JACOB D. HANGEN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Jacob Hangen appeals the denial of his Rule 3.800 motion challenging his sentencing as an adult for aggravated battery and battery. The court affirmed, holding that because Hangen had been previously found to have committed an offense and transferred to adult criminal prosecution in Duval County, he was thereafter required to be treated as an adult for all subsequent violations under Florida law.
The court held that once a child has been transferred for criminal prosecution and found to have committed an offense, the child must thereafter be handled in every respect as if an adult for any subsequent violation of Florida law. Therefore, no new individualized findings were required at the subsequent sentencing, and the trial court properly treated Hangen as an adult based on the prior Duval County determination.
[1] A prior judicial determination that a juvenile is to be handled as an adult for all future violations means that subsequent courts are not required to make new findings t…
[2] Once a juvenile has been transferred for criminal prosecution and found to have committed an offense, they shall thereafter be handled in every respect as an adult for an…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Once a child has been transferred for criminal prosecution pursuant to a voluntary or an involuntary waiver hearing or information and has been found to have committed the offense for which he is transferred or a lesser included offense, the child shall thereafter be handled in every respect as if he were an adult for any subsequent violation of Florida law”
This statutory provision establishes the governing rule that prior transfer to adult status automatically requires adult treatment for subsequent violations
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHangen entered a nolo plea to charges of aggravated battery and battery in St. Johns County in May 1992, receiving a 12-year sentence. In March 1991, …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Juvenile Sanctions cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The defendant, Jacob Hangen, appeals the denial of his 3.800 motion. This motion stems from his nolo plea to the charges of aggravated battery and battery in St. Johns County in May 1992. In return, three other counts were waived. He received a 12-year sentence. Hangen contests the fact that he was sentenced as an adult. Hangen claims the trial judge did not make the necessary findings that he be sentenced as an adult. The trial judge doesn’t dispute that he did not make the findings but says he doesn’t have to because in a previous case in Duval County in March 1991 Hangen was found to be an adult. The judge attached a copy of the Duval County order declaring him an adult for all future proceedings. The trial court is correct.
It is true that usually before a juvenile can be sentenced as an adult the trial court has to determine if adult sanctions are suitable by considering each of the criteria set forth in section 39.059(7)(c), Florida Statutes. Further, while recently changed by statute, the law which existed at the time Hangen was treated as an adult required specifics:
“In so doing, the trial court must give an individualized evaluation of how a particular juvenile fits within the criteria. Mere conclusory language that tracks the statutory criteria is insufficient. Jackson v. State, 588 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Youngblood v. State, 560 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Ervin v. State, 561 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).”
McCoy v. State, 632 So. 2d 181, 182 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), quoting Troutman v. State, 630 So. 2d 528, 531 (Fla.1993); and citing Kelly v. State, 605 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); and Tighe v. State, 571 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).
Although that was the law in effect at the time, this line of case law still does not apply to Hangen’s circumstances. Section 39.022(5)(d), Florida Statutes, states:
Once a child has been transferred for criminal prosecution pursuant to a voluntary or an involuntary waiver hearing or information and has been found to have committed the offense for which he is transferred or a lesser included offense, the child shall thereafter be handled in every respect as if he were an adult for any subsequent violation of Florida law, unless the court, pursuant to this paragraph, imposes juvenile sanctions under s. 39.059(e).1
According to the Duval County Circuit Court order, Hangen was found to have committed the offense of aggravated assault. Therefore, the St. Johns County Circuit Court was right in treating Hangen as an adult for this subsequent violation.
AFFIRMED.
DAUKSCH, COBB and PETERSON, JJ., concur. . As part of the overall re-working of the juvenile justice system, both §§ 39.022, and 39.059, Florida Statutes, have since been amended. The amended versions took effect October 1, 1994. The provision of § 39.022 above is now found— in slightly different language — under § 39.0587(l)(e)(4). Under the amended § 39.059: “Any decision to impose adult sanctions must be in writing, but is presumed appropriate, and the court is not required to set forth specific findings or enumerate the criteria in the subsection as any basis for its decision to impose adult sanctions.” § 39.059(7)(d), Fla.Stat.; see Shaw v. State, 645 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Springer v. State, 660 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…ces between the failure to enter contemporaneous reasons for a departure sentence and the failure to enter written findings justifying adult sanctions for a juvenile offender under section 39.059(7)(c), Florida Statutes (1991).1 Cf. Hangen v. State, 651 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (reaching the merits of a Rule 3.800 claim that juvenile offender was sentenced as an adult without the trial court having entered the requisite findings); see generally, Hill v. State, 438 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (challen…
-
Kison Evans v. State, 672 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…209, section 51, Laws of Fla. However, this amendment did not take effect until October 1,1994, long after Evans committed his offense as a juvenile and was sentenced as an adult.1 This amendment, then, would not apply to Evans. Cf. Hangen v. State, 651 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Shaw v. State, 645 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). An illegal sentence may be raised at any time. As the trial judge did not conclusively refute this claim of illegal sentence, the [*555] order denying post conviction relief is…
-
State v. Gallagher, 664 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)…PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. Hangen v. State, 651 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Kepner v. State, 577 So. 2d 576 (Fla.1991). PETERSON, C.J., and GOSHORN and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- Troutman v. State, 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1993)
- Edler v. State, 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1993)
- Tighe v. State, 571 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)
- Jackson v. State, 588 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)
- McCOY v. State, 632 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- Youngblood v. State, 560 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)
- Shaw v. State, 645 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- Amador v. Valdez, 561 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- Ervin v. State, 561 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- Nacion v. Salon Dejan, Inc., 605 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)