FRED CLARK, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Fred Clark appeals an order denying his Rule 3.850 motion for relief from a conviction and sentence for second-degree murder. Although the plea agreement offered by the trial judge was technically unauthorized and lacked mutuality of obligation, the court affirmed the conviction because the state and court subsequently performed under the agreement, curing the defect through their executed conduct.
The court affirmed the conviction and denied Clark relief. Although the plea offer was initially unauthorized and lacked mutuality, the defect was cured when the state and court subsequently performed their obligations under the agreement. Under contract principles applied to plea agreements, an executed contract lacking initial mutuality becomes binding when the other party accepts its benefits.
[1] A plea agreement lacking mutuality at its inception may become binding upon performance by the parties.
[2] A defendant who accepts the benefits of a plea agreement cannot later avoid its burdens.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“although a contract is lacking in mutuality at its inception, such defect may be cured by the subsequent conduct of the parties. Want of mutuality is no defense in the case of an executed contract, and a promise lacking mutuality at its inception becomes binding on the promisor after performance by the promisee.”
Establishes the core legal principle that defects in mutuality can be cured by subsequent performance, supporting the court's decision to enforce the plea agreement despite its initial defect.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceClark was charged with first-degree murder with a firearm. The circuit judge offered Clark multiple plea options, including one (Option B) involving a…
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
The defendant appeals from an order denying his 3.850 motion for relief from the conviction and sentence imposed after he pled guilty to second degree murder. We affirm.
Clark was charged with first degree murder with a firearm. At trial, the circuit judge presented the defendant with a number of plea options; they were:
A) Defendant could take a polygraph examination regarding his involvement in the homicide at issue. If he passed the test, the indictment would be dismissed and, if he failed the test, he would stand trial on the indictment and the results of the test would be admissible against him.
B) Defendant could plead guilty to the charges and, if he passed the test, then the plea would be vacated and the indictment dismissed. -If he failed the test, then the court would reduce the charge to second degree murder and sentence Defendant to 40 years in prison, with a three-year minimum mandatory for the use of a firearm.
C) Defendant could plead guilty to second degree murder and receive a sentence of 15 years with a three-year minimum mandatory for the use of a firearm.
D) Defendant could exercise his right to proceed to a jury trial on the charges in the indictment.
(Ex. B.; T. 2-11).
While the state objected to all three options, after consulting with counsel, the defendant eventually chose “Option B.” In accordance with it, he pled guilty, took the polygraph, and failed it. The state then fulfilled the terms of the agreement by reducing the charge to second degree murder, and Clark was duly sentenced, as promised, to forty years with a three-year minimum mandatory. As the defendant was informed below and now urges, it is true that the plea offer-— made in accordance with his usual practice by the particular circuit judge in question— was unauthorized and, because the state was not bound to dismiss if Clark passed the polygraph, was then unenforceable for lack of mutuality of obligation. See State v. Serra, 529 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); State v. Perez, 524 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). Nevertheless, after Clark accepted the offer, the state and the court — although they were not legally bound to do so — in fact fulfilled their part of the bargain by reducing the capital offense of first degree murder to second degree and granting the defendant the sentence previously proffered. In these circumstances, applying the contract principles which have regularly been applied to plea agreements such as this, see Madrigal v. State, 545 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), the pertinent rule is that
[although a contract is lacking in mutuality at its inception, such defect may be cured by the subsequent conduct of the parties. Want of mutuality is no defense in the case of an executed contract, and a promise lacking mutuality at its inception becomes binding on the promisor after performance by the promisee.
17 C.J.S. Contracts § 100(3), at 799-800 (1963) (footnotes omitted), quoted in City of South Miami v. Dembinsky, 423 So. 2d 988, 989 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), and Wright & Seaton, Inc. v. Prescott, 420 So. 2d 623, 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
Having accepted its benefits by avoiding a life sentence without parole, [the defendant] cannot, any more than any other contracting party, be relieved of the burden of his contract.
Novaton v. State, 634 So. 2d 607, 608 (Fla.1994) (citing Madrigal v. State; Jacobs v. State, 522 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), review denied, 531 So. 2d 1353 (Fla.1988); Preston v. State, 411 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), review denied, 418 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 1982); Smith v. State, 345 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 678 (Fla.1977)).
Affirmed.
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State v. Frazier, 697 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…agreement and continue the prosecution against them, the trial court ordered the cases dismissed and the state has taken this appeal. We affirm. Applying the rules of contract law applicable to plea agreements, like all others, see Clark v. State, 651 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), review denied, 660 So. 2d 712 (Fla.1995); Novaton v. State, 610 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), approved, 634 So. 2d 607 (Fla.1994); Madrigal v. State, 545 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), it is clear that the younger Fraziers were…
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Murry v. Zynyx Mktg. Commc'ns Inc., 774 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…ity at its inception becomes binding on the promisor after performance by the promisee. See Russell v. Martin, 88 So. 2d 315 (Fla.1956); Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla., Inc. v. Pinnock, 735 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). See also Clark v. State, 651 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Madrigal v. State, 545 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). Accordingly, even if there was a lack of mutuality in the contract under review at its inception, the contract has been performed by both sides and such lack of mutuality pres…
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Flagship Resort Dev. Corp. v. Interval Int'l, Inc., 28 So. 3d 915 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)…conduct of the parties.” Wright & Seaton, Inc. v. Prescott, 420 So. 2d 623, 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (quoting 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 100(3), at 799-800 (1963)); see also Ponce Dev. Co. v. Espino, 449 So. 2d 317, 319 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Clark v. State, 651 So. 2d 1309, 1310 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). Flagship relies on Espino for the proposition that only full and complete performance will cure a lack of mutuality of obligation. See Espino, 449 So. 2d at 318-19. We find Flagship’s argument unpersuasive, as this Court i…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (12 total)
- Novaton v. State, 634 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 1994)
- Wright & Seaton, Inc. v. Prescott, 420 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Domingo Antonio Madrigal v. State, 545 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
- Ruiz v. State, 411 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Gulf Mach. Co. & Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Avant, 345 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
- Smith v. State, 345 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- Preston v. State, 411 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Young v. State, 522 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Jacobs v. State, 522 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- City OF S. Miami v. Dembinsky, 423 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)