcrowding and to forfeit gain time upon probation revocation, which the trial court could not override.
No. The writ of prohibition was granted because DOC had statutory and administrative duty to cancel provisional credits awarded solely for prison overcrowding and to forfeit gain time when a paroled prisoner's probation was revoked. The trial court lacked authority to direct the manner in which DOC calculated these credits, as doing so usurped DOC's executive authority.
[1] Department of Corrections may cancel provisional credits awarded solely to reduce prison overcrowding, and courts may not review such decisions.
[2] A prisoner released on probation may have gain time forfeited without notice or hearing if probation is revoked.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“DOC may cancel provisional credits which were awarded for the sole purpose of reducing prison overcrowding and courts may not go behind the decision to do so.”
Establishes the core principle that courts lack authority to review or override DOC's cancellation of overcrowding-related provisional credits, citing Griffin v. Singletary and Langley v. Singletary.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKevin Lee Galston pleaded nolo contendere to DUI manslaughter and received concurrent 12-year sentences followed by 3 years probation. He was released…
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ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION AND/OR REHEARING
THOMPSON, Judge.
We grant Appellant’s motion for clarification and revise our opinion as follows:
Harry K. Singletary, Secretary of the Department of Corrections (“DOC”), petitions this court for writ of prohibition. Singletary seeks to prohibit the Honorable Robert Evans from compelling him to award 12 years and 171 days credit on Kevin Lee Galston’s, defendant below, sentence for violating probation, or requiring him to appear at contempt proceedings in his capacity as Secretary of DOC. We grant the writ.
Judge Evans sentenced Galston to DOC for violating probation. Galston had originally entered a plea of nolo contendere to two counts of DUI manslaughter and was sentenced to two concurrent 12 year terms of incarceration followed by 3 years probation. Galston was given provisional credit because of prison overcrowding and gain time for good behavior, released from prison and placed on probation. He violated his probation and was resentenced. The trial court sentenced him to two concurrent terms of 15 years incarceration with credit for 12 years previously served and 171 days credit for time in jail. Judge Evans intended that upon resentencing, Galston serve no more than three years in the DOC. After Galston was received by DOC, it cancelled 90 days of his provisional credit and forfeited 1749 days of his unforfeited gain time. The result was that Galston would serve substantially more than three years in prison. When Galston filed a motion to clarify, Judge Evans held a hearing at which an attorney for DOC appeared. Judge Evans wanted to know why DOC had not awarded the time credited by him on Galston’s sentence.
The attorney for DOC contended that the legislature had mandated upon sentencing for violation of probation, the cancellation of Galston’s provisional credit by section 944.278, Florida Statutes (1995) and forfeiture of Galston’s gain time by enactment of section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1995). The legislature also repealed prior statutes that had been enacted to release prisoners due to prison overcrowding. Ch. 93-406 § 32; 88-122 § 6, Laws of Florida. Because of a prison building program, the early release statutes were no longer necessary. After the hearing, in spite of the information presented, Judge Evans ordered DOC to award 12 years and 171 days credit to Gal-ston’s sentence or have Singletary appear on a show cause order why he should not be held in contempt.
In this case, DOC cancelled 90 days provisional credits awarded for the sole pur pose of reducing jail overcrowding. The Florida Supreme Court has held that DOC may cancel provisional credits which were awarded for the sole purpose of reducing prison overcrowding and courts may not go behind the decision to do so. Griffin v. Singletary, 638 So. 2d 500, 501 (Fla.1994); Langley v. Singletary, 645 So. 2d 961 (Fla.1994). Judge Evans had no authority to direct the manner in which DOC calculated credits awarded solely to reduce prison overcrowding. Davis v. Singletary, 659 So. 2d 1126, 1127 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
Further, DOC could forfeit 1749 days of Galston’s gain time. Gain time in Galston’s sentence was composed of basic gain time awarded pursuant to section 944.275(4)(a) and incentive gain time, awarded pursuant to section 944.275(4)(b). The purpose of gain time is to allow DOC to reduce a sentence “in order to encourage satisfactory prisoner behavior, to provide incentive for prisoners to participate in productive activities, and to reward prisoners who perform outstanding deeds or service.” See § 944.275(1), Fla. Stat. (1995); Dugger v. Rodrick, 584 So. 2d 2 (Fla.1991). However, a prisoner who is released on probation pursuant to Chapter 948, may have his gain time forfeited without notice or hearing if his probation is revoked. See § 944.28(1), Fla. Stat. (1995).
Judge Evans’ attempt to compel DOC not to cancel Galston’s provisional credits and gain time was a usurpation of DOC’s executive authority. DOC had a statutory and administrative duty to cancel provisional credits and forfeit gain time when Galston was returned to prison.
Petition for writ of prohibition is hereby GRANTED.
PETERSON, C.J., and ANTOON, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Moore v. Pearson, 789 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 2001)…llow DOC to reduce a sentence ‘in order to encourage satisfactory prisoner behavior, to provide incentive for prisoners to participate in productive activities, and to reward prisoners who perform outstanding deeds or service.’” Singletary v. Evans, 676 So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); see also § 944.275(1), Fla. Stat. (2000). The authority to regulate gain time resides exclusively within the Department of Corrections pursuant to chapter 944, Florida Statutes. See State v. Green, 547 So. 2d 925, 927 (Fla.1…
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Williams v. The Dep't OF Corr., 734 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)…996); Bradley v. State, 631 So. 2d 1096, 1098 (Fla.1994). We agree with the trial court’s finding because any attempt to compel enforcement of the negotiated plea agreement would be a usurpation of the DOC’s executive authority. Singletary v. Evans, 676 So. 2d 51, 52 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Davis v. Singletary, 659 So. 2d 1126, 1127 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). However, we also agree with Williams’ contention that all parties to the negotiated plea agreement contemplated that, of the fifteen-year sentence, he would onl…
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State v. Stevenson, 695 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…larified its intention to award the entire previously awarded credits, including the time cancelled by the Department, as credit against the current 15 year sentence. The court did not, as the court improperly attempted to do in Singletary v. Evans, 676 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), direct the Department to do anything. If the Department does not recognize the credits awarded by the court then Stevenson’s remedy will be by mandamus. [*729] On the merits, we agree with the trial court. The statute by its ter…
Authorities Cited
- Griffin v. Singletary, 638 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1994)
- Dugger v. Rodrick, 584 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1991)
- Carlton Davis v. Singletary, 659 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Langley v. Singletary, 645 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1994)