CLIFF ANTHONY JACKSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Jackson appealed the dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his three armed-robbery convictions and felony murder conviction violated double jeopardy. The First District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, finding that Jackson's claims were cognizable under Rule 3.800(a) and that his second argument regarding double sentencing for felony murder and the underlying armed robbery may have merit under the Hegstrom rule.
The court held that Jackson's claims attacked his sentences, not his convictions, and were therefore cognizable under Rule 3.800(a). The court rejected his first argument as a matter of law, finding that multiple robberies of one entity are a single-episode case allowing separate sentences. However, the court found merit in his second argument that sentencing for both felony murder and the underlying armed robbery may violate double jeopardy under the Hegstrom rule.
[1] A motion to correct an illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) is cognizable when a defendant challenges the imposition of sentences, not the c…
[2] Under case law existing at the time of the offenses, multiple sentences could be imposed for several crimes committed within a single criminal episode, even if those crim…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We conclude that Jackson did not challenge his convictions, but instead attacked only his sentences under case law existing at the time he committed his offenses. Accordingly, the trial court should have considered the merits of his arguments under rule 3.800(a).”
Establishes that Rule 3.800(a) is the proper vehicle for challenging sentences rather than convictions.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1982, Jackson and an accomplice committed an armed robbery of a savings and loan association, killing a police officer and wounding another. Jackso…
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ERVIN, Judge.
Cliff Jackson appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his motion to correct illegal sentence. Because the trial court incorrectly determined that Jackson’s claims were not cognizable under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Jackson and an accomplice committed an armed robbery of a savings and loan association in 1982, during which they killed a police officer and wounded another. Jackson pled guilty and was convicted of felony murder, attempted murder, and three counts of armed robbery. He asserts that the three armed-robbery sentences were imposed for his removal of money from the cash drawers of three tellers. Jackson received a life sentence for the murder conviction, with a 25-year minimum mandatory sentence, and concurrent life sentences for each additional conviction.
Jackson filed a motion pursuant to rule 3.800(a), claiming that under the double-jeopardy clause, he could not be sentenced separately for three counts of armed robbery which occurred during the same criminal episode, nor could he be sentenced separately for armed robbery and felony murder, as the underlying felony was armed robbery.
The trial court addressed only the first argument and dismissed the motion, holding that Jackson’s double-jeopardy challenge applied to his convictions, rather than his sentences, and thus his motion was not cognizable under rule 3.800(a). The court construed the motion as being one pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and concluded that it was untimely, because it was filed more than two years after his convictions had become final and did not fall within any recognized exception to the two-year limitation.
We cannot agree.
We conclude that Jackson did not challenge his convictions, but instead attacked only his sentences under case law existing at the time he committed his offenses.
Accordingly, the trial court should have considered the merits of his arguments under rule 3.800(a).
We nevertheless reject as a matter of law Jackson’s first argument. When Jackson committed his offenses, case law held that if a defendant is convicted of multiple counts which are facets of the same transaction, known as a single-transaction ease, only one sentence may be imposed for the highest offense charged. Cone v. State, 285 So. 2d 12 (Fla.1973); Fundak v. State, 362 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
Committing multiple robberies of one entity involving several victims, however, is considered a single-episode case, not a single-transaction case. Brown v. State, 430 So. 2d 446 (Fla.1983); O’Neal v. State, 323 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), cert. denied, 334 So. 2d 607 (Fla.1976); Harris v. State, 286 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973).
In single-episode cases, a defendant may be convicted and sentenced for committing several crimes within a single criminal episode.1
In contrast, the trial court did not address Jackson’s second argument relating to his sentences for both felony murder and the underlying armed robbery, which may be a valid claim under rule 3.800. In State v. Hegstrom, 401 So. 2d 1343 (Fla.1981), the court held that a defendant may be convicted of felony murder and the underlying felony of robbery, but could not be sentenced for both, in that multiple sentences violate the double-jeopardy clause. In the case at bar, Jackson committed his offenses of felony murder and armed robbery as the underlying felony, on October 19, 1982, and was convicted and sentenced in March 1983; therefore, the Hegstrom rule applied,2 and Jackson should not at such time have been sentenced for both crimes, although the convictions were proper.
Therefore, we reverse the dismissal of the motion and remand the case with directions to the trial court to consider whether Heg-strom applies to Jackson’s sentences, and, if so, whether his guilty plea precludes him from collaterally attacking his sentence.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
MINER and WOLF, JJ., concur. . Moreover, section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (1977), enacted in 1976, abrogated the single-transaction rule. Borges v. State, 415 So. 2d 1265 (Fla.1982).
. Hegstrom, however, was overruled four years later. State v. Enmund, 476 So. 2d 165 (Fla.1985) (holding that an underlying felony is not a necessarily lesser included offense of felony murder; consequently a defendant may be convicted and sentenced for both felony murder and the underlying felony).
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Darin S. Hopping v. State, 674 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…away, 658 So. 2d 983 (Fla.1995). Prior to Davis, this court determined that when only the sentence, not the conviction, is attacked as violating double jeopardy, the claim was cognizable as an illegal sentence under rule 3.800. See Jackson v. State, 650 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). [*906] In Lee v. State, 667 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), we recognized a possible distinction between the issue addressed in Davis, which involved the filing of contemporaneous written reasons for a guidelines departure sente…
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James Ray Parish v. State, 249 So. 3d 734 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)…re the vacation of the corresponding conviction, and the error is otherwise identifiable on the face of the record, Williams v. State, 957 So. 2d 600, 602 (Fla. 2007), the claim is cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) motion. See also Jackson v. State, 650 So. 2d 1026, 1027 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (reversing dismissal of motion to correct sentence where postconviction court did not address claim that Hegstrom applied, thus making Jackson's sentence for armed robbery illegal). ---PAGE 3--- At the time Parish was c…
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Hood v. State, 851 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)…e had completed his sentence when he completed his term of incarceration. Double jeopardy claims are cognizable under rule 3.800(a) when such errors are apparent on the record. See Hopping v. State, 708 So. 2d 263, 265 (Fla.1998); Jackson v. State, 650 So. 2d 1026, 1027-28 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Valdes v. State, 765 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). The appellant is correct that he cannot receive an additional sentence after fully satisfying his original sentence. Once the appellant’s 1998 sentence to five y…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Borges v. State, 415 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 1982)
- Cone v. State, 285 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1973)
- State v. Hegstrom, 401 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 1981)
- State v. Rivers, 401 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 1981)
- State v. Carney, 476 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1985)
- State v. Enmund, 476 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1985)
- Brown v. State, 430 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1983)
- Fundak v. State, 362 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Harris v. State, 286 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- O'Neal v. State, 323 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)