JOHN O. VARELA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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John Varela, age 16 at sentencing, appealed his conviction and 15-year sentence for robbery with a firearm, arguing the trial judge failed to enter written findings required by statute before sentencing a juvenile as an adult. The court affirmed, holding that Varela's prior adult conviction and his attorney's knowing waiver of the written findings requirement constituted valid exceptions to the general rule.
The court affirmed Varela's judgment and sentence, holding that while the general rule requires written findings before sentencing a juvenile as an adult, two exceptions applied: (1) Varela had been previously sentenced as an adult for a prior felony, which allowed adult sentencing without separate findings, and (2) Varela's attorney knowingly and intelligently waived the necessity of entering contemporaneous written findings.
[1] A trial judge is generally required to enter written findings using enumerated statutory criteria before sentencing a juvenile as an adult.
[2] Failure to provide contemporaneous written reasons for sentencing a juvenile as an adult requires remand for resentencing.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We agree with Varela that the general rule is a trial judge is required to enter written findings using the enumerated statutory criteria before the court elects to sentence a juvenile as an adult.”
Establishes the general statutory requirement for written findings when sentencing juveniles as adults
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceVarela, age 16, entered a nolo contendere plea to robbery with a firearm, a first-degree felony. He was sentenced to 15 years in the Department of Cor…
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THOMPSON, Judge.
John 0. Varela entered a plea of nolo contendere to an information that charged him with robbery with a firearm.1 He was sentenced to 15 years in the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) followed by 10 years probation. He now appeals his judgment and sentence. Varela alleges that because he was 16 at the time of sentencing, the trial judge was required to enter written findings pursuant to section 39.059(7), Florida Statutes (1993). Since the trial judge failed to enter written findings, Varela argues his judgment and sentence should be reversed and the case remanded for resentencing. We disagree, as discussed in this opinion, and affirm his judgment and sentence.
Varela entered a written plea to a first degree felony punishable by life imprisonment. At all essential stages of his case, he was represented by an attorney. The written plea resulted from negotiations with the State of Florida. The state and the defense agreed that the trial court would consider Varela’s juvenile record. If his record was not excessive, the court would “consider [a] youthful offender sentence or if [sentenced] as [an] adult to YO [youthful offender] facility under any circumstance (sic).” The trial court specifically informed Varela that in any event, he could be sentenced to serve time in the DOC. Varela entered the plea knowing there was a possibility he could be sentenced to serve time in the DOC.
We agree with Varela that the general rule is a trial judge is required to enter written findings using the enumerated statutory criteria before the court elects to sentence a juvenile as an adult. Troutman v. State, 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla.1993). Failure to provide contemporaneous written reasons requires the case to be remanded for resentencing. See State v. Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla.1984) (a trial judge must enter written findings pertaining to the suitability or non-suitability of a juvenile for adult sanctions and the failure to enter such findings requires a remand for resentencing). However, we recognize exceptions to the general rule that apply in this case.
One exception to the general rule that written findings be entered is that Varela had previously been sentenced as an adult. At sentencing, the state presented evidence that Varela had previously been convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon. As a result of this crime, he was sentenced to two years of community control followed by probation on 19 March 1993. He committed the current offense on 15 June 1993. His trial attorney did not contest the accuracy of the crime as reported in the pre-disposition report, but suggested that Varela should receive nine years in the DOC.
Section 39.022(5)(d), Florida Statutes (1993) states that a child who has been previously transferred and found to have committed the offense “shall thereafter be handled in every respect as if [t]he [child] were an adult for any subsequent violation of Florida law, unless the court, pursuant to this paragraph, imposes juvenile sanctions under s. 39.059.” The prior felony conviction allowed the trial court to sentence Varela as an adult.
Varela’s attorney also specifically waived the necessity of entering written findings. The following colloquy occurred between the trial court and Varela’s attorney:
THE COURT: Okay, looks to me like he was sentenced as an adult. It just means I don’t have to make a separate finding, and he ordered both a PSI and a PDR. I guess, Mr. Deen, I can go through all the machinations of determining that he needs to be sentenced as an adult, if you think that is necessary.
MR. DEEN: I don’t.
THE COURT: Okay. Do you agree that he had been previously sentenced as an adult, and the court is not required to make those findings?
MR. DEEN: Yes.
After review of the plea and sentencing proceedings, we hold that the waiver of the necessity to enter contemporaneous written findings pursuant to section 39.059(7), Florida Statutes (1993), was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made by Varela after consultation with his attorney. State v. Berry, 647 So. 2d 830 (Fla.1994). As noted above, the court thoroughly explained to Varela the effect of his waiver. We affirm the judgment and the sentence.
AFFIRMED.
COBB and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur. . § 812.13(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1993).
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Norris v. State, 659 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)…enter written reasons for imposing an adult sentence as required by section 39.059(7)(d), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994). We conclude that Norris waived his right to challenge the trial court’s decision to sentence him as an adult. In Varela v. State, 650 So. 2d 683, 684 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), we held that a juvenile could waive the requirement of contemporaneous written findings pursuant to section 39.059(7). In this ease, Norris appeared at sentencing with his mother and his attorney. The following colloquy occ…
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Street v. State, 665 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)…t required to make the written findings if the juvemle has been sentenced previously as an adult or intelligently and knowingly waives the right to be sentenced as a juvemle. See Norris v. State, 659 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Varela v. State, 650 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). Those exceptions are not present in this case. Because of the trial court’s error in failing to make written individualized findings, we vacate Street’s sentence and remand for resentencing. We are aware that section 39.059(7)(…
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Dontae Brown v. State, 692 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)…6); Roberts v. State, 677 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). Sentence VACATED; REMANDED. DAUKSCH and GOSHORN, JJ., concur. . § 812.13, Fla.Stat. . § 39.059(7)(c), Fla.Stat. (1993); Walker v. State, 656 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Varela v. State, 650 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Parks v. State, 637 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Learnhart Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 1984)
- Troutman v. State, 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1993)
- Edler v. State, 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1993)
- State v. Fletcher Berry, 647 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 1994)