SANDRA MOORE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Sandra Moore appealed her conviction for drug possession after pleading no contest, arguing the trial court applied the wrong legal standard when denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless encounter with police. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof to Moore and failed to make required factual findings on a dispositive issue.
The trial court erred by viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the state and by suggesting the jury should decide the consent issue. When the state relies on consent as justification for a search, it bears the burden of proving the consent was freely and voluntarily given, with no evidentiary presumption in favor of the state. Motions to suppress are exclusively for the trial court to decide, not a jury.
[1] A motion to suppress presents issues solely for the trial court to determine, and a jury has no part in the matter.
[2] When the state relies upon consent to conduct a search, it bears the burden of proving that the consent was freely and voluntarily given.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A motion to suppress presents issues solely for the trial court to determine and a jury has no part in the matter.”
Establishes that suppression motions are exclusively judicial determinations, not matters for jury resolution
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMoore was approached by three Lee County Sheriff's Deputies while standing on a residential street holding a handbag. During the encounter, authoritie…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Possession Of Drug Paraphernalia cases and more on FLexlaw
FRANK, Chief Judge.
Sandra Moore pleaded no contest to charges of possession of cocaine .and drug paraphernalia after the trial court denied her motion to suppress the smoking device and crack cocaine found in her possession. The trial court applied the wrong standard in ruling on the motion and we reverse.
Moore was approached by three Lee County Sheriff’s Deputies as she stood on a residential street while holding a small handbag. The key issue emerging from the encounter is whether the authorities, without a founded suspicion of criminal activity, ordered Moore to reveal the contents of her handbag or whether she voluntarily disclosed its contents. In any event, the authorities found a crack pipe and a small amount of crack cocaine. In denying the motion, the trial court thought it proper to view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the state.” Then, when pressed by the defense to resolve the question of whether Moore had given her consent to search, the trial court announced, “That’s something the jury is going to have to decide.”
The trial court’s remarks reveal its confusion as to the proper standard for resolution of the motion to suppress. A motion to suppress presents issues solely for the trial court to determine and a jury has no part in the matter. Carter v. State, 428 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Brown v. State, 352 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). Moreover, when the state relies upon consent to conduct a search, it shoulders the burden of proving that the consent was freely and voluntarily given. Louis v. State, 567 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). There is no evidentiary presumption favoring the state in this setting. The trial court erroneously relieved the state of its burden. Chesnut v. State, 404 So. 2d 1064 (Fla.1981); Denehy v. State, 400 So. 2d 1216 (Fla.1980).
We remind the trial court of its duty to announce whether reserved issues are dis-positive. Everett v. State, 535 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). The trial court failed in this instance to make such a finding and the parties did not stipulate that the issue was dispositive. On remand, should the issues be resolved in favor of the state and should Moore again decide to plead nolo contendere reserving the right to appeal, the trial court is to determine whether the issue surrounding the motion to suppress is dispositive.
We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CAMPBELL and PARKER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Hawk v. State, 848 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…uty to thereafter rule. See Ramsey v. State, 766 So. 2d 397, 397 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (“It is the trial court’s duty to announce whether preserved issues are dispositive.”) (citing Rust v. State, 742 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Moore v. State, 647 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)). Furthermore, Brown v. State, 376 So. 2d 382 (Fla.1979), has been interpreted as holding that in cases where the defendant is charged only with possession, such as in the instant case, an order denying the suppression of the con…
-
Ramsey v. State, 766 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…s was dispositive when he asserted that he wished to preserve his appellate rights in this case. It is the trial court's duty to announce whether preserved issues are dispositive. See Rust v. State, 742 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Moore v. State, 647 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Although typically we would remand for a determination of whether the preserved issue is disposi-tive, that is not necessary in this case because the denial of the motion to suppress the cocaine in this possession case is disposi…
-
Vasta v. State, 662 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…t the issue would have to be presented to the jury for resolution at trial. The state concedes error and correctly argues that the trial court should be directed to resolve the factual conflicts and make a decision on the motion. See Moore v. State, 647 So. 2d 326 (Fla.2d DCA 1994). Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for another hearing on the issue of consent. CAMPBELL and QUINCE, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Denehy v. State, 400 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 1980)
- Everett v. State, 535 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
- Chesnut v. State, 404 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 1981)
- Brown v. State, 352 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
- Carter v. State, 428 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Monnit Louis v. State, 567 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)